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Abstract
The Pacific Ocean contributes more than 50 percent to global tuna production. The
central and eastern regions have the most productive tuna fisheries in the Pacific. These
regions include countries that are signatories to the Parties to the Nauru Agreement
(PNA), a coalition of eight countries rich in tuna resources.
In 2007 the PNA introduced the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS), an effort or input based
management scheme. Under the VDS, licenses to fish in PNA exclusive economic zones
(EEZ) are sold on a ‘per-day effort’ basis. Each member country is assigned a share of
the licenses which are specific to each country. Each country is responsible for the sale
of its licenses, the majority of which are sold by auction to foreign fishing fleets. A key
aim of the PNA countries is to ensure the future health of the fishery, while maximizing
the returns from this important source of income. This thesis attempts to contribute to
this effort by examining the PNA and the VDS to analyse two key questions.
The first question is whether the PNA should switch from the VDS to an output
based regulation scheme, where licenses are sold based on the catch size. As an effort
based scheme, the VDS has only indirect control of the landed catch size of each vessel,
and a key criticism is that there is no upper limit on the size of the catch. Not only
could the catch value be higher than the license revenue, this has also led to concerns
about the sustainability of the fishery. The second question is whether a single global
license allowing access to all countries would have any significant benefits over the current
licenses which are specific to each country. Basic economic theory suggests that selling
licenses individually yields lower revenue levels, relative to selling licenses as a coalition.
However, a key consideration is a sharing rule that would be used to distribute revenue
shares from a single license. An independent review of the VDS in 2014 recommended
these two issues, among others, for further analysis. I address these questions in three
steps.
First, I introduce heterogeneity of fishing vessels into the standard textbook model
for a single fishery and show that in this single country case, revenue from output regu-
lation is always higher relative to input regulation. Although this result is important, it
provides limited insight into a multi-country setting such as the PNA, which has addi-
tional dynamics between countries. Second, extending this model to a two country case
the analysis suggests that under ideal conditions, output regulation still yields higher
income levels. However, in this multi-country setting each fishing vessel has to choose
which country to buy licenses from. This additional dynamic reveals that without the
assumption of perfect information for the fishery manager, achieving the target harvest
and stock levels set by the manager can be difficult.
Finally, I compare the returns from selling a single global license relative to individual
local licenses by developing a revenue sharing mechanism based on the distribution of fish
stocks over each member country. The results show that a single license not only yields
greater revenue levels, but also provides a more stable revenue stream over time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Pacific Ocean contributes more than 50 percent to global tuna production (FAO
2010). The central and eastern regions have the most productive tuna fisheries in the
Pacific. These regions include countries that are signatories to the Parties to the Nauru
Agreement (PNA), a coalition of eight Pacific Island Countries (PICs) known to be rich
in tuna (Aqorau 2009). The returns from these fisheries represent a significant source
of income for the PNA members. In 2007 the PNA introduced the Vessel Day Scheme
(VDS), an effort or input based management scheme. Under the VDS, licenses to fish in
PNA exclusive economic zones (EEZ) are sold on a ‘per-day effort’ basis. A license gives
fishing vessels the right to fish for one day. As a coalition the PNA sets the total allowable
catch (TAC) to be harvested in their combined EEZ. An estimated total allowable effort
(TAE) level is then determined which would yield the TAC. The TAE determines the
total number of fishing days in a season. Each member country is assigned a share of
the TAE, to be sold as licenses which only allows access to the seller’s EEZ. Due to the
increased bargaining power of the coalition, the VDS significantly increased the returns
of fishing revenues to the PNA members.
As an effort based scheme, the VDS has only indirect control of the landed catch
size of each vessel. The key criticism of the VDS is that there is no upper limit on the
size of the catch. As the catch value is potentially higher than the value of the returns
from the sale of licenses, revenue levels may not be maximized. In addition, the number
of total allocated catch days, and total catch tonnage have steadily increased since the
implementation of the VDS. This has led to concerns that the PNA fishery may be
potentially over-fished in the near future if this trend continues. As a result, proposals
have been made for a move to the relatively more established output based management
scheme, where licenses are sold per unit of harvest. Under such an arrangement, fishing
vessels pay for the right to catch a certain quantity of fish, most likely measured in
tonnage.
A key aim of the PNA countries is to ensure the future health of the fishery, while
maximizing the returns from this important source of income. This thesis attempts to
contribute to this effort by examining the PNA and the VDS to develop models tailored
specifically at examining two key questions. The first question is whether the PNA
should switch from the VDS to an output based regulation scheme. The second question
is whether a single global license allowing access to all countries would be preferred
over the current licenses which are specific to each country. An independent review
of the VDS was conducted by Anarson (2014) at the request of the PNA. The review
was comprehensive and made several recommendations related to governance, design, as
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well as legal aspects of the VDS. Among these were recommendations that research be
conducted on the two issues which form the core research questions of this thesis.
The first question was brought to the forefront of the policy agenda in the Pacific
Island community, particularly in the last five years primarily due to concerns about
overfishing. The proponents of a quota based scheme highlighted its success in other
countries, and suggest that this would carry over to the PNA case. There are two problems
with this point of view. Firstly, as far as the author is aware, specific comparisons between
input and output regulation have not been made in the fisheries economics literature.
One of the reasons for this is that the current models considered as standard in the field,
cannot distinguish between the two management schemes as the outcomes are identical.
Secondly, the experiences of output regulation in other fisheries may not be relevant
in the PNA context. The PNA as an institution is unique, and the mechanisms that
it employs to manage the fishery draws together many different aspects of economics
which are complex in their own right. Cooperative management of a fishery at the scale
or complexity of the PNA has not been attempted anywhere else in the world. A key
consideration for a switch to harvest based licenses is how well the PNA will be able to
monitor harvest levels. For these reasons it may be a mistake to suggest that success in
other fisheries will carry over to the PNA, without considering the unique circumstances
and context of the PNA.
The second question asks whether a single license for the entire coalition could be a
superior approach to license sales, as compared the current practice of members selling
country specific licenses. Regionalism is a key component of the development agenda for
the Pacific Islands region as a whole, and the PNA is a prime example of this approach.
Although a single license for the PNA is not a topic that is currently visible within the
policy agenda of the PNA, consideration of such a mechanism would add value to the
overarching theme of regionalism. Basic economic theory suggests that the advantages
from selling a single licenses relative to competing as sellers could be significant. A single
license would allow the PNA to act as a monopoly, raising prices to extract as much
profit from the fishery as possible. However, characterizing these advantages as well as a
mechanism to share the revenue among members of the PNA is not a trivial exercise.
Given the scale and complexity of the PNA, it is necessary to address these issues
in smaller more manageable steps, with added assumptions to further simplify and focus
the analysis on the core issues under consideration.
First I provide a background of the PNA and the VDS in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 I
introduce heterogeneity of fishing vessels into the standard textbook model for a single
fishery and show that in this single country case, revenue from output regulation is always
higher relative to input regulation. Although this result is important, it provides limited
insight into a multi-country setting such as the PNA, which has additional dynamics
between countries. In Chapter 4, I extend this model to a two country case which is a
simplification of the eight-country PNA case. The results from this analysis suggests that
under ideal conditions, output regulation is still predicted to yield higher income levels.
However, in this multi-country setting each fishing vessel has to choose which country to
buy licenses from. This additional dynamic reveals that without the assumption of perfect
information for the fishery manager, achieving the target harvest and stock levels set by
the manager can be very difficult. Together the results from Chapter 3 and 4 suggests
that selling a single licenses would greatly simplify the management of the fishery and
yield higher income levels. In Chapter 5, I compare the returns from selling a single global
license relative to individual local licenses by developing a revenue sharing mechanism
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that can incorporate both approaches. The results show that a single license yields not
only yields greater revenue levels, but also a more stable revenue stream over time.
The policy discussions in each of Chapter 4, 5, and 6 considers both PNA specific
as well as broader fishery management perspectives. Chapter 6 is dedicated to policy
implications specific to the PNA and the VDS considering insights from all three of
the core chapters together. There are three general implications suggested by the results.
First, a clear recommendation for a switch to harvest based licenses from the VDS may not
be relevant. Second, the results strongly suggest the consideration of a single license that
gives fishing vessels access to all countries. The final implication is that more research
needs to conducted to validate these results, and examine the conditions necessary to
support these results.
To provide some intuition about the problem, it may be useful to understand the
general process in which fishing harvest and effort targets are set. First the manager
determines the steady state stock levels that correspond to a management goal. Harvest
rates that will maintain this steady state stock level are then determined, and an effort
level that will achieve this harvest level is also found. Under output regulation, licenses
are sold based on the harvest level. Under input regulation, licenses are sold based on the
effort level. Under ideal circumstances the manager has perfect information about the
world and would set an effort level that achieves the exact harvest target. In this case
the two management schemes would be identical. However, the manager does not have
perfect information about the world, and it is therefore very difficult to set an effort level
which would achieve the exact target harvest levels. One example why this can be so
hard is fishermen behavior called effort creep, where limiting effort levels by the manager
leads to investments into fishing technology to increase productivity and catch more fish.
Usually these investments are made without the knowledge of the fishery manager to
achieve higher profit levels. A key simplifying assumption made by the standard model
is that the fishing vessels are identical. This makes characterizing the solution simpler,
but does not address the perfect information assumption even though the results under
input and output regulation are identical.
The majority of studies examining fisheries management generally assume that fisher-
men are included as primary stakeholders, such that their welfare is a key consideration.
The approach taken in each of the chapters presented in this thesis is that the welfare
of the fishing vessels are secondary to the PNA member countries. The main reason for
this is that the majority of the fishing fleet are foreign fishing vessels who have very little
influence on the policies of the PNA and are generally not concerned about the welfare
of the member countries. These foreign fishing fleets have long enjoyed highly lucrative
returns at the expense of PNA members, and this viewpoint serves to shift focus towards
the PNA’s efforts to improve their returns from this fishery.
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Chapter 2
The Parties to the Nauru Agreement
and the Vessel Day Scheme
The majority of countries in the Central and West Pacific are at low levels of devel-
opment. Aside from significant marine resources, most have very few natural resources.
Revenues from fisheries within their EEZ provide an important source of income for these
countries. The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was established in 1979 to
facilitate regional co-operation and co-ordination between Pacific Island countries (PIC)
with respect to fisheries policies. After the adoption of the exclusive economic zones
(EEZ) in 1982, the majority of fishing in PIC waters were carried out by distant water
fishing nations, as the island nations had no capacity for commercial fishing. However
distant water fishing nations strategized in bilateral negotiations to reduce access fees
to fisheries resources, and commercial fishing fleets under-reported their catch sizes to
further reduce fees.
As a result, in 1982 the seven countries in the FFA with the most productive tuna
fisheries formed the Parties to the Nauru Agreement in an effort to coordinate their
approach to foreign fishing fleets. The primary goal was to improve access fee payments,
improve catch and effort data, as well as maintain a sustainable harvest of the resource.
The formation of the PNA allowed the members to impose rules governing the conduct of
any vessel that wanted to fish for tuna in their EEZ. Despite these efforts, the economic
rents from the commercial harvesting of tuna did not increase as expected, as fishing
vessels still under-reported their catch sizes. It was difficult for officials to correctly
evaluate the catch size as the quota system depended on log book and observer data,
and it was not mandatory for vessels to unload their catch at predetermined ports for
verification (Havice 2013).
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
PNA EEZ 44,253 47,403 42,855 43,808 43,060 32,798
PNA AW 6,273 8,670 8,811 7,636 6,775 3,942
Total 50,526 56,073 51,666 51,444 49,836 36,739
Table 2.1: Purse seine log-sheet effort days of fishing vessels operating in PNA EEZ and
archipelagic waters. Source: WCPF (2014)
In 2007, the PNA introduced an effort based management scheme known as the Vessel
Day Scheme (VDS). A limit on total allowable effort (TAE) fishing days in a season is
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Vessel Length Frequency
0-50 8
51-60 22
61-70 76
71-80 145
81-90 9
91-100 2
100+ 6
Total 268
Table 2.2: Purse seine fishing vessels in good standing and approved to operate in FFA
EEZ and archipelagic waters,as of August 2016. Source: FFA (2016a)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FSM 136,513 125,179 152,702 152,396 181,377 209,345 133,406 161,009
Kiribati 227,940 304,217 185,147 187,186 534,558 283,861 707,278 616,874
RMI 25,268 12,956 17,369 20,853 24,836 39,655 77,248 30,352
Nauru 62,755 61,280 108,580 97,743 52,138 163,404 179,269 66,527
Palau 4,040 950 347 0 737 310 2,670 185
PNG 493,040 480,520 726,652 619,763 580,593 585,877 336,709 186,247
Solomon Is. 123,434 117,235 162,989 158,197 77,363 111,456 57,015 102,794
Tuvalu 40,010 62,858 64,791 55,983 66,437 54,155 95,919 78,999
Total 1,113,000 1,165,195 1,418,577 1,292,121 1,518,039 1,448,063 1,589,514 1,242,987
Table 2.3: Catch size in thousands of metric tonnes per PNA country. Source: FFA
(2016a)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FSM 245 159 209 290 395 422 212 226
Kiribati 404 359 241 333 1172 597 1067 773
RMI 44 16 23 37 54 83 116 40
Nauru 110 74 144 172 114 344 271 86
Palau 8 1.5 0.53 0 1.8 0.54 6.4 0.25
PNG 878 604 1,018 1,159 1,282 1,227 548 260
Solomon Is. 217 147 214 283 170 235 91 134
Tuvalu 69 74 83 98 143 113 142 96
Total 1,975 1,435 1,933 2,372 3,332 3,022 2,453 1,615
Table 2.4: Estimated value of catch in millions of USD per PNA country. Source: FFA
(2016a)
distributed to members based on historical catch data and the proportion of total stock in
each country. Licenses bought from one country are valid only in the EEZ of that country.
License days for parties could be sold between PNA members to allow for variability in
income due to differences in fish stocks and other shocks. The revenues from the VDS
depends on two taxes. The first is an access fee to register vessels with the PNA, which
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FSM 17 20 18 19 27 35 47 50
Kiribati 27 22 39 31 60 84 127 146
RMI 3.6 2.2 2.9 7.2 7.3 11 17 20
Nauru 10 6.7 12 13 11 13 21 35
Palau 2.3 0.97 1.6 1.8 4.7 5.4 5.8 8.4
PNG 46 31 55 62 71 77 93 94
Solomon Is. 18 15 19 24 23 25 27 41
Tuvalu 7.9 7.5 9 9.1 9.6 12 14 27
Total 131.8 105.37 156.5 167.1 213.6 262.4 351.8 421.4
Table 2.5: Total revenue from fisheries in millions of USD per PNA country. Includes all
sources - US treaty, longlines access fees, as well as purse seine and other bilateral fishing
fees. Source: FFA (2016a)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Pacific Island 62 64 75 83 94 98 102
Foreign 211 202 204 189 191 181 137
Total 273 266 279 272 285 279 239
Table 2.6: Number of fishing vessels operating in PNA EEZ. Source: WCPF (2014)
allows vessels to bid for licenses. The second is the price of a license (for individual vessel
days) which allows vessels to fish. Licenses are auctioned by each country over the course
of a season with full discretion over the format and timing of the auction. Licenses are
specific to each country and allow vessels to fish only in the waters of the country that
they bought the licenses from. Licenses have a mandatory reserve price which applies
to the licenses for all the countries set by the PNA to discourage fishing vessels from
strategizing to reduce prices. When the VDS was introduced in 2007, licenses were sold
at a minimum of US $5,000 per day. The minimum price of a vessel day has increased to
the current level of US $8,000 (PNA 2014).
The VDS discriminates fishing vessels based on length, which is expected to account
for the assumption that larger vessels are more productive and can catch more fish in
a given time. Table 2.2 shows that purse-seine fishing vessels operating in the PNA
are not equivalent in size. Tidd et al. (2016) examined the PNA purse seine fleet of
approximately 105 to 135 vessels over an 18 year period from 1993 to 2010, to determine
the growth in productivity of the fishing fleet. They found that from the sample of 56
purse seiners who operated within the fishery over all 18 years, 27 showed significant
increases in productivity levels, 26 showed no significant increases in productivity, and 2
showed negative productivity growth. Growth in productivity for the 27 vessels varied
from 11 percent to 215 percent, demonstrating significant heterogeneity in productivity
levels of vessels operating in the PNA fishery. The study concluded that the majority
of the change in productivity was attributed to adoption of new technology rather than
changes in effort levels. This is a prime example of ‘effort creep’, a term which describes
the tendency of fishing vessels to improve their productivity levels to offset regulation
designed to reduce harvest levels. Another study by Hoff (2006) of 49 vessels in the danish
purse-seine fleet operating in the north sea, over 11 years from 1988 to 1999, found even
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higher variations in productivity growth levels, from 23 percent to 490 percent.
Vessels under 50 meters are assigned half a day, 50 to 80 meters are assigned one day,
and 80 meters or more are assigned 1.5 days. Fishing time begins as soon as a vessel
enters a EEZ, with strictly enforced exceptions. The key advantage of the VDS is the
simplification of the monitoring process which has been crucial to its success. All fishing
vessels are required to have GPS tracking systems, and observers from the PNA on board.
The significant disadvantage of the VDS is that there are no limits on how much fish can
be caught. Since the implementation of the VDS, the TAC set by members has decreased
slightly from 35,738 days in 2008 to 45,136 in 2012. However, the number of days actually
used by the members has increased from 31,432 in 2008 to 41,591 in 2012 (Havice 2013).
Economic analysis specific to the case of the PNA and the VDS is limited. Clarke
and G. R. Munro (1987), Clarke and G. R. Munro (1991) modeled the PNA and DWFN
interactions through a principal-agent game. These games look at mechanisms that the
principal (PNA) can impose to induce agents (fishing vessels) to behave in a certain
manner. In this case the mechanisms examined at were two taxes on catch and on effort
respectively. They concluded that use of either taxes individually would not result in an
optimal profit maximizing outcome for the PNA because of distortions to the incentives
of fishing vessels. Instead, if a tax-subsidy scheme were used with the both types of
taxes, a first best optimal solution would result. However, implementation of such a
scheme would most likely not be feasible. Tokunaga (2015) looked at the related problem
of transboundary fish stocks with non-seasonal movements. She concluded that prices
should be set according to the level of stock a country has. The implication is that the
PNA should set their prices independently of each other rather than a single overall price.
A report by Deiye 2007 considered side payments as a component of a long-term access
agreement for DWFN to the fishing grounds of Nauru. The paper arose out of concerns
about revenue fluctuations from the adaptation of the VDS. The findings suggest that
the side payments to the VDS as the best option to ensure long term revenue stability
with the highest returns (Deiye 2007).
An independent review of the VDS was conducted by Anarson (2014) at the request
of the PNA. The review was comprehensive and made several recommendations related
to governance, design of catch share and license allocation mechanisms, compliance and
transparency, optimal license levels and prices, as well as legal aspects of the VDS. Two
recommendations were made for further examination of two issues. The first is a switch
to harvest based licensing from the current effort based licensing. This issue has also
been discussed at meetings by the PNA (PNA 2012). The second is examination of
a homogeneous license that can be used over multiple countries. These two issues are
important as they would also include consideration of several other recommendations
made in the report. For example, optimal levels of licenses as well as prices would be
key components of any study that would look at these two issues. A broad review of
the global state of foreign fishing agreements was conducted by the World Bank (Arthur
et al. 2014) which made similar recommendations to the VDS review.
A key issue that is affecting fisheries worldwide is the prevalence of illegal and unre-
ported fishing (IUU). The World Bank report by Anarson, Kobayashi, and Fontaubert
(2017) estimates the worldwide loss from IUU at $83 billion in 2012. This is also a serious
issue for the Pacific tuna fishery as a whole, with an estimate by the Forum Fisheries
Agency (FFA 2016b) of $600 million worth of product either harvested or transhipped
involving IUU activity. The Pacific countries are actively working to improve monitoring
and surveillance, however the FFA (2016b) report also suggests that the majority of IUU
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is by fishing vessels that are licensed to operate in the Pacific region. This has impor-
tant implications for the PNA and the VDS as this suggests that stronger measures are
required to improve monitoring of fishing vessels. This is a key consideration on whether
a switch to harvest based licenses will be successful.
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneous Fishing Vessel
Model: Single Country Analysis
3.1 Introduction
As a resource manager, the PNA faces two challenges. The first is deciding as a collective
the total number of licenses to be sold to the fishing vessels. This determines the total
effort expended in the fishery, and in theory also determines the amount of tuna caught.
If the TAC is too high, there could be overfishing of the stock. If the TAC is too low,
the PNA will not be maximizing the income from the fishery. The second challenge is
to ensure that maximum revenues are derived from the sale of the licenses. Presently,
the total allowable catch (TAC) is set together as a coalition and then shared among
the member countries. The TAC determines the number of licenses, which are auctioned
individually by each country to the fishing vessels. Each license is tied to the country
that sold it, and so fishing vessels can only fish in the EEZ of the country that it bought
the license from. There are no restrictions on the arrangements of the auctions, aside
from a reserve price set by collective decision.
The primary goal of this study is to compare input regulation management scheme
to an output regulation management scheme for a single country. The standard bio-
economic model by Gordon (1954) and Smith (1968) predicts that harvest, stock levels
and revenue under both management schemes are identical. An alternative methodology
for evaluating and comparing each management scheme is required. I extend this standard
model by introducing heterogeneity of fishing vessels into the analysis, which allows for
differences between the solutions of the two management schemes to be determined. To
the authors knowledge, this specific problem has yet to be examined in detail. While the
assumption of heterogeneous fishermen is not new, the PNA problem is unique both in its
size and scale, as well the combination of the different dynamics involved. The standard
model is outlined as a benchmark, which allows for comparison of the heterogeneous
model to the standard model.
In the standard bio-economic model, a stock of fish X grows over time according to
a function g(X), and decreases by a harvest function h(X,E). This harvest function
h depends on stock size X, fishing effort E, and fishing vessel productivity q. This
productivity level q is also known as the catchability value, and represents the proportion
of the stock that can be captured with one unit of effort E. Fishing effort over time within
a body of water containing stock X, is a function of the net profits that can be derived
from fishing activities. If stock levels are high, then holding other factors constant profit
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levels are also high which incentivize fishermen to enter the fishery.
In order to determine the harvest level and the corresponding effort E to apply to a
fishery, the manager derives the stock size that corresponds to a particular management
goal such as open access, maximum sustainable yield (MSY), or optimal extraction. In
open access, steady state levels are found where net revenues are driven down to zero. In
MSY, equilibrium is where the growth function of X is maximized. In optimal extraction,
X and E are treated as control variables in a maximization problem and are determined
simultaneously to find steady state levels.
The amount of fishing can be controlled by limiting the effort level expended by the
fishing vessels, or by limiting the amount of fish caught. Under output regulation, licenses
are sold based on the harvest level which effectively controls the amount of fish caught.
Under input regulation, licenses are sold based on the effort level which controls the
amount of effort expended. Under ideal circumstances the effort level that the manager
sets will result in the exact target harvest level. However, in practice this is very difficult
to achieve. One reason is that under input regulation fishing vessels have incentive to
increase their productivity level to increase harvest rates while paying the same amount
for licenses. In general, it is a problem related to the imperfect information that the
fishery manager has about the fishery and the fishing vessels.
Despite this significant shortcoming, fishing vessel catchability value q is always as-
sumed to be constant in the standard models. As a result, the standard model predicts
that effort based and quota based management schemes are identical. In the real world
fishing vessels in the same fishery can be heterogenous with respect to the amount that
they catch. This characteristic can be explained by captains and crew with good ex-
perience and skill, who can consistently guide the fishing vessels to productive fishing
grounds. Table 2.2 outlines the PNA fishing fleet as of 2016, which shows that fishing
vessels within the PNA vary in size. Tidd et al. (2016) examined the PNA purse seine
fleet from 1993 to 2010 and found significant heterogeneity in productivity growth levels
of fishing vessels. This implies that the output regulation and input regulation will not
achieve the same steady state stock levels in practice. The harvest rate could be underes-
timated if q represents a lower than average catchability rate of fishing vessels. Similarly,
the harvest rate could be overestimated if the q represents a higher than average catcha-
bility rate of fishing vessels. If the fleet is large such as in the PNA, this could result in
harvest rates significantly different from predicted targets.
Adopting the heterogeneous fishing vessels assumption offers several advantages that
can overcome these issues. The primary advantage is that input and output regulation
can have different steady state predictions for harvest, stock and revenue levels allowing
for meaningful comparisons. Another advantage is that the marginal price that a fishing
vessel is willing to pay for a fishing license can be identified, allowing for endogenous de-
termination of participation in the fishery within the model. This reflects the real world
where more productive fishing vessels are willing to pay different higher prices for the
same license as a result of differing productivity and costs. A third advantage of hetero-
geneous catchability values is that it is possible to explore the effects of different auction
mechanisms. Finally, the inclusion of heterogeneous fishing vessels into the standard
models allows for examination of a multi-country fishery.
In the hetereogenous fishing vessels model, fishing vessels have a productivity value
measured by the catchability coefficient q, which is drawn from some distribution f(q).
Fishing vessels behave as static optimizers, maximizing a linear profit function over the
season. Define the marginal fisher as the fishing vessel which makes zero economic profit
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and has catchability rate q¯. Fishing vessels with productivity levels below q¯ will make
negative economic profit and are not be able to participate in the fishery, and vessel
above q¯ will make positive economic profit. This implies that the equilibrium clearing
price is determined by the cutoff catchability value q¯, such that only fishing vessels who
are productive enough can afford to buy licenses from the fishery. This allows the model
to endogenously determine participation in the fishery.
I examine the single country case where a fishery manager dynamically determines
the optimal output for maximizing revenues over the lifetime of the fishery. I charac-
terize steady state conditions for open access, maximum sustainable yield, and optimal
extraction. I provide a simulation based loosely on the parameters of the PNA and the
Ecuadorian purse-seine fishing fleet, which is intended to demonstrate how the model
operates. I include the standard textbook model as a benchmark for comparison.
The main result of this chapter is that the heterogeneous model shows that output
regulation yields higher revenues to the fishery manager compared to input based reg-
ulation schemes. As a result revenue to fishing vessels is higher under input regulation
relative to output regulation. The simulation exercise results reflects the theoretical pre-
dictions of the model. These findings suggests that the heterogeneous model provides
more accurate estimations of harvest size because fishing vessel variability is inherent in
the model. This offers not only a closer approximation of the real world, but also results
in less sensitivity to an error in the estimation in the values of q. This is especially
important for fisheries with large fishing fleets such as the PNA. These results leads to
the policy recommendation that in a single country setting, output regulation should
be adopted over output regulation if harvest levels can be monitored accurately. These
results provide a foundation for an extension of the model to multiple countries, which is
a closer match of the PNA case.
Only a handful of studies have examined the PNA problem specifically. Clarke and
G. R. Munro (1987), Clarke and G. R. Munro (1991) modeled the PNA and DWFN
interactions through a principal-agent game. They examined two taxes on catch and
on effort that the principal (PNA) can impose to induce fishing vessels to behave in a
certain manner. They concluded that use of either taxes individually would not result
in an optimal profit maximizing outcome for the PNA because of distortions to the
incentives of fishing vessels. Instead, a tax-subsidy scheme used with both types of taxes
would result in a first best optimal solution. However, such a scheme would be complex
and impractical to implement.
The majority of the literature on heterogeneous fishing vessels examines welfare effects
to fishermen moving from open access or common pool resource management, to some
type of property rights arrangement. Examining the case of the Texas shrimp fishery
Johnson and Libecap (1982) were one of the first to identify heterogeneity in fishermen
ability based on observed catch size. One approach to modeling heterogeneous fishermen
focus on variations in cost between fishermen. Coglan and Pascoe (1999) show that
using average performance measures is misleading in heterogeneous fisheries where costs
vary among fishermen, and can lead to undesirable management outcomes. Grainger and
Costello (2015) examine the transition from common pool to property rights, and find
that there will be some opposition from some incumbent fishermen. Pe´reau et al. (2012)
examine ITQ dynamics in a fishery with an explicit social objective and finds that success
of an ITQ scheme is only achieved under very specific outcomes and depends on the
degree of heterogeneity of the fishing vessels. Other approaches, similar to that taken in
this study, focus on the variations in ability measured by productivity levels. Terrebonne
17
(1995) examines the welfare of heterogenenous fishermen, and finds that private ownership
in the form of ITQs leads to an optimal outcome. Heaps (2003) re-examined the same
problem and found that Terrebonne’s results do not always hold, and that in transition
from open access to ITQ fishermen welfare may actually decrease. Merrifield (1999) takes
a different approach and suggests policies aimed at reducing heterogeneity in a bid to
reach an efficient outcome.
This study assumes that the market for licenses is large, and that there is a single
equilibrium price level where the market clears. Another key assumption is that fishing
vessels profit functions are linear in cost. Once again this allows for a simpler model,
which offsets the potential benefits of including a non-linear cost function. Overall it
does not affect the conclusion of the study by a great deal, because the fishing vessels
would have been identical with respect to costs associated with fishing. The model
assumes no cost for countries to sell licenses. In the simulation exercise, I assume that
fishing vessels productivity levels are uniformly distributed. The primary reason is for
tractability in calculating the theoretical solutions. Other distribution functions such as
the normal distribution could be better representation of the fishing fleet, however closed
form theoretical solutions are difficult to characterize.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the model for the paper. Section
3.3 provides a numerical illustration of the model. Section 3.4 provides a discussion of
the results and policy implications, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
Assume there is a country with a stock of tuna which grow according to a logistic function.
This country sells fishing licenses which allows fishing vessels to operate in its waters.
There is a fishing fleet of size N which can buy fishing licenses. In the standard model,
fishing vessels are homogeneous. In the hetereogenous fishing vessels model, fishing vessels
have a productivity value measured by the catchability coefficient q which is distributed
according to some function f(.). As a result the licenses have different values unique to
each fishing vessel, which depend on how much fish each vessel can catch. The abundance
of fish in a particular country is measured by the stock size X, which I assume is common
information. As fishing vessels catch fish, they deplete the fish stock. I assume that the
licenses are all sold at the beginning of the season, which implies a competitive market
with significant demand from a high number of fishing vessels. More productive fishing
vessels will catch more fish, and so they potentially have a higher valuation of a given
license day, relative to a less productive fishing vessel.
As a baseline, I outline the standard Gordon-Smith model calculating optimal extrac-
tion, open access and maximum sustainable yield levels for each fishery. I then introduce
into the Gordon-Smith model heterogeneous fishing vessels, and determine the clearing
price of a fishing license under input and output control, as a function of the productivity
level q of fishing vessels.
3.2.1 Homogenous Fishing Vessels
For the single country case, there are no possible inflows and outflows of tuna stocks from
outside sources. Stock levels evolve according to the standard equation
X˙t = g(Xt)− h(Xt, Et) (3.1)
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subject to
X0 = X¯ > 0
Et ≥ 0
where g(Xt) is a logistic growth function for the stock of fish X, and h(Xt, Et) is a harvest
function which depends on the stock level and effort level E applied to the fishery. Effort
E = eN is the total fishing effort for all fishing vessels, where e is the effort level for each
individual fishing vessel measured in days and N is the total number of fishing vessels.
Given that there are a finite number of days in a year, for each time period there is a
maximum effort level Emax = emaxN that is equal to the maximum effort level in a season
multiplied by the number of all the fishing vessels operating in the fishery.
For the homogeneous case I assume the standard textbook logistic growth function
3.2, and the Schaefer (1957) catch-effort relation for the harvest function 3.3.
g(Xt) = rXt(1−Xt/K) (3.2)
h(Xt, Et) = qXtEt (3.3)
Open Access
Under open access there is no regulation on the amount of fishing in the fishery. The
equation of motion for effort is equal to zero at equilibrium
E˙t = ph(Xt, Et)− cEt = 0 (3.4)
Under the assumption that K > c
pq
, the open access equilibrium stock level is
XOA =
c
pq
(3.5)
Substituting equation 3.5 into the equation of motion for stocks (equation 3.1) yields the
open access equilibrium effort level.
EOA =
r
q
(1− c
Kpq
) (3.6)
Maximum Sustainable Yield
The logistical growth function g(X) is maximized where g′(X) = 0. This yields the MSY
equilibrium stock level.
XMSY =
K
2
(3.7)
Substituting this into the equation of motion for stocks (equation 3.1) yields the MSY
equilibrium effort level.
EMSY =
r
2q
(3.8)
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Optimal Extraction
The standard maximization problem for a fishery manager to optimize profit over the
lifetime of the fishery is
max
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[(ph(Xt, Et)− cE)]dt
subject to
X˙t = g(Xt)− h(Xt, Et)
X0 = X¯, E0 = E¯, Xt ≥ 0, Et ≥ 0
The solution for X∗ takes the following form, which can be positive or negative, however
the positive root is the solution to the problem in this case and we disregard the negative
root.1
X∗ =
−B ±√B2 − 4AC
2A
(3.9)
where
A =
2pr
K
;B = pr − pρ− cr
qK
;C =
ρc
q
Substituting equation 3.9 into the equation of motion for stocks (equation 3.1) yields the
optimal equilibrium (steady state) effort level E∗.
E∗ =
r
q
(1− X
∗
K
) (3.10)
The optimal harvest strategy is a piecewise function which depends on the stock level in
the fishery. This strategy results in a ‘bang-bang’ type of transition to steady state, and
is a result of the infinitely elastic tuna price (constant price) assumption. If the stock
level is above the steady state, the optimal harvest strategy is to apply maximum effort.
At steady state stock levels, the optimal harvest strategy is to apply the effort rate that
results in a harvest rate equal to the growth rate of the stock. At stock levels below
steady state the optimal harvest rate is zero.
E(t) =

Emax if X(t) > X
∗
E∗ if X(t) = X∗
0 if X(t) < X∗
(3.11)
Once the fishery manager finds the optimal stock level, the optimal harvest strategy
and the corresponding optimal quota for the season can be found. In the case of input
control or effort based regulation, the optimal amount of effort days becomes the total
allowable effort (TAE) which are to be sold to fishing vessels. In the case of output
control or a quota based regulation, the optimal harvest size becomes the total allowable
catch (TAC) size to be sold to the vessels.
With the homogeneous vessels assumption, the relationship between the effort level
and harvest level is constant. That is, it does not matter which regulation scheme is used
as the resulting harvest level, effort levels and steady state stock levels are the same.
1See Appendix A for Derivation
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3.2.2 Heterogenous Vessels
A critical assumption in the classic fishery managers problem outlined in Section 3.2.1
is that fishing vessels are heterogeneous. However, in reality some vessels may catch
more than others, even if fishing vessels are physically identical in every way. This is
known as the ‘good captain’ effect. This means that there is an element of heterogeneity
in the catchability coefficient of fishing vessels. It follows that the optimal effort levels
calculated assuming homogeneous fishing vessels may not achieve the target harvest or
stock levels as it does not take into consideration the potential variation in harvest rates.
Assume that there is a continuum of N fishing vessels from qmin = a to qmax = b. All
fishing vessels are identical aside from the catchability value q. This catchability value q is
distributed according to some probability density function f(.). Let e represent the effort
level of a single fishing vessel measured in days, which can vary from 0 to emax, where
emax is the total possible number of days in a fishing season. I maintain the constant
market price of tuna assumption, and so each vessel has incentive to fish the maximum
number of days in a fishing season due to the linear profit function.
The approach used to determine the number of licenses to be sold for either input
or output regulation is similar to the standard model. First, the fishery manager has to
find the stock level that corresponds to the management goal. This stock level is then
used to find the harvest and effort levels for each regulation scheme, which is then used
to determine the number of licenses to sell. Under input regulation the licenses are sold
as effort days, and under output regulation licenses are sold by tonnes of tuna caught.
If all fishing vessels are allowed to participate in the fishery, total harvest for time t
can be found by summing the harvest level for all fishing vessels from productivity level a
to b. Maintaining the Schaefer (1957) catch-effort relation for the harvest function from
the standard model in 3.3, total harvest at time t is
ht =
∫ b
a
qXteNf(q)dq (3.12)
If the fishery is regulated according to some management goal such as MSY or optimal
extraction, assuming a sufficiently large fishing fleet, not all fishing vessels will be able to
participate. Suppose that licenses are sold or distributed to fishing vessels according to
some competitive allocation method based on the fishing vessels marginal value for the
licenses. Let q¯ be the cutoff productivity level of the fishing vessel whose marginal value
for a fishing license is equal to zero. This implies that all fishing vessels with q ≥ q¯ should
participate since they have zero or positive marginal value for a license, but fishing vessels
with q < q¯ are better off not participating in the fishery since their marginal value for a
license will be negative. This further implies that q¯ is where the equilibrium price w¯ of
the licenses is determined. It also follows that only vessels with a catchability coefficient
q¯ and higher are able to pay the equilibrium price w¯, and are the only vessels able to
acquire licenses to fish. The tighter the regulation scheme, the less licenses there will be
to sell, and the closer q¯ will be to b which implies less vessels participating. Conversely,
the more relaxed the regulation scheme is, the more licenses there are to sell, and the
closer q¯ will be to a which implies more vessels participating.
Total harvest under regulation is the sum of harvest for all fishing vessels from qmax
to q¯. Since q¯ can vary over time with the stock level, it is denoted with a t subscript as
q¯t.
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ht =
∫ b
q¯t
qXteNf(q)dq (3.13)
Define the total number of vessels who can bid for licenses as the potential effort level
E = eN
If all fishing vessels are allowed to participate in the fishery, actual fishing effort level
expended in the fishery is equal to the potential effort level, E¯ = E. Under regulation,
fishing vessels with q¯t ≤ q ≤ qmax are the only vessels able to buy licenses to fish and
participate. This means actual effort expended in time t is E multiplied by the probability
of q¯t ≤ q ≤ qmax.
E¯(q¯t) = eNPr[q¯t ≤ q ≤ qmax] (3.14)
The equation of motion for stocks in the heterogeneous model is
X˙t = g(X)− h(X, q¯t) (3.15)
Open Access
Finding open access equilibrium in the heterogeneous model requires two equations to
solve for open access stock levels XOA, and open access cutoff catchability value q¯OA.
The first equation is the profit function of the marginal fishing vessel under open access
conditions, which is set to zero.
ph(X, q¯OA)− ce = 0 (3.16)
The intuition behind this equation is that in open access all fishing vessels are free to fish
without paying any licenses, and fishing vessels will only participate if it is profitable.
The second equation is the equation of motion for stocks 3.15, which is also set to zero.
X˙t = g(X)− h(X, q¯) = 0
This equation implies that given the open access effort level derived from q¯OA, the fishery
will reach a stable level. Equation 3.16 along with 3.15 form two simultaneous equations
that determine the solution for q¯OA and XOA. Once q¯OA is known, the open access effort
level E¯OA can be found by substituting q¯OA into 3.14.
The definition of open access is that there is no restriction on fishing activities, and
fishing vessels are free to exploit the fishery as much as they wish. In general, fishing
vessels are only limited by the market conditions and the length of the fishing season. As
long as fishing vessels are profitable they will continue to fish. One of the consequences
of the linear profit function that I have assumed for fishing vessels is that profits increase
linearly with stock levels. The only limit on their activity is the amount of effort that
they can expend in a season, which is fixed at emax. Holding the cost of fishing c, the
market price of fish p constant, at a certain stock level each fishing vessel has a stock
level below which they will not be profitable. This implies that at some XOA and some
q¯OA, the fishery will reach open access equilibrium where no vessel will have incentive to
enter the fishery due to very low profit levels.
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Optimal Extraction
The maximization problem for a fishery manager with heterogeneous catchability coeffi-
cients becomes
max
q¯
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[(ph(Xt, q¯t)− cE(q¯t)]dt
subject to
X˙t = g(Xt)− h(Xt, q¯t)
X(t) ≥ 0, E(t) ≥ 0
To solve this problem, the Hamiltonian equation is
H = ph(Xt, q¯t)− cE(q¯t) + λt[g(Xt)− h(Xt, q¯t)]
Applying the maximum principle, the following conditions are derived
∂H
∂q¯t
= phq¯(Xt, q¯t)− cEq¯(q¯t)− λhq¯(Xt, q¯t) = 0 (3.17)
λ˙t = λρ− phx(Xt, q¯t)− λ[gx(Xt)− hx(Xt, q¯t)] (3.18)
X˙t = g(Xt)− h(Xt, q¯t) (3.19)
Applying the steady state condition X˙ = 0, the following equilibrium condition is found.
(For derivations refer to Appendix A)(
p− cEq¯
hq¯
)
ρ =
(
p− cEq¯
hq¯
)
gx +
cEq¯
Xthq¯
g(Xt) (3.20)
Rearranging 3.20 gives a quadratic expression for X¯∗, where the positive root is the
solution. Substituting X¯∗ into the equation of motion for stocks yields the optimal
equilibrium (steady state) cutoff catchability level q¯. Together X¯∗ and equation q¯ form a
system of equations with two unknowns, where the solution to the system is the solution
to the model. Substituting q¯∗ into equation 3.14 yields the optimal steady state effort
level E¯∗.
To check for the stability of the system of equations X˙ = f(X, q¯) and E˙ = g(X, q¯)),
I compute the eigenvalues which can determine stability. Appendix 3.B provides the
derivations for these equations. The system can then be evaluated with parameters
under the simulation exercise.
Determining Equilibrium Price w
In order to determine the equilibrium price and q¯, I examine the demand for licenses by
the fishing vessels. A representative fishing vessel pays a fee to fish over one season only.
By backward induction, it’s dominant strategy is to extract as much fish as possible. In
the standard model fishing vessels are identical. In the heterogenous model fishing vessels
catchability coefficient q which determines the productivity of the fishing vessels, varies
from vessel to vessel.
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Output Control
Homogeneous Model
In the quota based regulation case, the profit maximizing problem for fisherman k
max
e
ph(X, ek)− wkh(X, ek)− cek
subject to
h(X, ek) = qkXek
emin ≤ e ≤ emax
where w is the price of a fishing licenses sold per ton of harvest caught, p is the market
price of a ton of tuna which fishermen sell to wholesalers, and c is the marginal cost of
fishing effort. The lower limit emin represents the limit at which a fisherman will not be
able to make a profit, and the upper limits emax represents the finite amount of fishing
days in a season. The first order condition is
phe(X, e)− whe(X, ek)− c = 0
Fishermen maximize profits where the marginal benefit (price per ton of tuna p) of a
fishing day equals the marginal cost of a fishing day (wk − cqx). Rearranging, the price
per unit of harvest that vessel k is willing to pay is
wkh = p−
c
qkX
(3.21)
Since all fishing vessels are the same in the standard model, wkh = wh. This means that
that wh = w
∗
h is the clearing price at steady state X
∗. In the standard model there is no
way to determine which specific vessels get the licenses.
Heterogeneous Model
Although fishinging vessels differ by productivity level in the heterogeneous model, the
maximization problem for each individual fishing vessel, and expression for the price per
unit of harvest each vessel is willing to pay (3.21) is identical to the homogeneous case.
An implication of equation 3.21 is that fishermen with higher productivity levels q
are able to pay a higher price for a license. Let w∗¯
h
be the license clearing price where all
the licenses are sold, and assume that there is enough demand such that for at least one
fisherman, w∗¯
h
≥ wkh. An implication of the linear profit function chosen above is that all
fishing vessels will demand the highest possible number of licenses. In the case of output
control this is equal to the maximum possible catch per day of a fishing vessel measured
by the size of the hold2, multiplied by the number of days on a season. Fishermen who
are able to pay wkh ≥ w∗¯h will demand the maximum number of licenses, and those who
cannot will demand zero licenses. At the clearing price, there is a cutoff catchability value
q¯ such that
w∗¯h = p−
c
q¯X¯
(3.22)
Any vessels with qk ≥ q¯ will be able to buy licenses, and those with qk < q¯ will not. The
optimal strategy for fishing vessel k is
2Assuming one fishing trip per day
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ek =
{
emax if qk ≥ q¯
0 if qk < q¯
(3.23)
Rearranging 3.22 for q¯∗ yields the inverse demand for licenses. Substituting this into the
harvest equation gives the optimal harvest level which is supported at steady state.
h∗ =
(
b2 −
[ c
X¯∗(p− w∗¯
h
)
]2) X¯∗eN
2(b− a)
Substituting the steady state cutoff catchability value q¯∗ from 3.46 into equation 3.22
above, we can determine the equilibrium license price for output control case as
w∗h = p−
c
X¯∗
[
b2 − 2(b−a)
eN
(r − rX¯∗
K
)
] 1
2
(3.24)
Input Control
Homogeneous Model
In the effort based regulation case, the profit maximizing problem for fisherman k is
max
e
ph(X, ek)− wkek − ce
which is subject to the same conditions as in the output control case. The first order
condition is
phe(X, ek)− wk − c = 0
Fishermen maximize profits where the marginal benefit (price per ton of tuna p) of a
fishing day equals the marginal cost of a fishing day (wk−c
qx
). Rearranging, the price per
unit of effort that vessel k is willing to pay is
wkE = pqkX − c (3.25)
In the standard model wkE = wE since all fishing vessels are the same. This means that
that wE = w
∗
E is the clearing price at steady state X
∗. In the standard model there is no
way to determine which specific vessels get the licenses.
Heterogeneous Model
Once again, although fishing vessels differ by productivity level in the heterogeneous
model, the maximization problem for each individual fishing vessel, and expression for
the price for a unit of effort each vessel is willing to pay (3.25) is identical to the homo-
geneous case.
An implication of equation 3.25 is that fishermen with higher productivity levels q,
are able to pay a higher price for a license. Let w∗¯
E
be the license clearing price where
all the licenses are sold, and assume that there is enough demand such that for at least
one fisherman, w∗¯
E
≥ wkE. An implication of the linear profit function chosen above, is
that all fishing vessels will demand the highest possible number of licenses. In the case
of input control, this is equal to the length of the season divided by the unit of effort.
Fishermen who are able to pay wkE ≥ w∗¯E will demand the maximum number of days in
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the season, and those who cannot will demand zero days. There is a cutoff catchability
value q¯, such that
w∗¯E = pq¯X¯ − c (3.26)
Any vessels with qk ≥ q¯ will be able to buy licenses, and those with qk < q¯ will not. The
optimal strategy for fishing vessel k is
ek =
{
emax if qk ≥ q¯
0 if qk < q¯
(3.27)
Rearranging 3.26 for q¯∗ yields the inverse demand for licenses. Substituting this into the
effort equation gives the optimal effort level which is supported at steady state.
E¯∗ = eN
(
1− w
∗¯
E
+ c
pX¯∗(b− a) −
a
b− a
)
(3.28)
Substituting the steady state cutoff catchability value q¯∗ from 3.46 into equation 3.26
above, we can determine the equilibrium license price for input control case as
w∗E = pX¯
∗[b2 − 2(b− a)
eN
(r − rX¯
∗
K
)
] 1
2 − c (3.29)
3.2.3 Steady State Characteristics
This section compares the steady state characteristics of standard model with the mod-
ified heterogeneous model for the single country case and the multi-country case, with
respect to revenue.
Revenue
Proposition 1. For a single country which sells licenses allowing vessels to fish, under
the assumption of competitive behavior and heterogeneous fishers, revenue received by the
country under output regulation is always greater than under input regulation.
Proof. Under output regulation, total revenue from each individual vessel is the price of
a license multiplied by the harvest (wHqiXei). Under input regulation total revenue from
each individual vessel to the country is the price of a license multiplied by effort (wEei).
The key is to note that q only appears in the revenue equation for output regulation
wHqiXei, and that effort level e is the same for all fishing vessels.
For the heterogeneous fishermen, q follows some distribution. By definition of a
distribution, there is a continuum of q values that are greater than q¯ and less than b.
Since the marginal fisher who makes zero profit is the same under both input and output
regulation (fisherman with q = q¯), it follows that revenue under output regulation must
be higher than revenue under input regulation.∫ b
q¯
wHqXedq >
∫ b
q¯
wEedq
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This result is independent of the distribution of q. This result also holds under the
assumption of non-linear costs for fishing vessels with respect to stock size X.
Proposition 2. Under the assumption of competitive behavior, all fishing vessels aside
from the marginal vessel who participate in a fishery through license purchase have positive
rent under both regulation schemes. However, rent under output regulation is always less
than rent under input regulation.
Proof. This result is direct result of Propositions 1. To show that all fishing vessels with
q > q¯ have positive revenue, consider fishing vessel j which has a qj > q¯ and fishing vessel
i which has qi = q¯. For the marginal fisher i, it is true that rent is zero. So, under input
regulation vessel j must have positive profit since
pqjXej > pqiXei
Similarly, under output regulation vessel j must have positive profit since
p− c
qjX
> p− c
qiX
Finally, since it has been shown that wHqjXej > wEej it is straightforward result that
revenue under output regulation is greater than revenue under input regulation for the
manager.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 and 2 is that under input control, the effort level
demanded by each vessel who buy the license is the same, which is the maximum days in a
season (emax). In addition, with the assumption of perfect competition, the price that all
fishing vessels pay for a license to fish for a day (or the entire season) is the same, which is
the price of the marginal fishing vessel with q = q¯. However, since productivity levels are
not equivalent across fishing vessels, the harvest size over a day (or the entire season) for
each boat will vary. More productive fishing vessels will catch more fish relative to less
productive vessels. In effect, the price per ton of tuna harvested under input regulation
will be less for high q vessels relative to fishing vessels with a lower q. This represents
additional rent for fishing vessels which is gained from fishery owners revenue.
For output regulation, even though high q vessels may catch more fish in a given
amount of time, all fishing vessels will pay the same price per ton of fish caught, which
is the price of the marginal fishing vessel with q = q¯. It follows that fishing vessels would
accrue less profit relative to input regulation, which means higher revenues for the fishery
owner.
The reason that the standard model does not have this prediction for revenues is that
it assumes that all fishing vessels are the same. This means that there are no differences
between the price per ton of fish caught under output regulation and input regulation.
The difference in the level of revenue from the two management schemes depends on
the spread of the productivity levels of the fishing vessels. Under input control if the
range between qmax and qmin is high, then the marginal fishing vessel (with q = q¯) may
be catching much less than the higher q vessels. In this case the high q fishing vessels
are underpaying potentially by a large amount, and gaining potentially much higher rent
then they would have under output regulation.
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3.3 Application
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the homogenous and heterogenous models
compare to each other using parameter estimates that roughly approximate the PNA
fishery for skipjack tuna. First I outline a functional form of the model assuming a
uniform distribution of q values. Then I determine approximate parameter estimates for
the PNA case. Finally I provide a simulation based on the parameter values.
Model Under Uniform Distribution
Under the assumption that f(q) is a uniform probability density function with qmax = b
and qmin = a, the harvest equation h from 3.13 becomes
h =
∫ b
q¯t
qXte
( N
b− a
)
dq =
[ q2
2(b− a)XteN
]b
q¯
h(X, q¯) = (b2 − q¯2t )
XteN
2(b− a) (3.30)
Total actual effort from 3.14 is
E¯(q¯) = eNPr[q¯t ≤ q ≤ qmax] = eN
(
1− q¯t − a
b− a
)
= eN
(b− q¯t
b− a
)
(3.31)
The equation of motion for stocks becomes
X˙t =
(
rXt − rX
2
t
K
)
− (b2 − q¯2t )
XteN
2(b− a) (3.32)
Open Access
Finding the open access stock level requires solving two equations with two unknowns,
q¯OA and XOA. The first equation is the profit function from the marginal fisher, who has
zero profit
pq¯OAXe− ce = 0
The second equation is the equation of motion for stocks which is also set to zero.
X˙t =
(
rXt − rX
2
t
K
)
− (b2 − q¯2t )
XteN
2(b− a) = 0
Open access effort level is found by substituting q¯OA into 3.31.
E¯OA = eN
(b− q¯OA
b− a
)
Optimal Extraction
From 3.20 I have the following equilibrium condition.(
p− cEq¯
hq¯
)
ρ =
(
p− cEq¯
hq¯
)
gx +
cEq¯
Xthq¯
g(Xt)
The functional form of the equilibrium condition is
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(
p− c
Xtq¯t
)
ρ =
(
p− c
Xtq¯t
)
(r − 2rX
K
) +
c
X2t q¯t
(
rx− rX
2
K
)
Rearranging gives
(
2pr
K
)X2 + (pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯t
)X − ρc
q¯t
= 0
An expression for X¯ takes the following form, where the positive root is the solution.
X¯ =
−B ±√B2 − 4AC
2A
(3.33)
where
A =
2pr
K
;B = pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯t
;C =
ρc
q¯t
Substituting X¯ into the equation of motion for stocks yields the optimal equilibrium
(steady state) cutoff catchability level q¯.
q¯ =
[
b2 − 2(b− a)
eN
(r − rX
∗
K
)
] 1
2 (3.34)
Together equation 3.52 and equation 3.46 form a system of equations with two un-
knowns. The solutions to the system is the solution to the model, X¯∗ and q¯∗. Substituting
q¯∗ into equation 3.31 yields the optimal steady state effort level E¯∗.
E¯∗ = eN
(
1− q¯
∗ − a
b− a
)
(3.35)
Appendix 3.B provides the derivations for these equations.
Parameter Estimates
According to Rice et al. (2014) the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) harvest for all tuna
stocks including skipjack in the entire WCPO region is roughly about 1.5 million metric
tons. Given that 1.5 million tons has been where the total PNA harvest of only skipjack
tuna has been fluctuating around since 2010, I use this number as the baseline for this
illustration. Assuming a logistic growth function, from equation 3.7, XMSY = K/2. The
carrying capacity equation is then equal to K = X˙4
r
, which yields a K value of 16.6
million tonnes for the entire WCPO region. Since the majority of the catch of skipjack
in the WCPO region is from the PNA countries, for simplicity I let K = 16 million tons.
For an estimate of the intrinsic growth rate of the stock r, a range of 0.1 to 0.34 was
estimated by the Pacific Fishery Management Council (2016). For tractability I let the
discount factor ρ = 0.1.
The number of fishing days per vessel is required to determine an estimate for q. From
the number of fishing vessels in the PNA (Table 2.6) and the figures of fishing vessel effort
days (Table 2.1) provided by the WCPF (2014), the average number of fishing days per
vessel for each year from 2010 to 2015 is approximately 180 days, or about 6 months.
This number is not definitive because the TAE is split among 7 countries, where some
get more and others less. Regardless it can provide a baseline for this illustration.
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Dividing the total number of fishing vessels for each year by the total catch yields
a number for average total catch per vessel per year from 2010 to 2015 (Table 3.1, row
3). Taking the average, this is equal to a yearly catch of 5,220 tons per boat. This
corresponds to a daily average catch of 29 tons. Dividing the yearly catch by the MSY
stock size since the WCPO has been operating at this figure since , the average annual
value of q is 0.0065 over the years 2010 to 2015. This figure corresponds to about 29 tons
of tuna caught per day per boat assuming a six month fishing season. This figure is a
little higher than that reported by the FFA (2016a), where their average over this period
is around 25 tons per effort day. Given q, a range of qmin < q < qmax is required for the
heterogenous case. To simplify, I let q = 0.006 for the heterogenous case, then I vary a
and b = around this value to determine how revenue changes.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average
Effort day/vessel 185 211 185 189 175 132 179
CPUE 7410 6625 7666 7422 8234 6688 7341
Yearly Catch/vessel 5211 4929 5513 5382 5670 4616 5220
Daily Catch/vessel 28.9 27.4 30.6 29.9 31.5 25.6 29.0
q 0.00065 0.00062 0.00069 0.00067 0.00071 0.00058 0.00065
Table 3.1: PNA fleet characteristics. Catch in tons.
q value 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 0.001
Yearly catch/boat 800 1600 2400 3200 4000 4800 5600 6400 7200 8000
Daily catch/boat 4 9 13 18 22 27 31 36 40 44
Table 3.2: Catchability q values and corresponding catch values in tonnes. Based on
MSY stock size of 8 million tons, and a 180 day fishing season.
Price per ton (p) of skipjack tuna can be estimated from Thailand frozen imported
prices. This is the most representative price measure because 90 percent of skipjack tuna
caught in the PNA is loined for canning in Thailand (WCPF 2014). Prices for the period
2010 to 2015 were moderately volatile, ranging from around USD 1,200 to about 2,200
per ton. I will assume p to be USD 1,500 per ton.
Estimates on the operating cost for the PNA fishing fleets are not publicly available.
The FFA (2016a) reports that the fuel costs are the most significant and volatile costs
for the PNA fleet. Detailed cost estimates for the Ecuadorian purse seine fishing fleets
over the 2014-2014 are outlined in Bucaram (2017), which have been used to estimate
the cost for the Eastern Pacific Ocean fishing fleets operating in the Antigua Convention
Area. For the Ecuadorian fleet the average number of fishing trips per year is 6, with
each trip lasting an average of 36 days. This translates into an average of 216 days out
at sea. Considering that a fishing day in the PNA excludes travel to the fishing grounds,
the fishing characteristics with regards to season length appear to be similar with only
6 days on average difference per trip between the fleets. If these six days are taken to
be the travel time to fishing grounds, then we can assume three days travel one way.
This is a reasonable assumption (and also a likely an underestimation) since the PNA
fishing grounds are geographically large and are far from DWFN countries. Out of the
264 purse seine fishing boats registered in good standing with the FFA for August 2016,
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the average capacity was 1,100 metric tons. The category with the highest capacity for
the Ecuadorian fleet is 1,050 metric tons. The average annual fuel used for vessels in this
category is 613,000 gallons or about 1,957 metric tons. The Singapore marine diesel oil
(MDO) price index is used by the FFA to estimate the cost of fuel for the PNA fleet FFA
(2016a). The average price of diesel over the 2012 to 2014 period was USD 800/mt (FFA
2016a). This means that fuel cost alone for fishing vessels in the PNA is at least USD
1.57 million a year on average. This figure is likely higher due to the PNA having larger
vessels in its fleet. Other costs include labor, supplies such as food and fishing gear, and
maintenance. Factoring these other costs in, the total cost could potentially be much
higher. For tractability I assume that PNA vessels have about USD 2 million a year in
total operating cost, with a sensitivity analysis also being provided for this parameter.
The catch rate for the Ecuadorian fleet is lower than the PNA fleets. Total catch per year
is on average 3,120 tons per vessel compared to 5,220 for the PNA fleet. If we assume
180 fishing days like the PNA this comes in at only around 17 tonnes per day, lower than
the 25 tonnes estimated by the FFA for the PNA fleet.
The initial parameters, which I will consider the baseline parameters, for the simu-
lation exercise are K = 16, 000, 000, r = 0.36 per year, q = 0.0006, p = 2000 per ton,
c = 2000000 per vessel per year, and ρ = 0.1. a = 0.0002 and b = 0.0009. It should
be noted that the values of a and b were chosen so as to ensure that q = q¯, so that the
results can be compared to what happens if the estimate of q is incorrect.
3.3.1 Results
The first question is whether the results from the model provide a reasonable estimation
of the PNA fishery. The PNA only harvests up to the MSY of the fishery. Table 2.1
shows that the range of effort days expended in the PNA fishery over the 2010 to the 2015
period range from a low of 36,739 to a high of 50,526 effort days. The predicted optimal
effort days in the homogeneous case is 57,081, and heterogeneous model is 45,594. Table
2.3 show that the range of total estimated catch size over 2008 to 2015 is from a low
of 1.11 million tons to a high of 1.58 million tons. The predicted optimal catch size in
the homogeneous case is 1.44 million tons, and heterogeneous model is also around 1.44
million tons. The optimal stock sizes of 7.54 millions tons for the standard model (Table
3.3) and 7.53 million tons for the heterogeneous case are not dissimilar to the MSY levels
of 8 million tons estimates for the PNA (Figure 3.1). Given these results, the estimates
appear to be reasonably representative of the PNA fishery.
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Figure 3.1: MSY, open access and optimal stock levels for both the standard homegenous
model and the heterogeneous model. Stock levels for X∗ and XOA are similar for both
models.
q X E P/day Rev Input h P/ton Rev Output
0.0002 10,519,439 110,981 6,421 712,643 1,297,180 549.38 712,643
0.0003 9,086,899 93,327 11,606 1,083,164 1,413,420 766.34 1,083,164
0.0004 8,333,333 77,625 16,667 1,293,750 1,437,500 900.00 1,293,750
0.0005 7,791,170 63,934 22,651 1,448,149 1,439,019 1,006.34 1,448,149
0.0006 7,543,526 57,081 26,607 1,518,732 1,435,312 1,058.12 1,518,732
0.0007 7,309,260 50,282 31,526 1,585,207 1,429,265 1,109.11 1,585,207
0.0008 7,130,526 44,902 36,426 1,635,578 1,422,990 1,149.39 1,635,578
0.0009 6,989,534 40,547 41,310 1,675,017 1,417,027 1,182.06 1,675,017
0.0010 6,875,396 36,955 46,184 1,706,708 1,411,543 1,209.11 1,706,708
Table 3.3: Homogeneous case - varying value of q from 0.0002−0.001. (Revenue in 000’s)
It should be noted that the results in this section represent the best case scenario for
the PNA in extracting rent from the fishing vessels. The result of this is that the license
price levels and the corresponding revenue levels should be significantly higher that what
is observed in the real world, but not so high that it exceeds the observed catch value.
As predicted by the model, revenue in the standard homogeneous model are the same
for input and output management schemes (Table 3.3). In the heterogeneous model, as
predicted revenue levels were higher in output regulation compared to input regulation.
In the baseline case the revenue from input management is about $1.22 billion, and output
management is about $1.52 billion (Table 3.4, row 4). These results are still under the
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a b q¯ X E P/day Rev Input h P/ton Rev Output
0.0002 0.0006 0.00037 8,528,904 62,478 15,087 942,596 1,433,706 863.82 1,238,465
0.0002 0.0007 0.00044 8,117,597 55,961 18,716 1,047,352 1,439,689 941.22 1,355,059
0.0002 0.0008 0.00052 7,790,573 50,370 22,659 1,141,325 1,439,013 1,006.47 1,448,319
0.0002 0.0009 0.00060 7,531,466 45,594 26,828 1,223,176 1,435,061 1,060.70 1,522,163
0.0002 0.0010 0.00069 7,324,728 41,520 31,155 1,293,562 1,429,740 1,105.68 1,580,831
Table 3.4: Heterogeneous case - holding a = 0.0002 constant, and varying b from 0.007−
0.001. (Revenue in 000’s)
a b q¯ X E P/day Rev Input h P/ton Rev Output
0.0002 0.0010 0.00069 7,324,728 41,520 31,155 1,293,562 1,429,740 1,105.68 1,580,831
0.0003 0.0010 0.00073 7,241,549 40,890 33,242 1,359,258 1,427,057 1,124.22 1,604,332
0.0004 0.0010 0.00078 7,168,995 40,270 35,265 1,420,127 1,424,462 1,140.62 1,624,768
0.0005 0.0010 0.00082 7,105,227 39,666 37,226 1,476,597 1,421,986 1,155.20 1,642,676
0.0006 0.0010 0.00086 7,048,764 39,081 39,126 1,529,093 1,419,641 1,168.24 1,658,485
Table 3.5: Heterogeneous case - varying a from 0.0002 − 0.0006, and holding b = 0.001
constant. (Revenue in 000’s)
a b q¯ X E P/day Rev Input h P/ton Rev Output
0.0005 0.0006 0.00055 7,704,235 58,651 23,923 1,403,129 1,438,032 1,024.28 1,472,947
0.0004 0.0007 0.00055 7,688,957 53,836 24,159 1,300,630 1,437,823 1,027.46 1,477,303
0.0003 0.0008 0.00057 7,625,960 49,477 25,172 1,245,429 1,436,852 1,040.65 1,495,259
0.0002 0.0009 0.00060 7,531,466 45,594 26,828 1,223,176 1,435,061 1,060.70 1,522,163
0.0001 0.0010 0.00065 7,420,799 42,147 29,009 1,222,651 1,432,452 1,084.58 1,553,608
Table 3.6: Heterogeneous case - increasing the range of a and b from 0.0005 and 0.0006,
to 0.0001 and 0.001. (Revenue in 000’s)
a b q¯ X E P/day Rev Input h P/ton Rev Output
0.0001 0.0005 0.00025 9,706,596 68,207 8,899 606,987 1,374,469 667.10 916,903
0.0002 0.0006 0.00037 8,528,904 62,478 15,087 942,596 1,433,706 863.82 1,238,465
0.0003 0.0007 0.00050 7,878,620 54,987 21,477 1,180,925 1,439,669 988.56 1,423,197
0.0004 0.0009 0.00070 7,317,431 44,066 31,329 1,380,561 1,429,517 1,107.29 1,582,896
0.0005 0.0010 0.00082 7,105,227 39,666 37,226 1,476,597 1,421,986 1,155.20 1,642,676
Table 3.7: Heterogeneous case - shifting a and b from 0.0001 and 0.0006, to 0.0005 and
0.001. (Revenue in 000’s)
real observed value of the catch in the PNA. The difference is just under $300 million,
or about 24.5 percent of the input management revenue. This result for the baseline was
consistent over all other all other combinations of a and b (Table 3.4 - Table 3.7 ). An
interesting feature is that as q¯ increases, the difference in input and output revenue in
percentage terms falls. The best example is from Table 3.7 where the difference in the
revenue in percentage terms falls from around 50 percent in row 1, to just over 10 percent
at row 5. This result is also consistent over all examples.
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a b q¯ X E p/day Rev Input h p/ton Rev Output
0.0005 7,802,722 64,245 22,490 1,444,853 1,439,124 1,004 1,444,853
0.0002 0.0009 0.0006 7,531,466 45,594 26,828 1,223,176 1,435,061 1,061 1,522,163
0.0002 0.0009 0.0005 7,929,054 64,245 20,843 1,339,045 1,957,799 978 1,915,540
Table 3.8: Comparison of homogeneous model with q = 0.006 to heterogeneous model
with equivalent effort levels.
As q¯ increases, optimal stock size X will fall also. q¯ increases if either a (Table 11),
b (Table 9), or both increase when there shift upward of the distribution and vice versa.
When the range of a and b increase in equal measure, the q¯ increases also but at a smaller
magnitude (Table 13). The effect on the steady state stock level X∗ is the opposite to
that of q¯. As predicted, when q¯ increases it means only the most productive fishing vessels
are fishing which effectively increase the effort and harvest potential which leads to lower
equilibrium stock levels. Increases in q¯ lead to increases in prices for both input and
output management. These changes in the license price levels are expected as creases in
q¯ mean that the marginal fisher is willing to pay a higher price that those with lower q¯.
It is clear that there is a significant difference in the standard model compared to
the heterogeneous model. What does this mean for the PNA? In the best case scenario,
the PNA correctly estimates the value of q, given the values of a and b. Assuming that
it is 0.006, this means there would be an effort level of about 57,081 fishing days at a
revenue level of $1.52 billion. Given the same level of q¯ which correspond to a = 0.0002
and b = 0.0009, the heterogeneous model yields a lower effort level at 45,594 fishing
days, with a lower revenue at $1.22 billion under input regulation. However since the
PNA is selling 57,081 effort days, the actual effect given the parameters a = 0.0002 and
b = 0.0009 is that q¯ = 0.0005, which would yield the actual and slightly higher revenue
level of $1.32 billion under input regulation. The reason why X∗ is higher is because the
fishery is not yet at equilibrium and q¯ is lower. The key takeaway is that under output
regulation actual revenue would be significantly higher under output regulation at $1.78
billion, and even under the standard model revenue would be $1.51 billion.
What if the estimate that the PNA has is not correct? If q is overestimated, for
example if the actual q¯ = 0.0006 and the PNA estimates a q value of 0.0007, then effort
level and harvest are lower. The effect on the stock levels are not significant because stocks
will remain in a healthy state. Revenue will fall, so this is not desirable from an income
perspective. On the other hand if the PNA underestimates q = 0.0005, while actual
q¯ = 0.0006 , then the predicted effort levels and harvest levels are going to be higher,
resulting in lower stock levels. In this case stock levels may fall lower than expected which
may have undesirable consequences for the future sustainability of the fishery. However,
in this case revenue levels are going to be higher.
Sensitivity analyses was conducted for parameters K, r, p , and c and are outlined
in Appendix B. The results of the sensitivity analyses are consistent with the theoretical
predictions in the model.
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3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Policy Implications
The standard model for the single country case predicts that whether licenses are sold as
units of harvest under output regulation or days of fishing effort under input regulation,
the revenue for the manager is the same. This implies that from a revenue perspective
the management scheme does not really matter. The most significant result of the hetero-
geneous model in the single country case is that the revenues under the two schemes are
not equal. Furthermore, the analysis finds that output regulation will generate higher
revenues than input regulation. These results strongly suggest that the management
scheme adopted is an important determinant of revenue levels, which supports a switch
to output regulation from the Vessel Day Scheme. A key consideration on whether a
switch to harvest based licenses will be successful, is how well the PNA will be able to
monitor harvest levels.
A serious issue for the PNA is the prevalence of illegal and unreported (IUU) fishing.
The PNA countries are actively working to improve monitoring and surveillance to reduce
IUU fishing. However, the FFA (2016b) report that the majority of IUU fishing activity
are from fishing vessels that are licensed to operate in the Pacific region. This has
important implications for the VDS as this suggests that stronger measures are required
to improve monitoring of fishing vessels and their catch levels. If fishing vessels can
continue to fish illegally or under report catch sizes, then a switch to harvest based
licenses will not be successful. However, if appropriate monitoring measures are taken, a
switch to output regulation will result in higher revenue to the the PNA members. One
consequence is that this will directly impact rent for fishing vessels negatively. This will
most likely increase the incentive for these licensed vessels to fish illegally, which further
emphasizes the importance of monitoring and surveillance.
Turning to a broader perspective on fishery management, one important advantage
of the heterogeneous model over the standard model is that it provides more accurate
results with respect to the harvest levels of the fishing vessels, and in turn the revenue
dynamics of a fishery. This is important for policy makers because if the predictions
of the model are incorrect then the best case scenario is that the revenue potential is
not realized, and the worst case is that the fishery could collapse from over harvesting.
Overall the standard model may be less forgiving of an error in the estimation of the
catchability value q as it is a single measure compared to the range of catchability values
for heterogeneous model. In addition, since heterogeneity of fishing vessels is a closer
representation of the real world, the heterogeneous vessels model provides a more robust
representation of a fishery and the dynamics involved.
Another benefit of the heterogeneous model is that it can identify the marginal price
that each individual fishing fishing vessels is willing to pay for a license, which is not pos-
sible with the standard model. This allows for analysis of different auction mechanisms,
and gives policy makers the opportunity to explore benefits or drawbacks of different
auction types. Finally, the heterogeneous model can predict which fishing vessels will be
able to participate in a fishery, and can be used to explain the phenomenon where small
fishermen are driven out of fisheries when new policies are introduced. The standard
model is unable to explain this observation. Overall the heterogenenous model gives pol-
icy makers additional tools to analyze the impacts of different policies that are possible
with the standard model.
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3.4.2 Limitations
The first major limitation of the model is the linear production function of the fishing
vessels. In the real world, fishing vessels are expected to have an optimal level of effort
or harvest, which are a function of the vessel characteristics as well as operating costs.
While a linear production function such as this allows for more tractability and simplic-
ity in the model, it does not capture this feature of fishing vessels. Theoretically, the
fishing vessels can fish indefinitely with the only limitation being the time and harvest
limits placed on the model exogenously. The second primary limitation of the model
is the uniform distribution assumption of productivity levels of fishing vessels used in
the simulation exercise. Once again the benefits of this assumption are tractability and
simplicity in modeling. However, a more real world representation of purse seine fishing
vessel productivity functions may be Normal or Pareto distribution functions. The diffi-
culty of these distribution functions is that they may not provide closed form theoretical
solutions. Future extension to this study should focus on improving these two primary
aspects.
3.5 Conclusion
The motivation for this study is the debate around the Parties to the Nauru Agreement
(PNA) tuna coalition, regarding a switch from the current input regulation based Vessel
Day Scheme to an output regulation based scheme. There are two primary considerations
for the PNA, which are important for most fisheries in general. The first is to maximize
the revenue stream generated from the fishery the fishery owner. The second is ensuring
the continued sustainability of the fishery into the future. This implies accurate modeling
of harvest size to ensure that overfishing does not occur. The primary weakness of VDS
is that there are no limits on the amount of fish that can be caught within the time
frame provided by the license. The standard Gordon-Schaefer model, which assumes
that fishing vessels are homogeneous, predicts that there is no difference in the input or
output management schemes. In order to allow for analysis of the two schemes, I introduce
into the standard model heterogeneous fishing vessels. The heterogeneous model assumes
fishing vessel productivity levels are uniformly distributed. I outlined the model and the
theoretical predictions. I then simulated the fishery using estimated parameters, in order
to validate the theoretical model.
The main result of this study is that in contrast to the standard model, the hetero-
geneous model predicts that the revenues from input and output regulation are not the
same. The analysis suggests that output regulation yields higher revenues. This result
lends support to the argument for switching to an output regulation based scheme over
input regulation for a single country. Although this result is important, extension of the
model to a multi-country setting is critical for more policy relevance to the PNA.
Relative to the standard model, the heterogeneous model is more representative of
the dynamics of a fishery. The heterogeneous model demonstrates that the standard
model is less forgiving of an error in the catchability value used, and may lead to an
underestimate or overestimate of the harvest level. This is important for fisheries with a
large fleet capacity such as the PNA. Underestimation is detrimental to the stock levels,
and overestimation yields lower revenue levels. Due to the homogeneity assumption for
fishing vessels, the standard model assumes all fishing vessels will try to participate in
the fishery and are limited only by the the effort level set by the manager. It provides
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no mechanism to determine which vessels end up with the limited number of fishing
licenses. In contrast, the heterogeneous model endogenously determines which vessels
participate in the fishery, which is determined by the productivity levels of the fishing
vessels. Two key simplifying assumptions in the model are a linear cost function and
a uniform productivity distribution function for the fishing vessels. Future studies can
be improved by incorporating a non linear cost function, as well as pareto or normal
distribution productivity functions.
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Appendix 2
3.A Homogeneous Model - Optimal Extraction
The standard maximization problem for a fishery manager to optimize profit over the
lifetime of the fishery is
max
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[(ph(Xt, Et)− cE)]dt
subject to
X˙t = g(Xt)− h(Xt, Et)
X0 = X¯, E0 = E¯, Xt ≥ 0, Et ≥ 0
To solve this problem, the Hamiltonian equation is
H = ph(Xt, Et)− cE + λt[g(Xt)− h(Xt, Et)]
Applying the maximum principle, the following conditions are derived
∂H
∂Et
= phE(Xt, Et)− c− λhE(Xt, Et) = 0 (3.36)
λ˙ = λρ− phX(Xt, Et)− λ[gX(Xt)− hX(Xt, Et)] (3.37)
X˙ = g(Xt)− h(Xt, Et) (3.38)
The solution to the optimization problem depends on the functional forms used for the
growth and harvest functions. Substituting and applying the steady state condition
X˙ = 0, after rearranging the following condition is found.3
(p− c
hE
)ρ = (p− c
hE
)gx +
c
XthE
g(Xt)
After some rearranging, the functional form of the above equation is
(
2pr
K
)X2 − (pr − pρ− cr
qK
)X − ρc
q
= 0
Applying the quadratic equation, the solution for the optimal stock size X∗ can be found.
The solution for X∗ takes the following form, which can be positive or negative, however
the positive root is the solution to the problem in this case and we disregard the negative
root.
X∗ =
−B ±√B2 − 4AC
2A
where
A =
2pr
K
;B = pr − pρ− cr
qK
;C =
ρc
q
3This is a standard textbook derivation that can be found, for example, in Clark (2010).
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Substituting equation 3.9 into the equation of motion for stocks (equation 3.1) yields the
optimal equilibrium (steady state) effort level E∗.
E∗ =
r
q
(1− X
∗
K
) (3.39)
39
3.B Heterogeneous Model - Optimal Extraction
From the harvest function
h(X, q¯) = (b2 − q¯2) XeN
2(b− a)
I find
hq¯(X, q¯) = −q¯ XeN
(b− a)
hX(X, q¯) = (b
2 − q¯2) eN
2(b− a)
From the effort function
E¯(q¯) = eN
(
1− q¯ − a
b− a
)
I find
E¯q¯(q¯) = −eN
( 1
b− a
)
From the logistic growth function
g(X) = rX(1−X/K)
I find
gx(X) = r − 2rX
K
From Section 2 the Hamiltonian equation is
H = ph(Xt, q¯t)− cE(q¯t) + λt[g(Xt)− h(Xt, q¯t)]
Substituting for the functional forms, the Hamiltonian becomes
H = p(b2 − q¯2) XeN
2(b− a) − ceN
(
1− q¯ − a
b− a
)
+ λt
[
rX(1−X/K)− (b2 − q¯2) XeN
2(b− a)
]
Applying the maximum principle, the following conditions are derived
∂H
∂q¯
= p(−q¯ XeN
(b− a))− c(−eN
( 1
b− a
)
)− λ(−q¯ XeN
(b− a)) = 0 (3.40)
λ˙ = λρ− p(b2 − q¯2) eN
2(b− a) − λ[r −
2rX
K
− (b2 − q¯2) eN
2(b− a) ] (3.41)
X˙ = rX(1−X/K)− (b2 − q¯2) XeN
2(b− a) (3.42)
From MP1
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λ = p− c
Xtq¯t
λ˙ = c
[ 1
X2t q¯t
dx
dt
+
1
Xtq¯2t
dq
dt
]
Substituting into MP2 yields(
p− c
Xtq¯t
)
ρ = p(b2 − q¯2) eN
2(b− a) +
(
p− c
Xtq¯t
)
[r − 2rX
K
− (b2 − q¯2) eN
2(b− a) ]
Applying the steady state condition X˙ = 0, the following steady state condition is found.(
p− c
Xtq¯t
)
ρ = p(r − rXt
K
)−
(
p− c
Xtq¯t
)
[
rXt
K
]
Rearranging gives
(
2pr
K
)X2 + (pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯t
)X − ρc
q¯t
= 0
The solution for X¯ takes the following form,
X¯ =
−B ±√B2 − 4AC
2A
where
A =
2pr
K
;B = p(ρ− r)− cr
Kq¯t
;C =
ρc
q¯t
Substituting this into the equation of motion for stocks yields an expression for optimal
q¯, which together with the equation for stocks determines the solution for the model.
To determine stability, substitute dx
dt
= x˙ into the expression for λ˙ and into MP2
dq
dt
=
(pXtq¯2t
c
− q¯
)[
ρ− r + 2rX
K
+ (b2 + q¯2)
eN
2(b− a)
]
−
(pXtq¯2t
c
)(b2 − q¯2)eN
2(b− a) −
q¯
Xt
(
rX(1−X/K)− (b2 − q¯2) XeN
2(b− a)
)
(3.43)
Re-arrange to get an expression for q˙.
q˙ =
(pXtq¯2t
c
)[
ρ− r + 2rX
K
]
− q¯
[
ρ− rX
K
]
(3.44)
X˙ =
(
rX − rX
2
K
)
− (b2 − q¯2) XeN
2(b− a)
X˙ and q˙ form the set of Euler equations, which can determine the stability of the system.
A =
(
a b
c d
)
=
∂X˙∂X ∂X˙∂q¯
∂q˙
∂X
∂q˙
∂q¯

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At steady state X˙ = q˙ = 0, which then gives us the following conditions
∂X¯
∂X
= r − 2rX
K
− (b2 − q¯2) eN
2(b− a) = 0
∂X¯
∂q¯
= (2q¯ − b2) XeN
2(b− a) < 0
∂q˙
∂X
=
pq¯2t
c
(ρ− r) + 2prq¯
2X
cK
+
rq¯
K
> 0
∂q˙
∂q¯
=
(2pXtq¯t
c
)[
ρ− r + 2rX
K
]
−
[
ρ− rX
K
]
= 0
µ is an eigenvector of A if µ2 + (a+ d)µ+ (ad− bc) = 0.
µ =
(a+ d)±√(a+ d)2 − 4(ad− bc)
2(1)
So eigenvectors µ1 > 0, µ2 < 0. This means the steady state (at X
∗ and q¯∗) is a saddle
point.
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3.C System Stability
To check for the stability of the system of equations X˙ = f(X, q¯) and E˙ = g(X, q¯)), I
need to find
A ≡
(
a b
c d
)
≡
fx(X∗, q¯∗) fq¯(X∗, q¯∗)
gx(X
∗, q¯∗) gq¯(X∗, q¯∗)

in order to compute the eigenvalues which can identify whether the system is stable.
From equation 3.3,
(
2pr
K
)X2 + (pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯t
)X − ρc
q¯t
= 0
an expression for X¯ takes the following form, where the positive root is the solution.
X¯ =
−B ±√B2 − 4AC
2A
(3.45)
where
A =
2pr
K
;B = pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯t
;C =
ρc
q¯t
Substituting X¯ into the equation of motion for stocks yields the optimal equilibrium
(steady state) cutoff catchability level q¯.
q¯ =
[
b2 − 2r(b− a)
eN
+
2rX(b− a)
eNK
] 1
2 (3.46)
∂q¯∗
∂q¯
= 0
∂q¯∗
∂X
=
1
2
[
b2 − 2r(b− a)
eN
+
2rX(b− a)
eNK
]− 1
2 2r(b− a)
eNK
(3.47)
Rearranging the expression for X∗ yields
X¯ =
−(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯t
)±
√
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯t
)2 − 4(2pr
K
)(ρc
q¯t
)
2(2pr
K
)
X¯ =
(
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯t
)2 − 4(2pr
K
)(ρc
q¯t
)
) 1
2
(4pr
K
)
− (pρ− pr −
cr
Kq¯t
)
(4pr
K
)
(3.48)
X¯ =
(
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)2 − 8cprρ
q¯K
) 1
2
(4pr
K
)
− Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
(3.49)
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X¯ =
(
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)2 − 8cprρ
q¯K
) 1
2
(
K
4pr
)− Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
(3.50)
X¯ = (pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)2
( K
4pr
)2
− 8cprρ
q¯K
( K
4pr
)2
− Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
(3.51)
X¯ = (pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)2
( K
4pr
)2
− 8cprρ
q¯K
K2
(4pr)2
− Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
(3.52)
X¯ = (pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)2
( K
4pr
)2
− cKρ
2q¯pr
− Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
(3.53)
∂X¯
∂X
= 0
∂X¯
∂q¯
= (pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)
cK
8rp2q¯2
+
cKρ
2prq¯2
− c
4pq¯2
After rearranging, the equation of motion for effort E˙ is
E˙ = X
b2peN
2(b− a) − q¯
2X
peN
2(b− a) −
(bceN
b− a
)
+ q¯
( ceN
b− a
)
and after substituting in X¯∗ and q¯∗ yields
E˙ =
[
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)2
( K
4pr
)2
− cKρ
2q¯pr
− Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
] b2peN
2(b− a)
−
[[
b2−2r(b− a)
eN
+
2rX(b− a)
eNK
]][
(pρ−pr− cr
Kq¯
)2
( K
4pr
)2
− cKρ
2q¯pr
−Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
] peN
2(b− a)
−
(bceN
b− a
)
+
[[
b2 − 2r(b− a)
eN
+
2rX(b− a)
eNK
] 1
2
]( ceN
b− a
)
(3.54)
Similarly, the equation of motion for stock size is
X˙ = Xr −X2 r
K
−X b
2eN
2(b− a) + q¯
2X
eN
2(b− a)
and after substitution of X¯∗ and q¯∗ yields
X˙ =
[
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)2
( K
4pr
)2
− cKρ
2q¯pr
− Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
]
r−[
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)2
( K
4pr
)2
− cKρ
2q¯pr
− Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
]2 r
K
−[
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)2
( K
4pr
)2
− cKρ
2q¯pr
− Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
] b2eN
2(b− a)
+
[
(pρ−pr− cr
Kq¯
)2
( K
4pr
)2
− cKρ
2q¯pr
−Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
][
b2− 2(b− a)
eN
(r− rX
∗
K
)
] eN
2(b− a)
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The partial derivatives of these are
fx(X
∗, q¯∗) =
r
K
[
(pρ − pr − cr
Kq¯
)2
( K
4pr
)2
− cKρ
2q¯pr
− Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
]
fq¯(X
∗, q¯∗) =
[
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)
cK
8rp2q¯2
+
cKρ
2prq¯2
− c
4pq¯2
]
r
−
[
(pρ−pr− cr
Kq¯
)2
( K
4pr
)2
− cKρ
2q¯pr
−Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
][
(pρ−pr− cr
Kq¯
)
cK
8rp2q¯2
+
cKρ
2prq¯2
− c
4pq¯2
]2r
K
−
[
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)
cK
8rp2q¯2
+
cKρ
2prq¯2
− c
4pq¯2
] b2eN
2(b− a)
+
[
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)
cK
8rp2q¯2
+
cKρ
2prq¯2
− c
4pq¯2
][
b2 − 2(b− a)
eN
(r − rX
∗
K
)
] eN
2(b− a)
gx(X
∗, q¯∗) = −(pr
K
)
[
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)2
( K
4pr
)2
− cKρ
2q¯pr
− Kpρ
4pr
+
K
4
+
c
4q¯p
]
+
([
b2 − 2r(b− a)
eN
+
2rX(b− a)
eNK
]− 1
2 r(b− a)
eNK
)( ceN
b− a
)
gq¯(X
∗, q¯∗) =
[
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)
cK
8rp2q¯2
+
cKρ
2prq¯2
− c
4pq¯2
] b2peN
2(b− a)
−
[
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)
cK
8rp2q¯2
+
cKρ
2prq¯2
− c
4pq¯2
][
b2 − 2r(b− a)
eN
+
2rX(b− a)
eNK
] peN
2(b− a)
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3.D Comparative Statics
In the heterogeneous model I look at the effect of the catchability distribution on stock
level X¯. To do this I let a = αb where 0 < α < 1. A change in b moves the whole
distribution, while a change in α moves only a. From 3.46 and 3.52 let
F (q¯, X¯, b, α) = X¯ −
−(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
) +
√
(pρ− pr − cr
Kq¯
)2 − 4(2pr
K
)(ρc
q¯
)
2(2pr
K
)
= 0
Q(q¯, X¯, b, α) = q¯ − [b2 − 2(b− αb)
eN
(r − rX
∗
K
)
] 1
2 = 0
Then by linearization, the implicit function theorem, and Cramer’s rule we have
∂X¯
∂b
= −
∣∣∣∣∣∂F∂q¯ ∂F∂b∂Q
∂q¯
∂Q
∂b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂F∂q¯ ∂F∂X¯∂Q
∂q¯
∂Q
∂X¯
∣∣∣∣∣
= − (
∂F
∂q¯
∂Q
∂b
− ∂Q
∂q¯
∂F
∂b
)
(∂F
∂q¯
∂Q
∂X¯
− ∂Q
∂q¯
∂F
∂X¯
)
< 0
∂q¯
∂b
= −
∣∣∣∣∂F∂b ∂F∂X¯∂Q
∂b
∂Q
∂X¯
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂F∂q¯ ∂F∂X¯∂Q
∂q¯
∂Q
∂X¯
∣∣∣∣∣
= −(
∂F
∂b
∂Q
∂X¯
− ∂Q
∂b
∂F
∂X¯
)
(∂F
∂q¯
∂Q
∂X¯
− ∂Q
∂q¯
∂F
∂X¯
)
> 0
∂X¯
∂α
= −
∣∣∣∣∣∂F∂q¯ ∂F∂α∂Q
∂q¯
∂Q
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂F∂q¯ ∂F∂X¯∂Q
∂q¯
∂Q
∂X¯
∣∣∣∣∣
= − (
∂F
∂q¯
∂Q
∂α
− ∂Q
∂q¯
∂F
∂α
)
(∂F
∂q¯
∂Q
∂X¯
− ∂Q
∂q¯
∂F
∂X¯
)
> 0
∂q¯
∂α
= −
∣∣∣∣∂F∂α ∂F∂X¯∂Q
∂α
∂Q
∂X¯
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂F∂q¯ ∂F∂X¯∂Q
∂q¯
∂Q
∂X¯
∣∣∣∣∣
= −(
∂F
∂α
∂Q
∂X¯
− ∂Q
∂α
∂F
∂X¯
)
(∂F
∂q¯
∂Q
∂X¯
− ∂Q
∂q¯
∂F
∂X¯
)
< 0
where
∂F
∂q¯
=
cr
4prKq¯2
− K
8pr
+
1
2
(
(pρ−pr− cr
Kq¯
)2−4(2pr
K
)(
ρc
q¯
)
)− 1
2
2(pρ−pr− cr
Kq¯
)4
cr
Kq¯2
+
8prρc
Kq¯2
> 0
∂F
∂X¯
= 1,
∂F
∂b
= 0,
∂F
∂α
= 0
∂Q
∂X¯
= −1
2
[
b2 − 2(b− αb)
eN
(r − rX¯
K
)
]− 1
2
2(b− αb)
eN
r
K
> 0
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∂Q
∂α
= − αb
eN
(r − rX
∗
K
) < 0,
∂Q
∂q¯
= 1
∂Q
∂b
= −2b− 2 + 2α
eN
(r − rX
∗
K
) > 0
The results appear to be be intuitive. The effect of shifting the entire distribution up
is that equilibrium stock levels will be lower because of higher harvest potential, and a
higher cutoff catchability value. The effect of moving the value of a = αb up is that some
fishermen are excluded so harvest potential is lower, and (in relative terms) the cutoff
catchability level will decrease.
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3.E Sensitivity Analysis
K q¯ X E P/day Rev Input h P/ton Rev Output
14,000,000 0.00060 6,405,494 47,018 31,255 1,469,515 1,250,912 1,475.47 1,845,678
15,000,000 0.00059 6,781,549 47,611 33,452 1,592,681 1,337,612 1,501.33 2,008,199
16,000,000 0.00059 7,156,301 48,142 35,641 1,715,825 1,423,984 1,524.68 2,171,117
17,000,000 0.00058 7,529,919 48,621 37,822 1,838,941 1,510,072 1,545.87 2,334,368
18,000,000 0.00058 7,902,543 49,055 39,997 1,962,024 1,595,912 1,565.19 2,497,903
Table 3.9: Heterogeneous case - varying carrying capacity K from 14, 000, 000 −
18, 000, 000 tons. (Revenue in 000’s)
p q¯ X E P/day Rev Input h P/ton Rev Output
1,600 0.00060 7,440,267 46,207 28,604 1,321,706 1,432,951 1,152.37 1,651,288
1,800 0.00059 7,284,538 47,263 32,135 1,518,783 1,428,483 1,337.53 1,910,634
2,000 0.00059 7,156,301 48,142 35,641 1,715,825 1,423,984 1,524.68 2,171,117
2,200 0.00058 7,048,731 48,886 39,128 1,912,795 1,419,639 1,713.43 2,432,458
2,400 0.00058 6,957,121 49,525 42,598 2,109,676 1,415,529 1,903.50 2,694,463
Table 3.10: Heterogeneous case - varying price per ton p from 1, 600− 2, 400 tons. (Rev-
enue in 000’s)
c q¯ X E P/day Rev Input h P/ton Rev Output
1,600,000 0.00058 6,916,210 49,811 35,463 1,766,466 1,413,571 1,599.17 2,260,536
1,800,000 0.00058 7,037,835 48,962 35,563 1,741,207 1,419,170 1,561.04 2,215,386
2,000,000 0.00059 7,156,301 48,142 35,641 1,715,825 1,423,984 1,524.68 2,171,117
2,200,000 0.00059 7,271,867 47,350 35,700 1,690,368 1,428,071 1,489.91 2,127,699
2,400,000 0.00060 7,384,760 46,582 35,741 1,664,878 1,431,483 1,456.61 2,085,106
Table 3.11: Heterogeneous case - varying vessel operating cost c from 1, 600, 000 −
2, 400, 000. (Revenue in 000’s)
r q¯ X E P/day Rev Input h P/ton Rev Output
0.10 0.00079 3,508,626 16,607 19,779 328,474 273,922 1,280.60 350,785
0.20 0.00071 5,686,472 28,763 33,975 977,206 733,095 1,507.11 1,104,857
0.36 0.00059 7,156,301 48,142 35,641 1,715,825 1,423,984 1,524.68 2,171,117
0.38 0.00057 7,276,048 50,692 35,087 1,778,627 1,507,552 1,518.98 2,289,945
0.40 0.00055 7,389,293 53,273 34,433 1,834,323 1,590,676 1,512.07 2,405,214
Table 3.12: Heterogeneous case - varying intrinsic growth rate r from 0.1−0.4. (Revenue
in 000’s)
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Chapter 4
Heterogeneous Fishing Vessel
Model: Multi-country Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The overall goal of this study is to compare an input regulation fishery management
scheme to a quota based management scheme, for a cooperatively owned and managed
fishery. Standard approaches to modeling this problem based on homogeneous fishing
agents predicts an identical outcome for both input and output management schemes, and
so meaningful comparisons cannot be made. In order to overcome this issue, I extend the
standard modeling techniques through the introduction of heterogeneous fishing agents.
The primary variables for comparison are the stock levels, harvest size, rent levels, and
the revenue levels to each country.
One clear implication of including heterogeneous fishing agents in this multi-country
setting, is that in order to correctly characterize the dynamics of the fishery each in-
dividual fishing vessel’s incentives have to be accounted for. Profit levels are the most
important consideration for fishing vessels, and so license prices are the primary mech-
anism through which the fishery manager can influence fishing vessels. I consider two
price setting methods for both input and output regulation, and I examine whether the
target stock, harvest, and revenue levels set by the manager can be achieved in each of
these cases. This study demonstrates that multi-patch management is more complex that
previously thought, and that the management scheme employed is critically important
to achieving the goals of the fishery manager.
With the standard Gordon-Smith model by Gordon (1954) and Smith (1968), fishing
vessel catchability value q is always assumed to be constant. This means that all vessels
are treated as homogeneous. However, in practice even fishing vessels that are physically
identical can be heterogenous with respect to the amount of fish that they catch. This
characteristic can be explained by captains and crew with good experience and skill,
who can consistently guide the fishing vessels to productive fishing grounds. The main
limitation of the standard model is that it predicts that input and output regulation
result in the same harvest and revenue levels, and so an alternative methodology for
evaluating and comparing each management scheme is required. Previously in Chapter
3, I introduced heterogeneous fishing vessels into the standard Gordon-Smith model for
a single country. This model predicted different outcomes between the two approaches,
and showed that revenue under output regulation was higher. Although this result was
important, it provides limited insights into cooperative management with two or more
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countries.
An important strand of the literature expanding on the Gordon-Smith model takes
into account the spatial aspect of fishery management, incorporating the behavior and
movement of fish stocks. Sanchirico and Wilen (1999) developed a model of spatially
connected fish stocks, congregated across space in patches. These patches can belong
to or represent different countries, and can have different characteristics making them
heterogeneous. This model has been especially useful in modelling trans-boundary and
straddling fish stocks. In this paper I introduce heterogeneous fishing vessels into the
multi-patch model by Sanchirico and Wilen, extending the model and allowing for multi-
country analysis not possible with the single country country case.
I limit the analysis to the two patch case, which can be viewed as two neighboring
countries, with possible inter-migration of fish stocks. Fishing vessels decide which coun-
try to buy licenses from, and licenses can be used only in the country where it was bought.
I assume perfect competition in the license market as this reduces the complexity of the
analysis, while still allowing key aspects of the model to be considered. I also assume
that the fishery manager has incomplete information about the fishing vessels. This as-
sumption reflects conditions in the real world, and increases the scope and contribution
of the analysis. In order to provide a benchmark for comparison, I include the standard
textbook model from Gordon-Smith and Sanchirico and Wilen. First I outline the model,
and characterize conditions for open access and optimal extraction. I then outline the
theoretical predictions and consequences of the model, and provide an illustration for two
countries.
In this multi heterogeneous country setting, the complexity involved in characterizing
equilibrium conditions increases substantially with the inclusion of heterogeneous fishing
agents. The most significant challenge is to determine how fishing vessels order themselves
over the two countries. This is important because it sets the harvest levels in each patch,
which is vital for maintaining the correct stock levels. To characterize this ordering, I
examine the profit functions of the fishing vessels and compare them across patches. I
show that in this multi-country setting, fishing vessels incentives do not necessarily align
with the goals of the fishery manager, and that these incentives differ under input and
output regulation. This means that in order to correctly incentivize fishing vessels, careful
consideration has to be given to how prices are set under each management scheme.
In this model, the method used to sets prices is dependent on how the harvest function
is characterized and entered into the maximization problem. In the single country version
of this model, only the most productive fishing vessels can afford to pay for the licenses.
The equilibrium price was based on a single cutoff catchability value of the marginal
fisher who makes zero profit. Fishing vessels below the marginal fisher cannot afford the
licenses and fishing vessels above the marginal fisher make positive rent. In this multi-
country scenario the fishery manager can set prices for both countries using a single cutoff
value, or it can use individual cutoff values for each country to set corresponding license
prices. I call the single cutoff method the full overlap case because in the characterization
of the harvest function by the fishery manager, all fishing vessels above the single q¯ are
allowed to buy licenses in either country. I call the case with individual cutoff catchability
levels full separation because in the characterization of the harvest function by the fishery
manager, the most productive fishing vessels are assigned to the larger country, and the
least productive fishing vessels to the smaller country. In this case, fishing vessels are
clearly separated into each country by the productivity levels of the marginal fishers.
In order to determine the optimal management scheme, I use two conditions to exam-
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ine input and output regulation under both full separation and full overlap price setting
methods. The first condition is that the license market has to clear. That is, fishing
vessels have an incentive to buy all of the licenses at the given prices. I show that al-
though this condition may appear straightforward, it is not easy to achieve without the
assumption of perfect information for the manager. The second and stronger condition,
is that fishing vessels efficiently order themselves over the two countries according to their
productivity levels. This conditions implies that the most productive fishing vessels buy
licenses from the country with the most productive fishery, and the less productive fishing
vessels buy licenses from the country with the less productive fishery. If both conditions
are met, the scheme is considered supportable in the sense that each country will achieve
the predicted harvest, stock and revenue levels. If the first condition is not met then that
management scheme is not supportable, and so evaluating the second condition does not
matter. If the first condition is met but the second condition is not, then full efficiency is
not supported. This means that the fishery manager cannot be certain about where each
fishing vessel may decide to fish, and so this implies that the harvest levels predicted by
the manager may not be met.
This study has four primary results from the theoretical prediction of the model. First,
under input regulation the license market will clear under the full overlap case. However,
an efficient ordering of fishing vessels over the two countries is not guaranteed. Second,
full efficiency is possible for input regulation under full separation, but this result may
be achievable only under specific conditions. Third, output regulation under full overlap
is not supportable under the assumptions made in this study. Finally, output regulation
under full separation could theoretically achieve the market clearing condition and effi-
cient ordering condition. However, this is unlikely to occur without intervention from the
manager and requires the assumption of perfect information. The last two results are
strong because they suggest that output regulation is not feasible. However these results
are driven by the assumption of constant cost over both countries. If this assumption is
relaxed, then output regulation could be supportable under both full separation and full
overlap conditions.
The simulation provided in this study is based loosely on parameters from the PNA
and the Ecuadorian fishing fleet. The Ecuadorian fleet was used because cost estimates for
the PNA fleet are not publicly available. The purpose of the simulation is to demonstrate
how the model works, and not intended to draw any PNA specific conclusions. However,
the general results of the simulation should be able to provide some insights for policy
makers. I assume there are no flows of stocks between countries in these simulations as
fewer variables focuses the results, allowing for a clearer interpretation of the key aspects
under consideration. Although a simulation based on the standard model is provided, the
results are not new. For this reason I focus discussion of the results on the new model.
The simulation was split into full overlap and full separation price setting methods. Input
and output regulation were then compared under each.
The first result from the simulation is that both full overlap and full separation yield
the same harvest rate, steady state stock levels, and total combined rent and effort
levels. However, the distribution of rent and effort to each country are different for each
approach. In full overlap, each country is weighted the same in terms of the share of
rent and effort. This means that if the two countries are the same size they receive the
same rent and effort levels. In full separation, one country (call it Country i) is always
assigned the most productive fishing vessels through the harvest function even if they
are the same size. Country i will receive less effort and subsequently less licenses since
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fishing vessels assigned to it require less effort to catch the same harvest level as the less
productive fishing vessels assigned to other country (call it Country j). Assuming fishing
vessels pay the marginal fishing vessels price, Country i will receive higher revenue levels
relative to Country j.
The simulation also suggest that potential revenue under output regulation is higher
relative to input regulation. This is true for all cases under the heterogeneous model.
This result extends from and reinforces the same result from the single country case.
However, in this multi-country setting one additional consideration is whether each reg-
ulation scheme is supportable. To check this I examine the simulation of fishing vessels
profit functions, which largely reflect the predictions of the theoretical model. The sim-
ulation results show that input regulation under the full overlap case allows the market
to clear, but efficient ordering is not guaranteed. Input regulation under full separation
can achieve both efficiency conditions, but this will occur only under specific conditions.
Output regulation on the other hand may not achieve the market clearing condition under
both full overlap and full separation, and efficient ordering is not possible at all under full
overlap. Finally, the simulation suggest that if the two countries are sufficiently different
in size, then it may not be able to sell any of its licenses.
The primary contribution of this paper is that it examines the welfare problem for
a revenue maximizing fishery coalition, comparing input versus output based regulation.
This analysis is not possible with the homogeneous assumption used in the standard
models found in the literature, and is achieved by introducing heterogeneity into the
multi patch bio-economic model. This study reveals that analysis of input versus output
regulation is more complicated than previously thought. While the assumption of hetero-
geneous fishermen is not new, the motivating problem for this analysis is also novel. To
the author’s knowledge, the specific problem of the PNA fishery outlined in this multi-
country context has yet to be explored within the literature. The potential impacts of
such an analysis on policy could be significant for the member countries of the PNA.
These results could also have wider implications for fishery management in general, as a
large majority of the work done in this field are still based on the simple homogeneous
fishing vessels assumption.
A weakness of the analysis is that the linear profit function assumption plays an im-
portant role in the results. This assumption implies that profit levels in output regulation
are dependent only on stock size and license prices, not productivity. This implies that
fishing vessels with a higher productivity level have no advantage under output regula-
tion. Coupled with the constant cost assumption, this somewhat limits the analysis that
the model can be applied to. Fortunately these modifications can be made fairly easily,
and will be areas for improvement in the future. Another possible criticism could be the
simplification of the multi-unit auction mechanism used to allocate licenses in practice, to
the perfect competition assumption used in this study. However, auctions are notoriously
difficult to implement correctly in practice, and are sensitive to a variety of factors. The
multi-country setting and competition between members in the PNA would increase the
complexity of such an analysis significantly. In addition,details of the exact mechanism
used by the PNA is not available, and so any attempt at replication would also have been
an approximation at best. For these reasons examination of the multi-unit auction mech-
anism used to allocate licenses in the PNA deserves to be examined separately, before
being included in this analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the model. Section 4.3 provides
a numerical illustration of the model. Section 4.4 provides a discussion of the policy
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implications, and Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model
Assume there are m possible countries with individual stocks of tuna which grow accord-
ing to a logistic function. Although each stock may have differing characteristic such
as growth rate and carrying capacity, I assume for tractability that both stocks share
the same growth characteristics, but different carrying capacities. The two countries are
neighbors, and there are possible inter-migration between the tuna stocks of each country.
These countries sell fishing licenses which allows fishing vessels to operate in their waters.
Licenses are country specific and cannot be resold or transferred. There is a fishing fleet
of size N which can buy fishing licenses from both countries. In the standard model, fish-
ing vessels are homogeneous. In the hetereogenous fishing vessels model, fishing vessels
have a productivity value measured by the catchability coefficient q which is distributed
according to some function f(.). As a result the licenses have different values unique to
each fishing vessel which depend on how much fish each vessel can catch. The abundance
of the fish in a particular country is approximated by the stock size X. I assume that
the information on the abundance of fish across countries is common information. This
means that the value each vessel places on a license will depend on its own productivity.
As fishing vessels catch fish, they deplete the fish stock. I assume that the licenses are
all sold at the beginning of the season, which implies that there is significant demand in
the market from a high number of N fishing vessels.
In the real world, fishermen are not exactly sure where the fish are going to be. They
have some information based on previous experience and forecasting about the probability
that fish will be at a certain country at a certain time. I assume that fishing vessels only
use the stock level at the beginning of the season as an indication of the profitability of a
particular patch. More productive fishing vessels will catch more fish, and so they have
a higher valuation of a given license day, relative to a less productive fishing vessel.
For reference, the standard multiple patch model by Sanchirico and Wilen (1999)
outlining open access, maximum sustainable yield and optimal extraction equilibrium
conditions is outlined in Appendix 4.A. I extend that model by introducing heterogeneous
fishing vessels, which follows from the single patch model outlined in Chapter 3, Section
3.2.
Subsection 4.2.1 characterizes the general model, outlines the equilibrium conditions
required for open access, and outlines the maximization problem and equilibrium condi-
tions for the optimal extraction solution. In Section 4.2.2, I examine the fishing vessels
problem to determine how fishing vessels order or sort themselves over the two coun-
tries in equilibrium. This is an important consideration in determining the revenue to
each country from the sale of licenses. Examining the fishing vessels profit functions also
determines if input or output regulation is supportable.
4.2.1 Heterogeneous Fishing Vessels Model
A critical assumption in the standard model is that fishing vessels are heterogeneous.
However in reality, some vessels can catch more than others, even if fishing vessels are
physically identical in every way. This is known as the ‘good captain’ effect, and refers
to captains and crew who can consistently guide the fishing vessel to productive grounds.
This means that there is an element of heterogeneity in the catchability coefficient of
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fishing vessels. It follows that the optimal harvest rate calculated using the standard
method outlined in Appendix 4.A could be different from the predicted harvest size, as
it does not take into consideration the potential variation in harvest rates.
The approach used to determine the number of licenses to be sold for either input
or output regulation is similar to the standard model. First, the fishery manager has to
find the stock level that corresponds to the management goal. This stock level is then
used to find the harvest and effort levels for each regulation scheme, which is then used
to determine the number of licenses to sell. Under input regulation the licenses are sold
as effort days, and under output regulation licenses are sold by tonnes of tuna caught.
A representative fishing vessel pays a fee to fish over one season only. By backward
induction, it’s dominant strategy is to extract as much fish as possible. Assume that
there is a continuum of N fishing vessels from qmin = a to qmax = b. All fishing vessels
are identical aside from the catchability value q. This catchability value q is distributed
according to some probability density function f(.) which determines the productivity
of the fishing vessels. Let e represent the effort level of a single fishing vessel measured
in days, which can vary from 0 to emax, where emax is the total possible number of days
in a fishing season. I maintain the constant market price p of tuna assumption, and so
each vessel has incentive to fish the maximum number of days in a fishing season due to
the linear profit function. All the licenses are sold at the beginning of the season, which
implies that each fisherman will only fish in one patch.
If all fishing vessels are allowed to participate in the fishery, total harvest for time t
for two countries i and j, can be found by summing the harvest level for all fishing vessels
from productivity level a to b. Maintaining the Schaefer (1957) catch-effort relation for
the harvest function from the standard model in Appendix 4.A, total harvest at time t is
h = N
∫ b
a
(
qXie+ qXje
)
f(q)dq (4.1)
If the fishery is regulated according to some management goal such as MSY or optimal
extraction, assuming a sufficiently large fishing fleet, not all fishing vessels will be able
to participate. Following from Chapter 3, I define q¯ as the productivity level of the least
productive fishing vessel who is able to participate in the fishery, which I call the marginal
fisher. Suppose that licenses are sold or distributed to fishing vessels according to some
competitive allocation method based on the fishing vessels marginal value for the licenses.
Then the profit level of the marginal fisher will be equal to zero, and q¯ determines the
equilibrium price w of the licenses for each country. It follows that only vessels with
a catchability coefficient q¯ and higher are able to pay the equilibrium price w¯ for each
respective country, and are the only vessels able to acquire licenses to fish.
The actual harvest level can be found by substituting q¯ into the bounds of the harvest
function in 4.1. There are two ways the manager can optimize over the two countries.
The first approach is to maximize over both countries, resulting in a single value for q¯. I
refer to this as the full overlap approach because the catchability coefficient q¯ = q¯i = q¯j.
This implies that maximizing as a single country will use a single q¯ in the bounds for the
harvest function. The second approach is to maximize over the two countries separately,
resulting in separate q¯i and q¯j. I refer to this as the full separation case, and implies that
maximizing over individual countries will use q¯i and q¯j as bounds in the harvest function.
Section 4.2.1 outlines how this is achieved.
The level of actual effort expended E¯ is also a function of q¯. To see this, define the
54
total number of vessels who can bid for licenses as the potential effort level
E = eN
As the fishing vessels with q¯ ≤ q ≤ qmax are the only vessels able to buy licenses to fish,
this means actual effort expended is E multiplied by the probability of q¯ ≤ q ≤ qmax.
Maintaining the assumption that q has some distribution f(.) from qmin = a to qmax = b,
the expressions for total actual effort are as follows. For the full overlap case, 4.2 and 4.3
can apply.
E¯i = eNiPr[q¯i ≤ q ≤ b] = eNi
∫ b
q¯i
f(q)dq (4.2)
E¯j = eNjPr[q¯j ≤ q ≤ b] = eNj
∫ b
q¯j
f(q)dq (4.3)
For the full separation case, assuming that qˆi ≥ q¯j, 4.4 and 4.5 apply.
E¯i = eNiPr[q¯i ≤ q ≤ b] = eNi
∫ b
q¯i
f(q)dq (4.4)
E¯j = eNjPr[q¯j ≤ q ≤ q¯i] = eNj
∫ q¯i
q¯j
f(q)dq (4.5)
The equations of motion for stocks are
X˙i = g(Xi)− h(Xi, q¯i)− diXi + djXj (4.6)
X˙j = g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯j)− djXj + diXi (4.7)
Open Access
The definition of open access is that there is no management scheme. This implies that
fishing vessels are free to move between any of the patches and can exploit the fishery
until it is no longer profitable. This means fishing vessels view both patches as single
large patch, moving between patches until profit levels at each patch are driven to zero for
a marginal fisherman. This implies that the marginal fisher is the same for both patches.
For the given market conditions p and c, the marginal fisher under open access can be
used to find the OA steady state equilibrium stock levels.
pq¯OAXie− ce = 0
XOA =
c
pq¯OA
XOA can then be substituted into the growth function to find OA steady state harvest
level where X˙ = 0. Equations 4.8 to equation 4.11 form a set of simultaneous equations
that solve for qOA and XOA.
pq¯iXie− ce = 0 (4.8)
pq¯jXje− ce = 0 (4.9)
X˙i = g(Xi)− h(Xi, q¯)− diXi + djXj = 0 (4.10)
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X˙j = g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯)− djXj + diXi = 0 (4.11)
In a single patch case, the profit function for the marginal fisher and the equation of
motion for stocks are required to be solved simultaneously to determine open access effort
and stock levels. For a multi-patch case, an additional concern is how fishing vessels will
distribute themselves over the two countries. To determine the distribution of fishing
vessels in each patch, first consider the decision that each fishing vessel has to make in
each period under open access. Fishing vessel k has to choose between country i and
country j. If profit levels are equal, it implies that stock levels must be equal as follows.
pii = pij
pqkXie− ce = pqkXje− ce
Xi = Xj
This condition means that fishing vessels will prefer to fish in the country with higher
stock under open access. If the two stock levels and growth functions are identical,
then all fishing vessels are indifferent between each patch and the fleet will be distributed
equally between the two countries. Figure 4.1 shows the profit functions for two countries
A and B, during the transition towards OA equilibrium. Only fishing vessels with q ≥ q¯
can afford to participate given the constraints imposed by market price of tuna p, cost of
fishing c, and the maximum days of fishing in a season emax.
To understand the transition dynamics under open access, consider a fisherman with
qk = qOA. In the leftmost diagram in Figure 4.1, fishing vessel k would prefer to fish in
country i given the higher profit levels. This is true for all other fishing vessels, and so
country i stock gets depleted first until the profit levels are equal as shown in the middle
diagram in Figure 4.1. The corresponding stock and harvest levels are shown in Figure
4.2 for two patches where Xi > Xj. Harvest in country i occurs until the stock level is
equal to the stock level in country j, as shown in the left to middle diagram. During
this transition, some fishing vessels who are not productive enough are forced to leave
the fishery. Fisherman k, like all other fishermen who are still able to participate, is now
indifferent between either patch as profit levels are equal. When this occurs, both patches
get harvested at an equal rate until only fisherman with q = qk are left. This is the steady
state open access level for both countries at XOA. At this stock level, economic rent is
equal to zero and all other fishing vessels have been forced to leave the fishery. This is
shown in the rightmost diagram in Figure 4.1 and 4.2.
Figure 4.1: From left to right, profit functions for transition from unequal stock levels to
open access equilibrium.
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Figure 4.2: Stock, growth and harvest levels for transition from unequal stock levels to
open access equilibrium, from left to right.
Fishing vessels are distributed over the two countries according to the relative size of
the harvest levels from each country. Let hOAi (X, q) = βh
OA
j (X, q) such that β represents
the relative size between harvests. Then country i will receive
Ni = N(
β
1 + β
)
of the fishing vessels, and country j will receive
Nj = N(
1
1 + β
)
of the fishing vessels. For example, if harvest at OA equilibrium for country i is twice as
large as country j, then country i will get two-thirds of the fleet, and country j will get
one-third of the fleet.
Optimal Extraction
The optimal extraction solution maximizes total rent from the fishery over time. There
are two possible approaches to finding an optimal solution, the full overlap approach or
full separation approach. The harvest function for a full overlap approach has a single
value q¯ for both country i and j, as follows.
h =
∫ qmax
q¯
q(XiNi +XjNj)ef(q)dq (4.12)
For full separation, the harvest function requires separate q¯i and q¯j for each country.
In addition this requires the manager to first maximize for country i from a to b to find q¯i,
then maximize over the fishing vessels that are left from q¯i to a. Essentially this process
prioritizes one country over the other. The harvest function that will achieve this is
h = N
∫ qmax
q¯i
qXief(q)dq +N
∫ q¯i
q¯j
qXjef(q)dq (4.13)
This approach assumes that fishing vessels will sort efficiently between the two countries,
with the most productive vessels fishing moving to the more productive patch. This may
not be necessarily true, and this problem is examined in the next section. However, this
assumption will be sufficient to characterize an optimal solution under full separation to
compare to the full overlap case. The comparison will be based on the total rent from
either approach.
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The following are the general maximization problems for the fishery manager under
full overlap and full separation. For full overlap, the number of fishing vessels in one of
the patches is used as one of the control variables along with q¯, in order to determine the
effort to be expended in each fishery. Since N = Ni + Nj, this will determine the effort
in the other patch as well. This is required because using only q¯ would be equivalent to
double counting the fleet size from b− q¯. For full separation this is not required because
there are two control variables in q¯i and q¯j.
Full Overlap
For full overlap, the fishery manager maximizes the effort level expended by a single
fishing fleet over both patches according to
max
q¯,Ni
∫ ∞
−∞
e−ρt[ph(Xi, q¯)− cEi(q¯) + ph(Xj, q¯)− cEj(q¯)]dt
Subject to:
X˙i = g(Xi)− h(Xi, q¯)− diXi + djXj (4.14)
X˙j = g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯)− djXj + diXi (4.15)
The current value Hamiltonian for setting a single price is
H = ph(Xi, q¯)− cEi(q¯) + ph(Xj, q¯j)− cEj(q¯) + λ[g(Xi)− h(Xi, q¯)− diXi + djXj]
+ µ[g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯)− djXj + diXi]
Applying the maximum principle the following conditions are derived
∂H
∂q¯
= phq¯(Xi, q¯)− cEq¯ + λhq¯(Xi, q¯) = 0
∂H
∂Ni
= phNi(Xi, q¯)− cENi + λhNi(Xi, q¯) + phNj(Xj, q¯)− cENi + µhNi(Xj, q¯) = 0
(4.16)
λ˙ = λρ− phx(Xi, q¯)− λ(gx(Xi) + hx(Xi, q¯)− di)− µdi
µ˙ = µρ− phx(Xj, q¯)− µ(gx(Xj) + hx(Xj, q¯)− dj)− λdj
(4.17)
X˙i = g(Xi)− h(Xi, q¯)− diXi + djXj
X˙j = g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯)− djXj + diXi
(4.18)
For tractability in characterizing the equilibrium conditions I consider that there are
no flows of stock between the patches, diXi = djXj = 0. At equilibrium, X˙i = X˙j = 0.
which implies λ˙ = µ˙ = 0. The conditions above reduce to(
p− cEq¯
hq¯
)
ρ =
(
p− cEq¯
hq¯
)
gxi +
cEq¯
Xihq¯
g(Xi) (4.19)(
p− cEq¯
hq¯
)
ρ =
(
p− cEq¯
hq¯
)
gxj +
cEq¯
Xjhq¯
g(Xj) (4.20)
The solutions for X∗i , X
∗
j , q¯i and q¯j are derived simultaneously from 4.19,4.20 and the
two equations of motion for stocks in 4.18.
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Full Separation
For full separation, the fishery manager maximizes the effort level expended by a single
fishing fleet over both patches according to
max
q¯i,q¯j
∫ ∞
−∞
e−ρt[ph(Xi, q¯i)− cEi(q¯i) + ph(Xj, q¯j)− cEj(q¯j)]dt
Subject to:
X˙i = g(Xi)− h(Xi, q¯i)− diXi + djXj (4.21)
X˙j = g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯j)− djXj + diXi (4.22)
The current value Hamiltonian for the problem is
H = ph(Xi, q¯i)− cEi(q¯i) + ph(Xj, q¯j)− cEj(q¯j) + λ[g(Xi)− h(Xi, q¯i)− diXi + djXj]
+ µ[g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯j)− djXj + diXi]
Applying the maximum principle the following conditions are derived
∂H
∂q¯i
= (phq¯(Xi, q¯i)− cEq¯i − λhq¯(Xi, q¯i) = 0
∂H
∂q¯j
= (phq¯(Xj, q¯j)− cEq¯j − λhq¯(Xj, q¯j) = 0
(4.23)
λ˙ = λρ− phx(Xi, q¯i)− λ(gx(Xi) + hx(Xi, q¯i)− di)− µdi
µ˙ = µρ− phx(Xj, q¯j)− µ(gx(Xj) + hx(Xj, q¯j)− dj)− λdj
(4.24)
X˙i = g(Xi)− h(Xi, q¯i)− diXi + djXj
X˙j = g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯j)− djXj + diXi
(4.25)
For tractability in characterizing the equilibrium conditions I consider that there are no
flows of stock between the patches, diXi = djXj = 0. At equilibrium, X˙i = X˙j = 0.
which implies λ˙t = µ˙t = 0. The conditions above reduce to
(
p− cEq¯i
hq¯i
)
ρ =
(
p− cEq¯i
hq¯i
)
gxi +
cEq¯i
Xihq¯i
g(Xi) (4.26)(
p− cEq¯j
hq¯j
)
ρ =
(
p− cEq¯j
hq¯j
)
gxj +
cEq¯j
Xjhq¯j
g(Xj) (4.27)
The solutions for X∗i , X
∗
j , q¯i and q¯j are derived simultaneously from 4.26,4.27 and the
two equations of motion for stocks in 4.25.
59
4.2.2 Steady State Characteristics
The main goal in this section is to determine how fishing vessels order themselves over
the two countries in equilibrium. This will determine if optimal harvesting under in-
put or output regulation can be supported at equilibrium. However, before considering
supportability, general conditions for an equilibrium to be reached must be considered.
Proposition 3. For any equilibrium to be reached, two conditions must be met. The first
condition is that all fishing license markets should clear. The second condition is that
fishing vessels maximize their profits.
These are the two general conditions that can be used to assess whether an equilibrium
has been reached, regardless of whether that equilibrium is considered desirable or not.
Different equilibrium can be reached depending on the management scheme and price
setting mechanism.
Proposition 4. For any equilibrium under input and output regulation to be considered
supportable, three conditions must be met. The first condition is that all fishing license
markets should clear. The second condition is that fishing vessels maximize their profits.
The third condition is the efficient ordering of fishing vessels over the two countries.
For supportability of any equilibrium under input and output regulation, the same two
general conditions for equilibrium are the minimal requirement. For full supportability
a third condition is required, which is that at equilibrium fishing vessels efficiently order
themselves over the two countries. This means that the most productive fishing vessels
fish in most productive country, and the least productive vessels fish in the less productive
country. Knowing which country each fishing vessel is operating in is important as it
enables the manager to calculate the exact harvest level in each country. Any equilibrium
that achieves the third condition will be more desirable than an equilibrium that does
not because the manager will be sure that the target harvest levels will be reached.
The first condition is not difficult to achieve considering that equilibrium harvest
levels are optimized to the size of the fleet. This implies that there are enough licenses
for fishing vessels to buy, as long as they can all afford to do so. The second condition
is also easy to achieve as it is an assumption that fishing vessels are profit maximizing
and will buy licenses from the country that is the most profitable. The third condition is
related to the profit maximizing condition of fishing vessels, but is a stronger condition
that is not easy to achieve because it is imposed from the perspective of the manager.
For this condition to be achieved, the incentives of each fishing vessels have to be aligned
with the harvest function used which is unlikely to be the case.
For the following analysis, I will consider that all three conditions need to be met
for an efficient outcome. However since the second condition is always assumed to be
true, I focus on the market clearing and the efficient ordering condition. To check these
conditions, I examine the fishing vessels problem both under input control and output
control.
An implication of the linear profit function I have assumed, is that all fishing vessels
will demand the highest possible number of license under either management scheme. In
the case of input control, licenses are sold in per day effort units. The maximum number
of licenses each fishing vessel can buy is equal to the total number of days in the season,
and is the same over all fishing vessels. The license price under input control wE, is equal
to the marginal profit from each patch for the marginal fisher.
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wE = pq¯X − c (4.28)
In the case of output control, licenses are sold in harvest units. The maximum number
of licenses a fishing vessel demands in a season is equal to the maximum possible seasonal
catch tonnage, which depends on each fishing vessels productivity level q. The license
price under input control wH , is equal to the marginal profit for the marginal fisher.
wH = p− c
q¯X
(4.29)
In order to correctly characterize the individual vessel level incentives, first I have
to determine if the stock levels X for each country will be the same in equilibrium for
full overlap and full separation. This can be determined by examining the total harvest
function for the fleet. From 4.12 for full overlap, harvest is a function of q¯ and also N .
This implies that although there may be a single q¯, there can be two separate harvest
levels for each patch, because the number of fishing vessels operating in each patch can
be adjusted. From 4.13, although there is only a single N , there are two separate q¯ and so
there can be separate harvest levels for each patch. This implies that steady state stock
levels can indeed be different over each patch. This is demonstrated in Figure 4.3, which
illustrates harvest functions plot alongside the stock growth functions for each patch.
It is important to note that harvest is increasing in the stock level X. This is a
consistent with 4.12 and 4.13, regardless of whether the harvest function is linear or not.
As Figure 4.3 (a) shows, even with a single harvest function there will be two separate
stock levels for each patch. Figure 4.3 (b) shows the case when there are separate harvest
functions for each patch. Once again there are two separate stock levels. This has
important implications for the ordering of the fishing vessels because it affects the profit
functions of individual fishing vessels. Different steady state stock levels implies that there
will be separate prices for licenses from each patch under full overlap and full separation,
given 4.28 and 4.29. The only exception is when both stock and q¯ levels are equal, which
occurs under full overlap with identical countries.
Figure 4.3: Harvest levels at equilibrium under optimal management for two countries, i
and j. (a) shows the harvest levels with a single harvest function; and (b) shows the two
separate harvest functions.
The relationship between harvest and q¯ is that the value of q¯ decreases as the equilib-
rium harvest h∗ increases. The intuition behind this is that a larger harvest size requires
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more fishing vessels, which means the marginal fisher must have a lower q to increase
(b− q¯). In the case where the manager maximizes for each country over the entire fleet,
for country i with a more productive fishery than j, h∗i > h∗j and q¯i < q¯j.
h∗i =
∫ b
q¯i
qXief(q)dq >
∫ b
q¯j
qXjef(q)dq = h
∗j
When choosing a patch to fish in, each fishing vessel has to consider the relative
profitability between each patch. This is the trade-off between the increase in revenue
from the patch with the larger stock, versus the increase in the license price to fish in
the higher stock patch. If Xi > Xj, all other things equal it means that wi > wj also.
To compare relative profitability, I introduce the idea of a transition value qˆ, which is
the value of q where profit in each patch is equalized. A fishing vessel with a q = qˆ is
indifferent between fishing in either country. A fishing vessel with a q > qˆ will prefer to
fish in country i, and a fishing vessel with a q < qˆ will prefer to fish in country j.
For each management scheme I consider the profit functions of fishing vessels for full
overlap and full separation.
Input Regulation
The profit function for a fishing vessel under input regulation is
piE = pq¯Xe− wEe− ce
These are shown in Figure 4.4 (a) for full overlap with a single q¯, and Figure 4.4 (b) for
full separation, where q¯A, q¯B, and qˆ are also shown. The expression for qˆ is found by
setting the profit levels equal to each other.
qˆ =
q¯iXi − q¯jXj
Xi −Xj (4.30)
For fishing vessel k to prefer to fish in country i, its catchability value qk must meet
two criteria. The first is based on the profit function between the two countries
qk > qˆ
The second second condition is that vessel k must be productive enough to afford a license
from country i.
qk ≥ q¯i
Similarly, for fishing vessel k to prefer to fish in country j, the corresponding conditions
that must be met are
qk < qˆ
qk ≥ q¯j
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Figure 4.4: Equilibrium under input regulation for two countries, i and j where i is the
larger country. (a) shows the profit functions under full overlap; and (b) shows the profit
functions from full separation.
Proposition 5. Under the assumption of competition and heterogeneous fishers, input
regulation under full overlap can achieve the market clearing condition. The efficient
ordering condition is also possible, but is unlikely to be achieved.
Proof. As long as there is a single q¯, if pii > pij all fishing vessels prefer to fish in country
i. Once all the licenses in country i have been sold, fishing vessels will have no choice but
to buy from country j, and the market will clear. This is because it is still profitable to
fish in country j.
Efficient ordering is also possible, but not likely. If the most productive fishing vessels
were to buy licenses first, then the less productive fishing vessels would have no choice but
to buy from country j. If at least one fishing vessels with lower q¯ may be able to purchase
licenses in the more productive patch, then a more productive fishing vessel would be
pushed out and forced to buy licenses in country j. It is easy to see that efficient ordering
can only be achieved under very specific conditions.
Proposition 6. Under the assumption of competition and heterogeneous fishers, input
regulation under full separation can achieve both market clearing and efficient ordering
conditions under very specific conditions.
Proof. First consider if Xi = Xj. Since q¯i > q¯j is a condition specified in the harvest
equation, this must mean that wi > wj and pii < pij for all values of q. Since Xi = Xj
and q¯i > q¯j, the profit function lines will be parallel to each other, but the profit function
for country j will be above country i. This situation implies that fishing vessels prefer to
fish in country j because higher license prices in country i have made it less profitable.
If the less productive fishing vessels were to buy the licenses first, they would exhaust
the licenses from j and the more productive vessels will be forced to buy from country
i. The market would clear, and efficient ordering will be achieved. However, if all fishing
vessels are allowed to buy the licenses simultaneously, then all it takes is a single higher
productivity vessel with q > q¯i to fish in country j, to force a less productive fishing
vessel with q < q¯i out of the fishery because it cannot afford to buy from country i. In
this case the market will not clear.
Now consider if Xi > Xj. Again q¯i > q¯j which means wi > wj and pii < pij. Since Xi >
Xj, the profit function for country i is steeper. This implies at very high productivity
levels they will meet and country i will be more profitable . As the difference in Xi and
Xj increases, the profit function for country i grows steeper until it looks like something
resembling Figure 4.4 (b). The intersection point will be the value qˆ. In this case all
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fishing vessels with qi > qˆ will prefer to fish in country i, and all vessels with qj < qˆ will
prefer to fish in country j, subject to b > qˆ. In this case, efficient ordering is guaranteed
without any conditions on the sale of the licenses imposed by the manager.
Output Regulation
The profit function for a fishing vessel under output regulation is
piH = pq¯Xe− wH q¯Xe− ce
This is shown in Figure 4.4 for both full overlap and for full separation. The profit func-
tions are the same in either case because all fishing vessels will have the same relative
profitability regardless of productivity levels. This can be seen by looking at the expres-
sion for qˆ under output regulation. This result implies that price levels do not matter,
and that the patch with the higher stock will yield higher profit levels.
pqˆXie− wiqˆXie− ce = pqˆXje− wj qˆXje− ce
pqˆXi − (p− c
q¯iXi
)qˆXi = pqˆXj − (p− c
q¯jXj
)qˆXj
pqˆXi − pqˆXi + cqˆ
q¯i
= pqˆXj − pqˆXj + cqˆ
q¯j
qˆ
q¯i
=
qˆ
q¯j
q¯j = q¯i (4.31)
Figure 4.5: Equilibrium under output regulation for two countries, i and j. Figure (a)
shows the profit function from full overlap, resulting in a single q¯; (b) shows the profit
functions from optimizing over each country separately, resulting in q¯i and q¯j.
Proposition 7. Under the assumption of competition and heterogeneous fishers, output
regulation under full overlap may be able to clear the license market, but it will not achieve
an efficient ordering unless the two patches are identical.
Proof. Under full overlap there is only one q¯. However since there are different stock levels
at steady state, one patch will always be more profitable than the other. Let country i be
the country with the higher stock level, and country j the lower stock level. No fishing
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vessel will prefer to fish in country j, and so this implies that all fishing vessels will buy
from country i first. When the licenses for country i run out, then fishing vessels will
buy from country j. Under this scenario if the lower productivity vessels are able to buy
licenses first, it is possible that the market can clear. This is because only fishing vessels
with higher profitability can afford to buy from country j, since q¯i < q¯j. If there are no
conditions imposed on buying of licenses, then the license market will not clear because
the more productive fishing vessels will buy from country i, pushing out lower productive
fishing vessels, who will not be able to afford licenses from country j. This also means
that it is impossible for efficient ordering to be achieved.
Proposition 8. Under the assumption of competition and heterogeneous fishers, output
regulation under full separation may be able to clear the license market, which means it
is also possible that efficient ordering can be achieved. However, this is unlikely to occur.
Proof. Let country i be the country with the higher stock level, and country j the lower
stock level. Under full separation there are individual cutoff levels q¯i and q¯j. In addition,
the harvest function imposes the condition that q¯i > q¯j. Since there are different stock
levels at steady state, depending on the license prices one patch may be more profitable
than the other or they could be equally profitable. Consider that if the price of licenses
for country i is set high enough, country j may be more profitable than country i. This
implies that all fishing vessels will buy from the country j first. When the licenses for
country j run out, then fishing vessels will buy from country i. Under this scenario the
market can clear only if the less productive fishing vessels buy their licenses first, in which
case efficient ordering can be achieved. This is because less productive fishing vessels will
fish in country j and the the most efficient fishing vessels can only buy licenses to fish
in country i. However, it only takes one high productivity fishing vessel to buy licenses
first, pushing out the lower productivity vessel out of the fishery.
The implication of condition 4.31 is that under the assumptions made in this study,
output regulation is not likely to achieve the market clearing condition. In addition,
output regulation under full separation will not be able to achieve efficient ordering. These
results may appear a little extreme, and may not necessarily reflect what is observed in
the real world. One of the reasons for the result is the constant cost assumption for c. In
Figure 4.6, I show that it is possible for fishing vessels to distribute as in the effort case
for different license prices if the costs of fishing in each patch are different. For example,
if one patch is further away or the weather or fishing conditions are not as favorable as
another patch.
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Figure 4.6: This figure shows that if the constant cost assumption is relaxed, it is possible
to have an efficient ordering with separate license prices.
4.3 Application
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the heterogenous model using parameter es-
timates baased loosely on the PNA fishery for skipjack tuna. The full overlap and full
separation cases are also compared by examining total rent. First the functional forms
characterizing the model are outlined. Then I show results from simulations for the model
using parameter estimates.
4.3.1 Model
Under the assumption that f(q) is a uniform probability density function with qmax = b
and qmin = a, the full overlap harvest equation from 4.12 is
h =
∫ b
q¯
q(Xi +Xj)e
( N
b− a
)
dq =
[ q2
2(b− a)XieN
]b
q¯
h(X, q¯) = (b2 − q¯2)(Xi +Xj)eN
2(b− a) (4.32)
Total actual effort is
E¯i = eNi
∫ b
q¯
f(q)dq =
(b− q¯)eNi
b− a (4.33)
E¯j = eNj
∫ b
q¯
f(q)dq =
(b− q¯)eNj
b− a (4.34)
For full separation, the harvest equation that reflects efficient sorting of fishing vessels
from 4.13 is
h =
∫ b
qˆ
qXie
( N
b− a
)
dq +
∫ qˆ
q¯j
qXje
( N
b− a
)
dq =
[ q2
2(b− a)XieN
]b
qˆ
+
[ q2
2(b− a)XeN
]qˆ
q¯j
h(X, q¯) = (b2 − qˆ2) XieN
2(b− a) + (qˆ
2 − q¯j2) XjeN
2(b− a) (4.35)
Total actual effort is
E¯i = eNi
∫ b
qˆ
f(q)dq =
(b− qˆ)eNi
b− a (4.36)
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E¯j = eNj
∫ qˆ
q¯j
f(q)dq =
(qˆ − q¯j)eNj
b− a (4.37)
The functional forms of the equations of motion, which are the same for full overlap
and full separation, are as follows.
X˙i = riXi − riX
2
i
Ki
−XieN (b
2 − qˆ2)
2(b− a) − diXi + djXj = 0 (4.38)
X˙j = riXi −
rjX
2
j
Kj
−XjeN (qˆ
2 − q¯j2)
2(qˆ − a) − djXj + diXj = 0 (4.39)
Open Access
Under the assumption that Ki >
c
pqi
and Kj >
c
pqj
, the steady state stock size for the two
patches under open access are
pq¯OAXie− ce = 0
pq¯OAXje− ce = 0
This yields open access stock levels
XOAi =
c
pq¯OA
XOAj =
c
pq¯OA
To find q¯OAi and q¯
OA
j , substitute X
OA
i and X
OA
j into the equation of motion for stocks
(4.38) and (4.39), which both equal to zero at steady state. This implies g(X) = h(q¯, X).
Disregarding flows between patches, this becomes
ri −
[ c
pq¯OA
] ri
Ki
= eNi
(b2 − q¯OA2)
2(b− a)
ri −
[ c
pq¯OA
] rj
Kj
= eNj
(b2 − q¯OA2)
2(b− a)
This means that Ni and Nj can be identified, which then identifies effort levels in each
patch in open access equilibrium.
Optimal Extraction
If both patches were under single ownership, the owner would maximize the effort level
expended over both patches according to
max
qˆ,q¯j
∫ b
a
e−ρt[ph(Xi,t, qˆ)− cEi,t(qˆ) + ph(Xj,t, q¯j)− cEj,t(q¯j)]dt
Subject to:
X˙i = g(Xi)− h(Xi, qˆ)− diXi + djXj (4.40)
X˙j = g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯j)− djXj + diXi (4.41)
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Full Overlap
The current value Hamiltonian for setting a single price is
H = ph(Xi, q¯)− cEi(q¯) + ph(Xj, q¯j)− cEj(q¯) + λ[g(Xi)− h(Xi, q¯)− diXi + djXj]
+ µ[g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯)− djXj + diXi]
Since there is only a single q¯ to be determined, the second control variable will have to be
Ni. This is the only way that the proportion of fishing vessels operating in either patch
can be determined. To make this work, set Nj = N −Ni in the maximization problem.
Applying the maximum principle the following conditions are derived
∂H
∂q¯
= phq¯(Xi, q¯)− cEq¯ + λhq¯(Xi, q¯) = 0
∂H
∂Ni
= phNi(Xi, q¯)− cENi + λhNi(Xi, q¯) + phNj(Xj, q¯)− cENi + µhNi(Xj, q¯) = 0
(4.42)
λ˙ = λρ− phx(Xi, q¯)− λ(gx(Xi) + hx(Xi, q¯)− di)− µdi
µ˙ = µρ− phx(Xj, q¯)− µ(gx(Xj) + hx(Xj, q¯)− dj)− λdj
(4.43)
X˙i = g(Xi)− h(Xi, q¯)− diXi + djXj
X˙j = g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯)− djXj + diXi
(4.44)
For tractability, from this point forward in characterizing the conditions I consider
that there is no flows of stock between the patches, diXi = djXj = 0. At equilibrium,
X˙i = X˙j = 0. which implies λ˙ = µ˙ = 0. The conditions above reduce to(
p− cEq¯
hq¯
)
ρ =
(
p− cEq¯
hq¯
)
gxi +
cEq¯
Xihq¯
g(Xi)
(
p− cEq¯
hq¯
)
ρ =
(
p− cEq¯
hq¯
)
gxj +
cEq¯
Xjhq¯
g(Xj)
(For derivations refer to Appendix 4.B) The shadow prices are
λ = p− c
q¯Xi
µ = p− c
q¯Xj
From the steady state conditions, substituting for g(X) and h(X, q¯) and rearranging gives
me
X2i
2pri
Ki
+Xi
(
pρ− pri − cri
Kiq¯
)
+
cri
q¯
= 0 (4.45)
X2j
2prj
Kj
+Xj
(
pρ− prj − crj
Kj q¯
)
+
crj
q¯
= 0 (4.46)
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The solution for X∗i takes the following form.
X∗i =
−Bi ±
√
B2i − 4AiCi
2Ai
(4.47)
where
Ai =
2pri
Ki
;Bi = pρ− pri − 2cri
Kiq¯
;Ci =
cri
q¯
and
X∗j =
−Bj ±
√
B2j − 4AjCj
2Aj
(4.48)
where
Aj =
2prj
Kj
;Bj = pρ− prj − 2crj
Kj q¯
;Cj =
crj
q¯
Full Separation
The current value Hamiltonian for setting separate prices is
H = ph(Xi, qˆ)− cEi(qˆ) + ph(Xj, q¯j)− cEj(q¯j) + λ[g(Xi)− h(Xi, qˆ)− diXi + djXj]
+ µ[g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯j)− djXj + diXi]
Applying the maximum principle the following conditions are derived
∂H
∂qˆ
= (phq¯(Xi, qˆ)− cEqˆ − λhq¯(Xi, qˆ) = 0
∂H
∂q¯j
= (phq¯(Xj, q¯j)− cEq¯j − λhq¯(Xj, q¯j) = 0
(4.49)
λ˙ = λρ− phx(Xi, qˆ)− λ(gx(Xi) + hx(Xi, qˆ)− di)− µdi
µ˙ = µρ− phx(Xj, q¯j)− µ(gx(Xj) + hx(Xj, q¯j)− dj)− λdj
(4.50)
X˙i = g(Xi)− h(Xi, qˆ)− diXi + djXj
X˙j = g(Xj)− h(Xj, q¯j)− djXj + diXi
(4.51)
For tractability, from this point forward in characterizing the conditions I consider that
there is not flows of stock between the patches, diXi = djXj = 0. At equilibrium,
X˙i = X˙j = 0. which implies λ˙ = µ˙ = 0. The conditions above reduce to
(
p− cEqˆ
hqˆ
)
ρ =
(
p− cEqˆ
hqˆ
)
gxi +
cEqˆ
Xihqˆ
g(Xi) (4.52)(
p− cEq¯j
hq¯j
)
ρ =
(
p− cEq¯j
hq¯j
)
gxj +
cEq¯j
Xjhq¯j
g(Xj) (4.53)
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(For derivations refer to Appendix 4.C) The shadow prices are
λ = p− c
q¯jXi
µ = p− c
q¯jXj
From equation 4.52 and 4.53, substituting for g(X) and h(X, q¯) and rearranging yields
X2i
[2pri
Ki
]
−Xi
[
pρ− pri − cri
q¯jKi
]
+
cρ
q¯j
= 0 (4.54)
X2j
[2prj
Kj
]
+Xj
[
pρ− prj − crj
q¯jKj
]
+
cρ
q¯j
= 0 (4.55)
The solution for X∗i takes the following form, which can be positive or negative. The
positive root is the solution in this case. For country i,
X∗i =
−Bi ±
√
B2i − 4AiCi
2Ai
where
Ai =
2pri
Ki
Bi = pρ− pri − cri
q¯jKi
Ci =
cρ
q¯j
For country j,
X∗j =
−Bj ±
√
B2j − 4AjCj
2Aj
where
Aj =
2prj
Kj
Bj = pρ− prj − crj
q¯jKj
Cj =
cρ
q¯j
Equations 4.54 and 4.55, along with the equations of motion for stock 4.40 and 4.41
form a set of four simultaneous equations which determine equilibrium stock levels (X∗i
and X∗j ) and cutoff catchability values (q¯i and q¯j). Once these are found, the harvest
levels, effort levels and the corresponding licenses can be determined.
70
4.3.2 Parameter Estimations
The justification for the initial parameters which I will consider the baseline parameters
are outlined in Section 3.3. Total carrying capacity for the PNA is K = 16, 000, 000. For
each country, this total carrying capacity will be split from equal to very unequal shares.
Stock intrinsic growth rate r = 0.36 per year, q = 0.0006, p = 2000 per ton, c = 2000000
per vessel per year, and ρ = 0.1. a = 0.0002 and b = 0.0009. It should be noted that the
values of a and b were chosen so as to ensure that q = q¯.
4.3.3 Simulation Results
First I present simulation results for the homogeneous model, comparing revenue from
input to output regulation. Then I present the results for the heterogeneous model
comparing total rent to the fishery for full overlap and full separation. Finally I present the
results for the heterogeneous model comparing revenue from input to output regulation.
Standard Model
Two simulations for the homogeneous case were run. The first simulation varied the
value of q, while holding stock levels for Country i and Country j at 12 million and
4 millions tons respectively (Table 4.1). The second simulation varied the stock levels
for each country from a large difference to a small difference (Table 4.2). The first two
rows in Table 4.2 refers to a case single country case. As expected the main results for
the standard model from Chapter 1 still hold, which is that an increase in q leads to
a reduction in revenue. This is because increasing the value of q leads a reduction in
the price of a license, which more than offsets the increase in the number of licenses.
However, a new result specific to the two country case is that if the difference in stock
levels between the two countries is large enough, it will not be feasible for the small
country to sell all of its licenses. This can be seen in row 4 of Table 4.2, where the license
price and revenue are negative. In actual application, the country may have a certain
price level below which where it will not sell. This will result in a surplus of licenses for
that country.
q K X E P/day Rev Input h P/ton Rev Output
0.00040 12,000,000 6,815,174 344.43 22,965 1,423,759 1,408,414 1,010.90 1,423,759
0.00040 4,000,000 3,622,342 464.16 7,001 584,894 1,008,812 579.78 584,894
0.00050 12,000,000 6,364,937 361.31 20,714 1,347,142 1,379,848 976.30 1,347,142
0.00050 4,000,000 3,235,641 478.66 5,067 436,578 929,270 469.81 436,578
0.00060 12,000,000 6,056,018 372.90 19,169 1,286,658 1,354,971 949.58 1,286,658
0.00060 4,000,000 2,971,083 488.58 3,744 329,294 870,975 378.07 329,294
0.00070 12,000,000 5,830,222 381.37 18,040 1,238,374 1,334,071 928.27 1,238,374
0.00070 4,000,000 2,777,778 495.83 2,778 247,917 826,389 300.00 247,917
0.00080 12,000,000 5,657,644 387.84 17,177 1,199,150 1,316,551 910.83 1,199,150
0.00080 4,000,000 2,629,860 501.38 2,038 183,943 791,136 232.51 183,943
Table 4.1: Homogeneous 2 country case - varying value of q from 0.0004 − 0.0008, and
keeping Ki = 14 million tons and Kj = 2 million tons. (Revenue in 000’s)
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q K X E P/day Rev Input h P/ton Rev Output
0.00060 16,000,000 7,543,526 317.12 26,607 1,518,732 1,435,312 1,058.12 1,518,732
0.00060 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.00060 14,000,000 6,801,926 344.93 22,899 1,421,700 1,407,704 1,009.94 1,421,700
0.00060 2,000,000 2,123,962 520.35 0 0 663,124 0 0
0.00060 12,000,000 6,056,018 372.90 19,169 1,286,658 1,354,971 949.58 1,286,658
0.00060 4,000,000 2,971,083 488.58 3,744 329,294 870,975 378.07 329,294
0.00060 10,000,000 5,304,114 401.10 15,409 1,112,520 1,276,474 871.56 1,112,520
0.00060 6,000,000 3,769,102 458.66 7,734 638,541 1,037,239 615.62 638,541
0.00060 8,000,000 4,543,450 429.62 11,606 897,522 1,171,176 766.34 897,522
0.00060 8,000,000 4,543,450 429.62 11,606 897,522 1,171,176 766.34 897,522
Table 4.2: Homogeneous 2 country case - varying value of K for each country, and keeping
q = 0.0006. (Revenue in 000’s)
Heterogeneous Model
Two sets of simulations were run comparing total rents from the fishery for two countries,
i and j. Table 4.4 shows the results of the simulation for full overlap cases, and Table
4.3 shows the results of the simulations for full separation. In each table four different
scenarios with varying stock carrying capacity K were simulated. The first scenario is
where the carrying capacity for both countries is Ki = Kj = 8 million tons. The second
is where Ki = 10 million tons, and Kj = 6 million tons. The third is where Ki = 12
million tons, and Kj = 4 million tons. Finally the fourth is where Ki = 14 million tons,
and Kj = 2 million tons. The last case where Ki = 14 million tons, and Kj = 2 million
tons is omitted.
Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 show the steady state equilibrium stock and harvest functions
for the cases where Ki = Kj = 8 million tons, Ki = 10 million tons and Kj = 6 million
tons, and Ki = 12 million tons and Kj = 4 million tons respectively. These figures
correspond to the cases in the tables. The last case where Ki = 14 million tons, and
Kj = 2 million tons is omitted. Similarly, Figures 4.11, 4.10, 4.13 and 4.12 show the
profit levels for input regulation and output regulation under both full overlap and full
separation case. In each of the fours cases I provide simulations that correspond to the
three different country sizes, with the last case where Ki = 14 million tons, and Kj = 2
million tons being omitted.
The tables show the carrying capacity K in the first collumn, followed by the cutoff
catchability rate q¯, then equilibrium stock level X, harvest level h, and effort level E.
N represents the number of fishing vessels operating in each fishery, which is required
to determine the correct effort level under full overlap. In full separation, N is equal to
the entire fleet size because effort is determined by the separate cutoff levels. Column 7
shows the total potential rent to the entire fishery, including the fishing vessels. Column
8 shows the price of a licenses under input regulation, and column 9 shows the profit level
to each country for input regulation. The last two columns shows license price and profit
levels to each country under output regulation.
The first result is that steady state stock levels and harvest levels are identical under
full overlap and full separation. The optimal q¯ value is the same for the smaller country
under both cases, but effort levels are not. This means that while total rent over both
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K(000′s) q¯ X h E N Rent wE piE wH piH
14,000 0.00065 6,686,157 1,257,467 41,117 517 1,429,344 24,919 1,024,584 1,037 1,304,522
2,000 0.00065 2,034,680 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12,000 0.00050 6,383,072 1,075,598 40,575 357 1,162,567 15,224 617,707 867 932,684
4,000 0.00050 3,251,186 219,108 16,227 143 148,357 2,303 37,364 257 56,417
10,000 0.00044 5,853,851 873,754 37,359 296 895,528 10,271 383,699 721 629,553
6,000 0.00044 4,279,956 441,703 25,831 204 375,543 4,522 116,802 434 191,642
8,000 0.00042 5,147,724 660,723 32,482 250 630,175 7,015 227,864 581 383,564
8,000 0.00042 5,147,724 660,723 32,482 250 630,175 7,015 227,864 581 383,564
Table 4.3: Heterogeneous full overlap - holding a = 0.0002 and b = 0.001 while varying
Ki and Kj. (Revenue in 000’s)
K(000′s) q¯ X h E N Rent wE piE wH piH
14,000 0.00063 6,686,157 1,257,467 41,511 500 1,424,965 24,048 998,244 1,026 1,290,109
2,000 0.00065 2,034,680 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12,000 0.00068 6,383,072 1,075,598 36,135 500 1,211,902 24,996 903,220 1,038 1,116,912
4,000 0.00050 3,251,186 219,108 20,668 500 99,022 2,303 47,588 257 56,417
10,000 0.00072 5,853,851 873,754 31,191 500 964,065 24,146 753,137 1,027 897,592
6,000 0.00044 4,279,956 441,703 31,999 500 307,007 4,522 144,693 434 191,642
8,000 0.00077 5,147,724 660,723 26,140 500 700,635 21,819 570,355 994 656,677
8,000 0.00042 5,147,724 660,723 38,823 500 559,715 7,015 272,349 581 383,564
Table 4.4: Heterogeneous full separation - holding a = 0.0002 and b = 0.001 while varying
Ki and Kj. (Revenue in 000’s)
countries are the same, the distribution of rent over the two countries between full overlap
and full separation are not the same. The larger country receives a higher proportion
of the rent under full separation relative to full overlap. If the full separation model is
applied to two identical countries, the rent levels will not be the same. This is because
one country requires additional effort days to fish an equivalent amount of fish than the
other due to the less productive vessels that it has. This can be seen in the last two rows
of Table 4.3. The second result is that if two countries are significantly different to each
other in terms of size of fish stocks, an optimal solution where the small country can
participate may not be feasible. This is demonstrated in the first two grayed out rows of
both tables, and is the reason this case is omitted from the figures.
The last four columns of the tables show the revenue levels from licenses sales for both
input regulation and output regulation under the best case scenario. That is, if prices
were set at the corresponding q¯ levels, and under the assumption that the market clearing
and efficient ordering conditions are achieved. As the tables show, revenue under output
regulation would yield higher returns from licenses sales. However, these result only hold
if the both conditions for efficiency are achieved. In order to determine if the markets
will clear I examine the profit functions for fishing vessels under all four scenarios. These
are shown in Figures 4.10, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13.
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Figure 4.7: The equilibrium steady state levels for K = 8 million in black and K = 8
million in blue.
Figure 4.8: The equilibrium steady state levels for K = 10 million in black and K = 6
million in blue.
Figure 4.9: The equilibrium steady state levels for K = 12 million in black and K = 4
million in blue.
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(a) Ki = 8 mil, Kj = 8 mil (b) Ki = 10 mil, Kj = 6 mil (c) Ki = 12 mil, Kj = 4 mil
Figure 4.10: Full Overlap - Input Regulation for Ki (black) and Kj (blue)
(a) Ki = 8 mil, Kj = 8 mil (b) Ki = 10 mil, Kj = 6 mil (c) Ki = 12 mil, Kj = 4 mil
Figure 4.11: Full Overlap - Output Regulation for Ki (black) and Kj (blue)
(a) Ki = 8 mil, Kj = 8 mil (b) Ki = 10 mil, Kj = 6 mil (c) Ki = 12 mil, Kj = 4 mil
Figure 4.12: Full Separation - Input Regulation for Ki (black) and Kj (blue)
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(a) Ki = 8 mil, Kj = 8 mil (b) Ki = 10 mil, Kj = 6 mil (c) Ki = 12 mil, Kj = 4 mil
Figure 4.13: Full Separation - Output Regulation for Ki (black) and Kj (blue)
For both management schemes under full overlap, it is clear that unless the two
countries are identical as in 4.10a and 4.11a, the larger country is more profitable than
the smaller country. For input regulation under full overlap, in 4.10b and 4.10c the
market will clear since both countries are profitable above q¯. However, efficient ordering
is not guaranteed. For output regulation cases under full overlap shown in Figure 4.11,
there are different values for q¯ for each country, and the larger country i is always more
profitable. This means that it may not be possible for the license market to clear, and it
is impossible for efficient ordering to occur because q¯i > q¯j.
For input regulation and output regulation under full separation, the smaller country
is more profitable than the larger country, as shown in Figure 4.12 and 4.13. This is
due to the higher price being charged for the larger country licenses relative to the full
overlap cases, which is a reflection of the condition that q¯i > q¯j in the harvest function.
For input regulation cases under full separation in Figure 4.12a and 4.12b, the market
may be able to clear, however this is highly unlikely unless the less productive fishing
vessels buy licenses first. The case in Figure 4.12c is the only candidate where where
the market can clear and efficient ordering achieved without any license sales conditions.
Finally for output regulation under full separation, figure 4.13a, 4.13b and 4.13c may all
achieve market clearing and efficient ordering if less productive fishing vessels are allowed
to buy licenses first. Without this condition the markets may not clear.
4.4 Policy Implications
The first policy implication is that support for a switch from the current VDS to a output
based scheme may no longer be relevant. In fact, it may be in the interest of the PNA to
continue with the VDS rather than switch to quota based regulation. This will depend
on the constant cost of fishing assumption. If the costs of fishing over different member
countries is the same, then the PNA may be better off retaining the VDS. However, if
the cost of fishing over different countries are significantly different, then output based
quota regulation could potentially yield the same results, but with higher revenue. Given
that that the PNA is a single large fishery based in the same ocean, the only significant
differences in cost between each country could be from the distances required to travel
to each country.
The second policy implication is that the PNA should continue to set modest harvest
targets, and consider a safety margin for the number of licenses that it sells. This is
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because the analysis suggest that the conditions required for the a fishery manager to
hit the exact harvest targets are very specific, and hence unlikely to occur. This implies
that it is more likely that the harvest targets set by the PNA are either not met, or
exceeded. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that this experience is likely to be different
for each of the countries. There is anecdotal evidence indicating that this is the real world
experience for the PNA, where some countries are unable to sell all of their licenses, while
other have excess demand for their licenses and are pressured to sell more licenses than
they are allocated.
This leads to the third policy implication, which is that the PNA should examine
current licenses sales arrangements and pricing mechanisms to see if improvements can
be made in terms of ensuring that at least markets clear. The PNA is a coalition of
eight countries, and so an analysis based on the methodology used this study will be very
complicated. In addition to this, licenses are sold using auctions which are complex and
notoriously difficult to correctly implement. A first step may be to use empirical data to
examine fishing vessels incentives to examine if pricing mechanisms can be modified to
improve license sales, particularly of the smaller countries.
The final policy implication is that it may the best interest of all of the countries to
sell the licenses as a group. This conclusion is drawn by examining the single and multi-
country models together. Clearly, the single country case is much simpler and does not
have any of the additional price dynamics as the multi-country case. An important con-
sideration with a single license is how to share the revenue. There are several prominent
mechanisms, however they are complex and would be very difficult to apply in practice.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I introduce the two country case for the hetergeneous model, based on
the multi-patch model from Sanchirico and Wilen. Fishing vessels decide between which
countries to buy licenses from, and fishing vessel licenses are specific to each country. The
overall goal of this study is to compare an input regulation fishery management scheme
to a quota based management scheme, for a cooperatively owned and managed fishery.
The primary variables for comparison are the stock levels, harvest size, rent levels, and
the revenue levels to each country. The distribution of each of these variables is a key
consideration in this multi-country setting.
One clear implication of including heterogeneous fishing agents, is that in order to
correctly characterize the dynamics of the fishery, every fishing vessel’s incentives have
to be accounted for. I consider two price setting methods for both input and output
regulation, and I examine whether the target stock, harvest, and revenue levels set by the
manager can be achieved in each of these four cases. This study demonstrates that multi-
patch management is more complex that previously thought, and that the management
scheme employed is critically important to achieving the goals of the fishery manager.
This study has four primary results. First, under input regulation the license market
will clear under the full overlap case. However, an efficient ordering of fishing vessels over
the two countries is not guaranteed. Second, full efficiency is possible for input regulation
under full separation, but this result may be achievable only under specific conditions.
Third, output regulation under full overlap is not supportable under the assumptions
made in this study. Finally, output regulation under full separation could theoretically
achieve the market clearing condition and efficient ordering condition. However, this
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is highly unlikely to occur without intervention from the manager and assuming perfect
information. The last two results suggest that output regulation is not feasible. However,
relaxing the assumption of constant cost over both countries could change this result.
The first result of the simulation is that both full overlap and full separation yield the
same harvest rate, steady state stock levels, and total combined rent and effort levels. The
simulation also suggest that potential revenue under output regulation is higher relative
to input regulation. This is true for all cases under the heterogeneous model. This result
extends from and reinforces the same result from the single country case. The simulation
results show that output regulation may not achieve the market clearing condition under
both full overlap and full separation, and efficient ordering is not possible at all under
full overlap.
One interesting outcome from this simulation exercise is that under full overlap, the
larger country is more profitable, primarily due to the higher stock level. However, under
full separation the smaller country is more profitable than the larger country. This is due
to the higher license prices that are charged for the larger country’s licenses eroding the
advantage of a larger stock size.
The primary contribution of this paper is that it examines the welfare problem for
a revenue maximizing fishery coalition, comparing input versus output based regulation,
achieved by introducing heterogeneity into the multi patch bio-economic model. The
motivating problem for this analysis is also novel. To the author’s knowledge the specific
problem of the PNA fishery outlined in this multi-country context has yet to be explored
within the literature. The potential impacts of such an analysis on policy could be
significant for the member countries of the PNA. A weakness of the analysis is that the
linear profit function assumption plays an important role in the results. This assumption
means that profit levels in output regulation are dependent only on stock size and license
prices, not productivity. This implies that fishing vessels with a higher productivity level
have no advantage under output regulation. Coupled with the constant cost assumption,
this drives the negative results of output regulation. These could be areas for improvement
in future studies.
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Appendix 3
4.A Standard Model
Assume there arem countries. Each country has a separate stock in a spatial environment,
which can be treated as a patch. Stock size X for country i evolves according to
X˙i = gi(Xi)− hi(Xi, Ei)− diXi +
m∑
j=1,j 6=i
djiXj (4.56)
subject to
Xi(0) = X0, Xj(0) = X0, Ei(0) = E0, Ej(0) = E0, t ≥ 0
Xi(t) ≥ 0, Xj(t) ≥ 0, Ei(t) ≥ 0, Ej(t) ≥ 0
where g(X) is a logistic growth function for the stock of fish X, and h(X,Et) is a harvest
function which depends on the stock level and effort level E applied to the fishery. Effort
E for country i is a function of the net revenues available in each country, and evolves
according to
E˙ = δi[phi(Xi, Ei)− cEi] +
m∑
j=1,j 6=i
δji[phi(Xi, Ei)− cEi − phj(Xj, Ej)− cEj] (4.57)
subject to the same conditions as in 4.56, where gi(Xi) = rXi(1 −Xi/K) is the growth
rate and hi(Xi, Ei) = qiXiEi represents the harvest of tuna from patch i.
In equation 4.56, diXi ≥ 0 represents the outflow of tuna from country i into other
countries, and djiXj ≥ 0 represents the inflow of fish from country j to country i. For
tractability I disregard tuna outflows and inflows from international waters. Effort in
each country depends on own patch net revenues and elasticity term δi, as well as on
relative net revenues and the between patch elasticity interactive term between country
j and country i, δji.
This general model can be used to represent many different scenarios and is considered
a fully integrated model (Sanchirico and Wilen 1999). In this general specification there
is movement from each patch to all the other patches. Another possible specification
is a source-sink model, when there is one way movement from one patch to the other
patches. As a simplification, the summation term in equation 4.56 becomes djXj ≥ 0,
and similarly the between patch elasticity interactive term δji in equation 4.57 becomes
δj.
Open Access
For the two country open access case, at equilibrium, the equations of motion for stock
X and effort E for each country are equal to zero. For the fully integrated model, these
are
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X˙i = gi(Xi)− hi(Xi, Ei)− diXi + djXj = 0 (4.58)
X˙j = gj(Xj)− hj(Xj, Ej)− djXj + diXj = 0 (4.59)
E˙i = δi(phi(Xi, Ei)− cEi) + δj[(phi(Xi, Ei)− cEi)− (phj(Xj, Ej)− cEj)] = 0 (4.60)
E˙j = δj(phj(Xj, Ej)− cEj) + δi[(phj(Xj, Ej)− cEj)− (phi(Xi, Ei)− cEi)] = 0 (4.61)
From 4.60 and 4.61, we get:
(δi + δj)(phi(Xi, Ei)− cEi)− δj[(phj(Xj, Ej)− cEj)] = 0
(δj + δi)(phj(Xj, Ej)− cEj)− δi[(phi(Xi, Ei)− cEi)] = 0
Using elementary algebra the only solution to this system of equations is
pqiXiEi − cEi = 0
pqjXjEj − cEj = 0
Under the assumption that Ki >
c
pqi
and Kj >
c
pqj
, the steady state stock size for the two
patches under open access are
XOAi =
c
pqi
(4.62)
XOAj =
c
pqj
(4.63)
Substituting these back into the equations of motion for stock 4.58 and 4.59, we get
expressions for steady state effort levels under open access
EOAi =
1
qi
[ri − di + djKi
Ki
]− cri
pKiq2j
(4.64)
EOAj =
1
qj
[rj − dj + diKj
Kj
]− crj
pKjq2i
(4.65)
Maximum Sustainable Yield
The logistical growth function is maximized where g′(X) = 0, however there are addi-
tional interaction terms for inflows and outflows of tuna to other countries to consider as
part of total growth of the stocks.
gi(Xi)− diXi + djXj0
gj(Xj)− djXj + diXi
Taking the derivative for these yields the MSY equilibrium stock level.
XMSYi =
Ki
2
− diKi
2r
(4.66)
XMSYj =
Kj
2
− djKj
2r
(4.67)
Substituting this into the equation of motion for stocks (equation 4.58 and 4.59) yields
the MSY equilibrium effort level.
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EMSYi =
Ki(
ri
4
+
d2i
4ri
− di
2
) +
djKj
2
(1− dj
rj
)
qiKi
2
(1 + 1
ri
)
(4.68)
EMSYj =
Kj(
rj
4
+
d2j
4rj
− dj
2
) + diKi
2
(1− di
ri
)
qjKj
2
(1 + 1
rj
)
(4.69)
Optimal Extraction
If both patches were under single ownership, the owner would maximize the effort level
expended over both patches according to
max
Ei,Ej
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[ph(Xi,t, Ei,t)− cEi,t + ph(Xj,t, Ej,t)− cEj,t]dt
Subject to:
x˙i,t = g(Xi,t)− h(Xi,t, Ei,t)− diXi,t + djXj,t (4.70)
x˙j,t = g(Xj,t)− h(Xj,t, Ej,t)− djXj,t + diXi,t (4.71)
Xi(0) = X0, Xj(0) = X0, Ei ≤ Emax, Ej ≤ Emax, t ≥ 0
Ei(t) ≥ 0, Ej(t) ≥ 0
Emax is the maximum possible effort days that can be applied to the fishery in a season.
This is equal to the number of days in a season for each fishing vessel emax multiplied by
the number of vessels N operating in the fishery. That is, Emax = Nemax.
The current value Hamiltonian for the problem is
H = ph(Xi,t, Ei,t)−cEi,t+ph(Xj,t, Ej,t)−cEj,t+λ[gi(Xi,t)−hi(Xi,t, Ei,t)−diXi,t+djXj,t]
+ µ[g(Xj,t)− h(Xj,t, Ej,t)− dj,tXj,t + diXi,t]
Applying the maximum principle the following conditions are derived
∂H
∂Ei,t
= (phE(Xi,t, Ei,t)− c− λhE(Xi,t, Ei,t) = 0
∂H
∂Ej,t
= (phE(Xj,t, Ej,t − c− λhE(Xj,t, Ej,t) = 0
(4.72)
λ˙ = λρ− phx(Xi,t, Ei,t)− λ(gx(Xi,t) + hx(Xi,t, Ei,t)− di)− µdi
µ˙ = µρ− phx(Xj,t, Ej,t)− µ(gx(Xj,t) + hx(Xj,t, Ej,t)− dj)− λdj
(4.73)
x˙i,t = g(Xi,t)− h(Xi,t, Ei,t)− diXi,t + djXj,t
x˙j,t = g(Xj,t)− h(Xj,t, Ej,t)− djXj,t + diXi,t
(4.74)
At the steady state equilibrium, x˙i,t = x˙j,t = 0 and λ˙t = µ˙t = 0. The conditions above
reduce to 1
1These derivations are similar to the heterogeneous case that is presented in Appendix ??
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(
p− cEqi
hqi
)
ρ =
(
p− cEqi
hqi
)
gxi +
cEqi
Xi,thqi
g(Xi,t) (4.75)(
p− cEqj
hqj
)
ρ =
(
p− cEqj
hqj
)
gxj +
cEqj
Xj,thqj
g(Xj,t) (4.76)
From equation 4.75 and 4.76, substituting for g(X) and h(X,E) and rearranging
(
2pr
K
)X2i,t − (pr − pρ−
cr
qi,tK
− cdi
qj,tK
)Xi,t − ρc− cdi
qi,t
= 0 (4.77)
(
2pr
K
)X2j,t − (pr − pρ−
cr
qj,tK
− cdj
qi,tK
)Xj,t − ρc− cdj
qj,t
= 0 (4.78)
The solutions for X∗i and X
∗
j takes the following form, which can be positive or negative.
This depends on parameters however the positive root is the solution in this case.
X∗i =
−Bi ±
√
B2i − 4AiCi
2Ai
(4.79)
where
Ai =
2pri
Ki
;Bi = pr − pρ− cr
qi,tK
− cdi
qj,tK
;Ci =
ρc− cdi
qi,t
and
X∗j =
−Bj ±
√
B2j − 4AjCj
2Aj
(4.80)
where
Aj =
2prj
Kj
;Bj = pr − pρ− cr
qj,tK
− cdj
qi,tK
;Cj =
ρc− cdj
qj,t
.
Substituting equation 4.79 and 4.80 into the equation of motion for stocks (equations
4.70 and 4.71) respectively, yields the optimal equilibrium (steady state) effort levels E∗i
and E∗j .
E∗i =
ri
qi
(1− X
∗
i
Ki
)− di
qi
+
djX
∗
j
qiX∗i
(4.81)
E∗j =
rj
qj
(1− X
∗
j
Kj
)− dj
qj
+
diX
∗
i
qjX∗j
(4.82)
The optimal harvest strategy for each country is a piecewise function which depends on
the stock level in the fishery. This is a ‘bang-bang’ type of transition to steady state, and
is a result of the infinitely elastic tuna price (constant price) assumption. If the stock
level is above the steady state, the optimal harvest rate is to apply maximum effort. At
steady state stock levels, the optimal strategy is to apply the effort rate that results in
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a harvest level equal to the growth rate of the stock. At stock levels below steady state
the optimal harvest rate is zero.
Ei(t) =

Emax if Xi(t) > X
∗
i
E∗i if Xi(t) = X
∗
i
0 if Xi(t) < X
∗
i
(4.83)
Ej(t) =

Emax if Xj(t) > X
∗
j
E∗j if Xj(t) = X
∗
j
0 if Xj(t) < X
∗
j
(4.84)
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4.B Optimal Extraction - Full Overlap
H = p(b2− q¯2) XieNi
2(b− a) − ceNi
(b− q¯
b− a
)
+ p(b2− q¯2)Xje(N −Ni)
2(b− a) − ce(N −Ni)
(b− q¯
b− a
)
+ λ
[
riXi(1−Xi/Ki)− (b2 − q¯2) XieNi
2(b− a) − diXi + djXj
]
+ µ
[
rjXj(1−Xj/Kj)− (b2 − q¯2)Xje(N −Ni)
2(b− a) − djXj + diXi
]
Disregarding flows between patches the Hamiltonian is
H = p(b2 − q¯2) XieNi
2(b− a) + p(b
2 − q¯2)Xje(N −Ni)
2(b− a) − ceN
(b− q¯
b− a
)
+ λ
[
riXi(1−Xi/Ki)− (b2 − q¯2) XieNi
2(b− a)
]
+ µ
[
rjXj(1−Xj/Kj)− (b2 − q¯2)Xje(N −Ni)
2(b− a)
]
Applying the maximum principle the following conditions are derived
∂H
∂q¯i
= p(−2q¯ XieNi
2(b− a)) + p(−2q¯
Xje(N −Ni)
2(b− a) )− c(−eN
1
b− a)−
λ(−2q¯ XieNi
2(b− a))− µ(−2q¯
Xje(N −Ni)
2(b− a) ) = 0 (4.85)
∂H
∂Ni
= p(b2 − q¯2) Xie
2(b− a) − ce
(b− q¯
b− a
)
− p(b2 − q¯2) Xje
2(b− a) + ce
(b− q¯
b− a
)
+ λ
[
− (b2 − q¯2) Xie
2(b− a)
]
+ µ
[
(b2 − q¯2) Xje
2(b− a)
]
= 0 (4.86)
λ˙ = λρ− p(b2 − q¯2) eNi
2(b− a) − λ[ri −
2riXi
Ki
− (b2 − q¯2) eNi
2(b− a) ]
µ˙ = µρ− p(b2 − q¯2)e(N −Ni)
2(b− a) − µ[rj −
2rjXj
Kj
− (b2 − q¯2)e(N −Ni)
2(b− a) ]
(4.87)
X˙i = riXi(1−Xi/Ki)− (b2 − q¯2) XieNi
2(b− a)
X˙j = rjXj(1−Xj/Kj)− (b2 − q¯2) XjeNj
2(b− a)
(4.88)
From MP1
λ = p− c
q¯Xi
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µ = p− c
q¯Xj
From MP3, applying the steady state condition X˙i = 0 and X˙j = 0 I get
ri − riXi
Ki
= (b2 − q¯2) eNi
2(b− a)
rj − rjXj
Kj
= (b2 − q¯2)e(N −Ni)
2(b− a)
Applying the steady state condition λ˙ = 0 and µ˙ = 0 to MP2
λρ = p(ri − riXi
Ki
) + λ[ri − riXi
Ki
]
µρ = p(rj − rjXj
Kj
) + µ[rj − rjXj
Kj
]
After substitution this gives me the tranversality condition, which along with the
equation of motion for the fishery forms a set of equations which can solve for q¯, Xi and
Xj.
(p− c
q¯Xi
)ρ = p(ri − riXi
Ki
) + (p− c
q¯Xi
)[ri − riXi
Ki
]
(p− c
q¯Xj
)ρ = p(rj − rjXj
Kj
) + (p− c
q¯Xj
)[rj − rjXj
Kj
]
which after rearranging becomes
X2i
2pri
Ki
+Xi
(
pρ− pri − cri
Kiq¯
)
+
cri
q¯
= 0 (4.89)
X2j
2prj
Kj
+Xj
(
pρ− prj − crj
Kj q¯
)
+
crj
q¯
= 0 (4.90)
The solution for X∗i takes the following form.
X∗i =
−Bi ±
√
B2i − 4AiCi
2Ai
(4.91)
where
Ai =
2pri
Ki
;Bi = pρ− pri − 2cri
Kiq¯
;Ci =
cri
q¯
and
X∗j =
−Bj ±
√
B2j − 4AjCj
2Aj
(4.92)
where
Aj =
2prj
Kj
;Bj = pρ− prj − 2crj
Kj q¯
;Cj =
crj
q¯
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4.C Optimal Extraction - Full Separation
H = p(b2 − q¯2i )
XieN
2(b− a) − ceN
(b− q¯i
b− a
)
+ p(q¯2i − q¯2j )
XjeN
2(b− a) − ceN
( q¯i − q¯j
b− a
)
+ λt
[
riXi(1−Xi/Ki)− (b2 − q¯2i )
XieN
2(b− a) − diXi + djXj
]
+ µt
[
rjXj(1−Xj/Kj)− (q¯2i − q¯2j )
XjeN
2(b− a) − djXj + diXi
]
Disregarding flows between patches
H = p(b2 − q¯2i )
XieN
2(b− a) − ceN
(b− q¯i
b− a
)
+ p(q¯2i − q¯2j )
XjeN
2(b− a) − ceN
( q¯i − q¯j
b− a
)
+ λt
[
riXi(1−Xi/Ki)− (b2 − q¯2i )
XieN
2(b− a)
]
+ µt
[
rjXj(1−Xj/Kj)− (q¯2i − q¯2j )
XjeN
2(b− a)
]
Applying the maximum principle the following conditions are derived
∂H
∂q¯i
= −pq¯iXieN
b− a +
ceN
b− a +
pq¯iXjeN
(b− a) −
ceN
b− a + λ
q¯iXieN
b− a − µ
q¯iXjeN
(b− a) = 0 (4.93)
∂H
∂q¯j
= −pq¯jXjeN
b− a +
ceN
b− a + µ
q¯jXjeN
b− a = 0 (4.94)
λ˙ = λρ− p(b2 − q¯2i )
eN
2(b− a) − λ[ri −
2riXi
Ki
− (b2 − q¯2i )
eN
2(b− a) ]
µ˙ = µρ− p(q¯2i − q¯2j )
eN
2(b− a) − µ[rj −
2rjXj
Kj
− (q¯2i − q¯2j )
eN
2(b− a) ]
(4.95)
x˙i = riXi(1−Xi/Ki)− (b2 − q¯2i )
XieN
2(b− a)
x˙j = rjXj(1−Xj/Kj)− (q¯2i − q¯2j )
XjeN
2(b− a)
(4.96)
From MP1
λ = p− c
q¯jXi
(4.97)
µ = p− c
q¯jXj
(4.98)
From MP3, applying the steady state condition x˙i = 0 and x˙j = 0 we get
ri − riXi
Ki
= (b2 − q¯2i )
XieN
2(b− a)
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rj − rjXj
Kj
= (q¯2i − q¯2j )
XjeN
2(b− a)
Applying the steady state condition λ˙ = 0 and µ˙ = 0 to MP2 yields
λρ = p(b2 − q¯2i )
eN
2(b− a) + λ[ri −
2riXi
Ki
− (b2 − q¯2i )
eN
2(b− a) ]
µρ = p(q¯2i − q¯2j )
eN
2(b− a) + µ[rj −
2rjXj
Kj
− (q¯2i − q¯2j )
eN
2(b− a) ]
which after substitution and rearranging, the following steady state conditions are
found.
ρ
(
p− c
q¯jXi
)
= p
(
ri − riXi
Ki
)
+
(
p− c
q¯jXi
)[
− riXi
Ki
]
ρ
(
p− c
Xj q¯j
)
= p
(
rj − rjXj
Kj
)
+
(
p− c
Xj q¯j
)[
− rjXj
Kj
]
which after rearranging becomes
X2i
[2pri
Ki
]
−Xi
[
pρ− pri − cri
q¯jKi
]
+
cρ
q¯j
= 0
X2j
[2prj
Kj
]
+Xj
[
pρ− prj − crj
q¯jKj
]
+
cρ
q¯j
= 0
The solution for X∗i takes the following form, which can be positive or negative. The
positive root is the solution in this case. For country i,
X∗i =
−Bi ±
√
B2i − 4AiCi
2Ai
where
Ai =
2pri
Ki
Bi = pρ− pri − cri
q¯jKi
Ci =
cρ
q¯j
For country j,
X∗j =
−Bj ±
√
B2j − 4AjCj
2Aj
where
Aj =
2prj
Kj
Bj = pρ− prj − crj
q¯jKj
Cj =
cρ
q¯j
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Chapter 5
A Revenue Sharing Mechanism for a
Tuna Cartel: Local vs Global
Licenses
5.1 Introduction
In this paper I analyze two approaches to revenue sharing for a coalition of seven tuna
rich countries in the central-eastern Pacific Ocean. This coalition is known as the Parties
to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), and was formed in order to achieve greater bargaining
power and management over the fisheries resources in its EEZ. The first approach is what
I refer to as partial cooperation, and is the approach that the PNA currently employs.
Under partial cooperation the number of total licenses is set together then distributed
to members to sell individually. The second approach which I introduce in this paper
is what I consider to be a full cooperation approach, and is where the total number of
licenses are set and sold together as one entity. I will refer to this as the full cooperation
approach. These two approaches are mechanisms that are used to share the revenue from
the cooperative management of the tuna fishery. The primary objective of this study is
to compare these two mechanisms in order to characterize the benefits and drawbacks of
switching to full cooperation.
There are a few points to note about the general approach taken in this study. First,
only the welfare of the member countries in the PNA is considered. The model is fairly
complex even without considering the welfare of fishing vessels, and so this will keep the
analysis as simple as possible. This also serves to focus the results of the study on the
policy implications to the PNA and the member countries. Second, the results from this
study only reflect the design of each approach, and are independent of any market power
considerations. This was achieved by the choice of the demand function employed in the
study. These results therefore serve as a minimum benchmark for what can be achieved
by switching to full cooperation, as the inclusion of market power gains reinforce the
results of the study. An implication of this is that I assume perfect information, in order
to characterize this benchmark. Thirdly, given that the PNA has been in existence for
almost four decades, I assume that the PNA as a coalition is inherently stable. As such,
analysis of the stability of the coalition is not an important consideration in this study.
The central and eastern areas of the Pacific ocean have the most productive tuna
fisheries in the region. These include countries that are signatories to the Parties to the
Nauru Agreement (PNA), a coalition of eight Pacific Island Countries (PICs) known to
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be rich in tuna resources. The returns from these fisheries represent a significant source
of income for the PNA members. In 2007 the PNA introduced the Vessel Day Scheme
(VDS), an effort or input based management scheme. Under the VDS, licenses to fish in
PNA exclusive economic zones (EEZ) are sold on a ‘per-day effort’ basis. A license gives
fishing vessels the right to fish for one day, or 24 hours. As a coalition the PNA sets
the total allowable catch (TAC) to be harvested in their combined EEZ. An estimated
total allowable effort (TAE) level is then determined which would yield the TAC. Each
member country is assigned a proportion of the TAE, or the total number of fishing days
in a season. From this point forward, I will refer to this as the share of TAC for each
member country.
Licenses to fish are currently sold by individual countries to distant water fishing
nation (DWFN) fishing vessels in per day effort units. Under the current arrangement
the PNA sets the total allowable catch (TAC) as a coalition. The TAC determines the
total harvest, and in turn the total number of effort days or licenses to be sold. This
decision is made every few years during a meeting attended by leaders of each member
country. In some cases the TAC for the current year is provisionally adopted for the
next few years. For example, the PNA set the TAC for 2017 as the same tentative
TAC for 2018 and 2019. Licenses are then distributed to each country who sells its
licenses individually. The licenses are distributed according to shares based primarily
on historical catch, predictions of the future stock size and distribution of fish over the
member countries, and likely also includes some level of political considerations. Political
considerations aside, these predictions are not completely accurate, and it is one of the
reasons the PNA usually sets tentative TAC and shares for a few years at a time. In a
sense these tentative shares are an approximation of an average share, which is likely to
be a more accurate prediction than specific catch share rates. The licenses are specific
to each country and are therefore heterogeneous or local. This arrangement represents
only partial cooperation as countries are still competing with each other by selling local
licenses.
Since the implementation of the VDS in 2007, total revenue to the coalition as a
whole improved dramatically relative to pre-VDS. However, revenue to smaller member
countries have been relatively low and volatile from year to year, with some countries
failing to sell all of its licenses. The basic intuition behind why this occurs is that the
current method of distributing TAC shares is essentially based on an average approxima-
tion of predicted stock shares in each country. However, since licenses are specific to each
country, the sale of licenses in each country is dependent on actual realized stock shares.
Any discrepancies between the the average and realized shares results in some countries
having a shortage of licenses, while others will have excess licenses. In order to mitigate
this issue, the PNA has allowed licenses to be traded across countries, so that countries
with excess licenses can still receive some revenue by selling licenses to countries with
excess demand. However, license trading in this manner will not yield as much revenue to
the original selling country as direct sales to fishing vessels. An independent review of the
VDS requested by the PNA by Anarson (2014) recommended that a study considering
the costs and benefits of single license over multiple countries be conducted. The review
also recommended that the PNA consider long term share levels rather than year to year
revisions.
One attractive feature of this mechanism is that it gives each country full control
over the sale of the licenses, and by extension the amount of fishing in its EEZ. Not
only can countries safeguard against overfishing, this independence ensures countries are
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fully insulated from other members in terms of the finances related to the revenue from
license sales. In addition, this control over the license sales may be a useful tool in the
diplomatic relationships of individual PNA countries with DWFN countries. The current
mechanism is also well established, with a proven record of decision making which has
provided stability for the coalition over the last two decades. This is a significant point, as
the PNA is a rare example of a successful multinational cooperative managing a renewable
resource such as a fishery (Bernadett 2014).
The single largest drawback to the current partial cooperation mechanism is the loss
of revenue resulting from the excess demand for licenses in some countries, and excess
supply in other countries. This is caused by the discrepancy in the shares of the TAC
which is distributed to each country, and the actual distribution of the stock of fish over
the countries. This also explains why some countries may have been tempted to sell more
licenses than they were allocated, and why some end up with unsold licenses. The second
disadvantage of partial cooperation is the dependence of the revenue on the volatility of
the share of fish stock in each country in each year. This is a problem even under the best
case scenario where the TAC shares are revised correctly to match the distribution of tuna
stock. Revenue volatility was a key concern for at least one of the PNA countries during
consideration of the VDS (Deiye 2007). The third major drawback of partial cooperation,
is the competition between countries to sell licenses. This competition erodes the market
power of the PNA, and is contrary to the idea of a coalition which strives to replicate a
monopoly market. This implies that revenue received by each country can be improved
by simply removing this competition between members. This last aspect is not included
in the analysis, as the focus is to characterize a minimum benchmark of improvement
based solely on the the design of the sharing mechanisms themselves.
In this study I introduce a full cooperation approach, where the PNA sets the TAC
over multiple years, and sells the licenses as one entity. The primary point of difference
is that these licenses can be used in any EEZ, and are therefore homogeneous or global.
This means that one license will give fishing vessels access to all countries in the coalition.
It turns out that having a single license not only smooths out revenue from license sales,
but also ensures that any excess supply or demand for individual countries is eliminated.
All of the licenses can be sold because a single license allows fishing vessels to move freely
among each country based on the actual distribution of fish stocks. This is an important
point and is where the majority of the gains in revenue over partial cooperation come
from. I show that unless each country’s share of the stock of fish remains constant from
year to year, full cooperation always yields equal to or greater revenue levels relative to
partial cooperation. In addition, revenue levels to each country will be stable from year
to year, which is another key advantage to this approach. This is primarily due to the
licenses being all sold, but also because the share for each country is constant over the
number of periods the TAC is decided.
To illustrate the difference between partial and full cooperation, and to understand
the intuition behind the results, consider the simplest possible example of the model
which is for two countries (A and B) in two periods. This example is outlined in Table
5.1, and forms a basic model which can be extended to multiple countries and multiple
time periods.
In period 1, country A has a 20 percent share of the total fish stock, which is denoted
by αA1 = 0.20, and 30 percent share of the total fish stock in period 2 which is denoted by
αA2 = 0.30. Under both partial cooperation and full cooperation, the TAC is distributed
between members according to an expected average share based on the α’s, which is
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Table 5.1: Illustration of difference in shares for partial cooperation and full cooperation
t = 1 t = 2 t = 1, t = 2
Country A αA1 = 0.20 α
A
2 = 0.30 βA = 0.25
Country B αB1 = 0.80 α
B
2 = 0.70 βB = 0.75
constant for both period 1 and period 2. For country A, this is equal to βA = 0.25. Since
there are only two countries, the shares for country B are the complement of country A.
In period 1, country B has αB1 = 0.80 share of the total fish stock, and in period 2 it has
αB2 = 0.70 share of the fish stock. This means the share of the TAC is βB = 0.75 for
country B.
Note that in period 1, the share of the TAC that country A receives is βA = 0.25,
but the actual realized share of the total stock of fish is equal to αA1 = 0.20 in period 1.
Similarly, in period 1 country B receives βA = 0.75 of the TAC, but α
B
1 = 0.80 of the
total stock of fish. Under the assumption of perfect competition among member countries
selling licenses, setting the TAC and the number of licenses is the same as setting a single
market price for the licenses. For a given market price, fishing vessels buy licenses based
on the abundance of fish which is represented by the proportion of the stock of fish in
each country. However, in this example there is clearly a discrepancy between the the
share of the TAC each country receives, and the proportion of the total stock of fish that
each country has. This discrepancy is where the inefficiency in partial cooperation comes
from.
Under partial cooperation, in period 1 country A will end up with a surplus of licenses
because it receives a higher share of the TAC that the total fish stock share in it’s EEZ.
By the same logic, country B will end up with excess demand for licenses because it has a
higher share of the total fish stock in its EEZ than the share of the TAC that it receives.
In period 2, the situation reverses, with country A running out of licenses and country B
not able to sell all of its licenses. Under full cooperation both countries receive the same
share of TAC as in partial cooperation. However, since there is a single license which
allows vessels access to both countries, the distribution of fish stocks does not matter to
the sale of the licenses, and so all the licenses will be sold.
In this example I have assumed for tractability that the distribution of the TAC
over the two periods is identical under partial and full cooperation. Given the tentative
setting of the shares over multiple years, this probably represents the situation in the
real world. However, it is also possible that the shares could be adjusted to correctly
match the actual distribution of fish stocks. In this case the model predicts that total
revenue to the coalition is identical in each period and for the total number of periods,
for both partial and full cooperation. However, revenue to each country in each period
will fluctuate under partial cooperation relative to full cooperation.
This study has four primary results. The first result is that full cooperation will always
result in a more stable income stream relative to partial cooperation. Two exceptions
to this result are when the share of fish stock in each country remains stable from year
to year, or if full cooperation is implemented in a single year rather than over multiple
years. In these two cases the revenue streams will be identical under partial cooperation.
The second result is that if the total stock of fish to the coalition remains stable from
year to year, total revenue to each country over all periods is always greater under full
cooperation. If total stock levels were to fluctuate significantly, it is possible that partial
cooperation could yield higher revenue levels relative to full cooperation. However, I
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show that the degree to which the total stock levels need to vary from year to year for
this situation to occur is considerable. For such a large fish stock such as the PNA, it is
unlikely to occur unless there is a collapse of the fish stocks. The third result is that total
income to the coalition for each individual period for full cooperation will always be equal
to or greater than partial cooperation, only if the demand function is convex or linear. If
the demand function is concave, then partial cooperation could yield higher total income
relative to full cooperation. This result implies that the concavity or convexity of the
demand function for licenses plays an important role in the degree of the difference in
the revenue between the two functions. For very concave demand functions, countries are
always better off under partial cooperation. The final result is that risk averse countries
will always prefer full cooperation to partial cooperation. I show that full cooperation
second order stochastically dominates partial cooperation. This implies that on average,
income from full cooperation will be higher than partial cooperation.
One key advantage of the proposed approach is that the sharing rule used in the
current arrangement is retained, minimizing departure from the current approach. This
point helps justify dropping coalition stability from this analysis. From a mechanism
design perspective, this sharing mechanism is simple and intuitive. While there are
several prominent and well established sharing mechanisms which could potentially work,
they are generally very complex and difficult to implement in real world applications.
For example, the Shapley-value (Shapley 1953) calculates the share of benefits for each
member of a coalition as the average of the marginal contribution of that member to
every possible combination of the coalition which it is included. Such a complex sharing
mechanism would be difficult to explain, let alone justify its adoption, to policy makers.
The primary disadvantage of the full cooperation approach is that countries will lose
the ability to control the sale of the licenses and the amount of fishing in its EEZ. Firstly
considering the issue of control over licenses sales, from a political standpoint giving
up the ability to control the sale of licenses may be important for some of the larger
countries who do not have significant problems with revenue fluctuations. Although the
option still remains for shares to be distributed as licenses under full cooperation, the
price for all licenses will be the same and so it is equivalent to receiving a share of the
revenue. Theoretically there is no reason to sell licenses individually as it would only
involve costs of individual sale by each country. However, politically there may be value
in each country retaining control of it finances. It may also serve as transition step to full
revenue sharing. In the presentation of the model and the rest of this section I reference
only revenue shares, but the retention of licenses shares is considered in the discussion
section.
The second and perhaps more concerning issue is that countries will not be able
to control the amount of fishing in its EEZ, which could cause overfishing problems.
However, because the stock is jointly managed by setting the TAC together, as long as
the TAC is not exceeded by countries selling more licenses than they were allocated,
this should not be an issue. In this study I assume that there is a positive relationship
between the share of fish stock and the amount of fishing in each country. In addition, the
cost of fishing between each country is the same, and that the quality of the fish remains
constant in all countries. That implies fishing vessels will fish proportionately the same
amount as the shares of each country. One important point to note is that all countries
share the stocks. This means that any overfishing in one country is likely to impact the
others. The proposed approach at least ensures that smaller countries are compensated
for any overfishing in any of the other EEZ.
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Another limitation with the full cooperation approach, is that it relies on a fairly
accurate estimate of the stock of fish in each country. In this respect however, it is no
different from the current partial cooperation approach. For the model I make the strong
assumption that the stock level and distribution of fish is known with some certainty from
year to year. This to some extent reflects how the PNA sets its TAC tentatively from year
to year. This tentative TAC implies that there is room to allow for uncertainty. Given
that the intention of this study is to compare both approaches under ideal conditions, I
assume that stock levels are known with certainty. Relaxing this assumption could be an
important area for future expansion of the model.
In the model I assume that the stock of skipjack migrate between the waters of each
of the countries in the PNA, and are therefore common to the majority of the coalition.
I do not consider significant source-sink effects from some countries to others, which
would impact the dynamics of the sharing mechanism. For simplicity I assume a single
stock, and that each country has a share α of the stock in each time period. I also
assume that there is a single large fishing fleet which can buy licenses from any of the
countries. Throughout the paper, I will refer to a large country as a country with the
larger stock and vice versa for a smaller country. The total number of time periods that
the coalition sets the TAC is denoted as T . Each individual time period is denoted as
t. I examine revenue levels for each country for each single t period as well as for all T
periods. Similarly, I examine revenue to the entire coalition for each single t period, as
well as for all T periods.
The general form of the demand function adopted in this paper allows for representa-
tion of convex, linear and concave demand functions, while retaining the intercepts in all
cases. This allows for convenient comparison of the revenue levels for different demand
conditions. The results show that the concavity or convexity of the demand function play
an important role in determining the degree of difference between the two mechanisms.
One of the important assumptions made in this study is that the demand functions for
the coalition and each individual country have the same vertical intercept and the same
slopes. This implies that each individual country has the same market power as the
coalition. This means that the revenue potential to the coalition and each individual
country is the same under both approaches, which enables the comparison between the
two approaches to be as objective as possible by disregarding any market power gains
from the new approach. While this assumption may reflect the case for larger countries
which have significantly larger shares relative to the smaller countries, it is unlikely that
this is the case for smaller countries. This implies that there will be additional gains
in revenue specifically from market power for the full cooperation approach relative to
partial cooperation, which reinforce the findings in this analysis.
Under both mechanisms, demand for licenses is determined by the distribution of stock
among countries and supply is determined by the amount of licenses each country has to
sell. Since all licenses are assumed to be sold in the beginning of the season, all fishermen
have access to the same information. Along with the assumption that all countries have
the same market power, this means there is a single price for all licenses. This means
that the model closely resembles a Cournout market structure. In practice licenses are
sold by each PNA country throughout the year at non specified intervals, which implies
that fishing vessels can receive different information and so prices can adjust. However
given the goals of the study and the fact that the market does not clear in practice, this
is a reasonable compromise.
When examining coalitions, stability is usually an important consideration. The PNA
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has now been existence for more than two decades, and endured several deviations from
the coalition rules by members. For this study I assume that the PNA is inherently stable
(Yeeting et al. 2018) and so I focus on showing that the revenue under full cooperation
is at least as good as revenue under partial cooperation.
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. The first contribution is from
comparing mechanisms for the management and revenue sharing of a renewable resource
using local versus global licenses. Licenses allowing the exploitation of a natural resource
are not unique to fisheries. However the cooperative management of a natural resource
which can move over time is not readily found in other industries. This leads to the
question of whether there should be a single cooperative level global license, or as in
the case of the PNA individual local licenses. Some examples of resource right licenses
sold in the literature are mining prospecting licenses and radio spectrum licenses. Like
the PNA licenses, radio spectrum licenses (Milgrom 1998, McMillan 1994) and mining
licenses (Cramton 2007) are sold using auctions. However that is where similarities end
as neither of these licenses have been examined in the context of local versus global rights.
The second contribution is this idea of partial cooperation within cooperative games.
Partial cooperation falls in both cooperative and non-cooperative fields. As far as the
author is aware this specific type of structure has not been examined before. OPEC is
the most similar example of a large multinational coalition structure which resembles
partial cooperation. Unlike OPEC however, the PNA deals with a renewable resource
with variable endowment. Another example that shares some of the characteristics of the
problem under examination is the cap and trade program related to greenhouse gases.
Total emissions are decided together based on a process loosely resembling grandfathering
and a certain amount of political considerations, and is then distributed to members which
are sold as licenses. These licenses can be also considered to be global since they can be
used anywhere.
The third contribution is with the idea of basing a revenue sharing mechanism on the
average of an exogenous variable over time. Many of the prominent sharing mechanisms
depend on complicated algorithms which are difficult to implement in the real world.
The Shapley-value (Shapley 1953) calculates the average marginal contribution of each
member. The nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969) rule attempts to maximizes the benefit of the
least well off coalition. The Nash bargaining solution is egalitarian or equal-sharing in the
sense that it values each player equally (Nash 1953). The proposed revenue sharing rule
is simple and easy to understand, which does not deviate significantly from the current
sharing mechanism which should improve its chances of being adopted.
The rest of the introduction provides an overview of the current literature. Section
5.2 introduces the model. Section 5.2.1 outlines the key results. Section 5.3 provides a
discussion and the implications of the findings, and Section 5.4 concludes.
5.1.1 Literature Review
A considerable portion of the literature on coalitions in fisheries management has focused
on non-cooperative games, which involve players reaching stable alliances through credible
threats. In cooperative games players agree to certain terms which enable alliances to
be formed. These games are enforced through punishment. Cooperative games can also
include a transferable utility or sharing stage as part of the agreement, for example side
payments. The PNA problem under consideration falls in to the category of cooperative
games with transferable utility. Bailey, Rashid Sumaila, and Marko Lindroos (2010)
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surveys the use of game theory in fisheries economics, and M. Lindroos, V. Kaitala, and
L. G. Kronbak (2007) provides a survey of coalition games in fisheries. Coalition games
generally fall into either cooperative or non-cooperative games.
Coalition games in fisheries has its beginnings in two player games. Gordon R. Munro
(1979) was one of the first to recognize the importance of game theory to the management
of transboundary fisheries resources, with an analysis using two player games. After the
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, Veijo Kaitala
and Gordon R. Munro (1993) recognized the potential application of multi-player games
to the management of straddling fisheries resources by more than two countries. Veijo
Kaitala and G. Munro (1997) provided the first analysis of coalition games to the problem,
by analyzing the Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO) that emerged
from the United Nations Agreement on Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (cite UN) requiring
multiple countries to work together to manage straddling fish stocks. They concluded
that a significant issue with the new agreement was what they termed the new member
problem. This is the situation where several countries cooperate and successfully raise the
stock size of the joint resource. Subsequently other countries which were not part of the
cooperation and made no contribution wish to join and reap the benefits. Another related
issue is called the interloper problem, and refers to the policing of non-member fishing
vessels who may attempt to free ride on the conservation efforts of the members. Veijo
Kaitala and G. Munro (1997) suggested the introduction of transferable membership and
a membership waiting period as possible solutions to the new member problem.
Many of the studies conducted on coalitions in the fisheries literature focused on two
stage non-cooperative games, which are solved by backward induction. In the first stage
coalitions are formed, and in the second stage countries and coalitions determine their
best strategies. This approach yields Nash equilibrium which can then be analyzed to
determine stability. Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson (2000) and Marko Lindroos
(2004a) applied a two stage game for the Norwegian spring spawning herring fishery.
Anarson et. al. analyzed a five country game and concluded that the grand coalition
is not stable unless side payments are allowed. The primary reason for this was that
Norway which has the largest EEZ, requires substantial incentive to cooperate as it
would be worse off relative to the alternative where it acts alone. Shapley values for each
country were calculated and are presented as an option for the size of the side payments.
Gordon R. Munro (1979) showed that side payments could be effective in overcoming
the non-cooperative outcome that is typical in tragedy of the commons type of games.
Lindroos and Kaitala showed that for a three player game, a full coalition approach is
not feasible due to the high opportunity cost which is a result of the highly productive
fishing fleets of the three countries. However, analysis with less productive fishing fleets
allowed a full coalition to be more favorable. Pintassilgo (2003) extended these two stage
coalition games to include externalities, and applied it to the Atlantic Bluefin tuna. He
found that in the presence of strong externalities, a fair sharing rule is not sufficient to
ensure the stability of the grand coalition.
An additional class of games includes a third state which involves the sharing of the
surplus. These are called transferable utility (TU) games. Veijo Kaitala and Marko
Lindroos (1998) examined the sharing of the surplus from the cooperation in the man-
agement of a straddling fish stock for a three player game. One player was a coastal
state, and two were DWFN. They compared three sharing rules the Shapley-value (Shap-
ley 1953), nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969), and the nash bargaining solution (Nash 1953).
The Shapley value calculates the average marginal contribution of each member. The
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nucleolus rule attempts to maximizes the benefit of the least well off coalition. The Nash
bargaining solution is egalitarian or equal-sharing in the sense that it values each player
equally. Marko Lindroos (2004b) extended the same problem to two coastal states and
two DWFN. The coastal states and DWFN are allowed to negotiate as a group and the
results suggest that if costal states have efficient fleets, then they may be able to restrict
the coalition negotiation of the DWFN by acting as a veto coalition.
Li (1998) suggested a fair sharing rule to improve the stability of a coalition. Possible
rules which examined were nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969), Shapley-value (Shapley 1953),
and egalitarian. Using a coalition game approach, Li found that a fair sharing rule would
guarantee the stability of a coalition because inefficient members would be discouraged to
enter as their share would be low. Pintassilgo and Duarte (2000) looked at the case of the
northern blue-fin tuna, and showed that the transferable membership and the membership
waiting period solutions are enough to prevent the breakdown of the coalition. The
addition of new members to a coalition can have negative implications for the stability
of the coalition (Hannesson 1997), however Marko Lindroos (2008) showed that new
members may also have a stabilizing effect.
Lone Grønbæk Kronbak and Marko Lindroos (2006) analyzed a four stage game mod-
eled after the Baltic sea cod fishery. In the first two stages authorities form coalitions,
and then in the following two stages fishermen form coalitions. This study showed that
the level of enforcement by authorities affects the coalition decisions of the fishermen.
Most of the studies mentioned above had stability as a primary concern. Yeeting
et al. (2018) examined the case of the PNA fishery to determine the stability of the VDS
under partial and full compliance. Her findings suggest that partial compliance results
in improved stability relative to full compliance.
5.2 Model
To begin, the following simplifying assumptions are made. First, the share of fish in each
time period t for each of the N countries can change. The distribution of this share of
the stock of fish for each time period t is known, and the expected distribution over a
total T =
∑T
i=1 ti periods is also known. Over some of the individual t periods, countries
could have a high share of fish, and in others it could have a low share. Let α be a vector
of the distribution of the stock of fish over all countries at each time period t (such that∑N
i=1 αi = 1), and let β be a vector of the share of the average or expected stock of fish
over the entire time period T , such that
∑N
i=1 βi = 1. For simplicity I assume that for
each year the total stock of fish over all of the countries does not change from year to
year.
Under both full cooperation and partial cooperation, the authority or manager sets
the total number of licenses over the entire time period LT which is then split over the
number of periods. Under full cooperation the coalition sells one license, and the revenue
is split among the members based on the average share β over the T periods. Under
partial cooperation, countries sell licenses individually after a total number of licenses
has been set, and then split between each country as an average share β. Fishing vessels
decide on which country to buy licenses from, and they have perfect information about
the distribution of fish.
I assume that the demand function for licenses belongs in the following general class
of functions.
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w = p− pLσ( c
pqX
)σ
This particular functional form is based on the maximization problem of the fishing vessels
under input regulation (See Appendix 5.A). p is the market price per ton of tuna, c is the
cost of catching a ton of tuna, q is the catchability coefficient of a representative fishing
vessel, and X is the stock of fish. σ is the coefficient which determines the convexity or
concavity of the demand function. This general function can represent different demand
conditions depending on the value of σ, which must be positive. For a linear demand
function, σ = 1 which gives a simpler form as follows.
w = p− c
qX
L
If σ > 1 then the demand function is concave, and when σ < 1 the demand function is
convex. In all of these cases the intercepts remain the same which provides a convenient
way to compare the revenue under different demand conditions. Figure 5.1 provides an
illustration of the demand function with different values of σ.
Figure 5.1: The general demand function with convex, linear and concave demand.
Note that the license price w increases with p, q and X, but decreases with c. This is an
important feature of demand functions for fishing licenses, and although very simplified,
reflects real world dynamics for fishing licenses. Since there is a single homogeneous
fishing fleet buying licenses, I assume that p, c and q are constant across all of the
countries. The only value that can be different is X. This allows for differing demand
based on stock sizes.
5.2.1 Revenue Comparison
Single Period
Applying demand function for output regulation, the fishery managers maximization
problem, which is the same for full and partial cooperation, and optimal L are as follows.
w = p− pLσ( c
pqX
)σ
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max
L
wL = (p− pLσ( c
pqX
)σ
)L
L∗ =
pqX
c(σ + 1)
1
σ
Substituting into the revenue function, revenue to each individual country from partial
cooperation is
RiPC = (p− p(Li∗PC)σ(
c
pqX i
)σ)Li∗PC = (p− p(βiL∗PC)σ(
c
pqαiX
)σ)βiL∗PC
RiPC =
[
p− p
( βipqX
c(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
)σ( c
pqαiX
)σ] βipqX
c(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
RiPC = β
ip
2qXt
c
[ 1
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
−
(βi
αi
)σ 1
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
+1)
]
(5.1)
For full cooperation, first I have to calculate total revenue to the coalition, which is then
split as a share to the countries according to βi.
RFC = (p− p(L∗PC)σ(
c
pqX
)σ)L∗
RFC =
[
p− p
( pqX
c(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
)σ( c
pqX
)σ] pqX
c(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
RFC =
p2qXt
c
[ 1
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
− 1
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
+1)
]
(5.2)
Revenue to each individual country under full cooperation is
RiFC = β
ip
2qXt
c
[ 1
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
− 1
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
+1)
]
(5.3)
For brevity, let θ = (σ + 1)(
1
σ
) and let RFC = pi and RPC = pˆi. The revenue functions
from this point forward will be expressed as
pˆii = β
ip
2qXt
c
[1
θ
−
(βi
αit
)σ 1
θ(1+σ)
]
(5.4)
pii = β
ip
2qXt
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
]
(5.5)
Proposition 9. If T = 1, the revenue to each country is identical under both full coop-
eration and partial cooperation.
Proof. For T = 1, βi = αi. It is clear that if
βi
αi
= 1, then 5.4 is equal to 5.5.
This result is important because it shows that there is no advantage to the full coop-
eration approach if it is implemented on a yearly basis.
Proposition 10. If T = 1, the level of revenue in both partial and full cooperation has
a positive relationship with the value of σ. That is, the more concave the demand curve
the higher the revenue, and more convex the lower the revenue.
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Proof. Consider σ and the limits of θ and θ(1+σ) as follows.
lim
σ→∞
θ = 1
lim
σ→0
θ = e ≈ 2.7182
lim
σ→∞
θ(1+σ) =∞
lim
σ→0
θ(1+σ) = e ≈ 2.7182
As the demand function becomes more concave, θ approaches 1, and as it becomes more
convex, θ approaches e. This implies that as the demand function becomes more concave,
1
θ
gets larger, and vice versa. Similarly, as the demand function becomes more concave,
the limit for θ(1+σ) is ∞, and as it becomes more convex the limit is equal to e ≈ 2.7182.
This implies that as the demand function becomes more concave, 1
θ(1+σ)
gets smaller and
vice versa. The result follows.
By themselves these two results from a single period are fairly limited in what they
can infer, but they do form a foundation for results for multiple periods in the next
section. To see an illustration of these two results, let
λiFC =
1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
λiPC =
1
θ
−
(βi
αit
)σ 1
θ(1+σ)
The second column in Table 5.2 shows the corresponding values for λPC and λFC given
different values of σ. Note that λPC = λFC since
βi
αit
= 1 for T = 1. For illustration
purposes I have included the third column in Table 5.2, showing how λFC is determined.
Table 5.2: Values for λFC and λPC , with varying σ
σ λFC λPC
0.25 0.41− 0.33 = 0.08 0.41− (βi
αi
)0.25
0.33
0.5 0.44− 0.29 = 0.15 0.44− (βi
αi
)0.5
0.29
1 0.5− 0.25 = 0.25 0.5− (βi
αi
)1
0.25
2 0.58− 0.19 = 0.38 0.58− (βi
αi
)2
0.19
4 0.67− 0.13 = 0.53 0.67− (βi
αi
)4
0.13
Multiple Periods
The next step is to extend the model to multiple periods. Strictly speaking, all the
variables can change from one period to the other. However for tractability, I will assume
that the fishing fleets cost c, catchability q and the market price of fish p, all remain
constant. Since β is the same over each time period, it does not change either. The
critical variables that change will be the stock of fish X, and the share of fish αi.
From 5.1 and 5.3, I sum over time periods T > 1 to get 5.7 and 5.6.
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pii =
T∑
t=1
βi
p2qXt
c
[1
θ
−
(βi
αit
)σ 1
θ(1+σ)
]
(5.6)
pii =
T∑
t=1
βi
p2qXt
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
]
(5.7)
Now that α does not necessarily equal β, a comparison can be made between partial
cooperation and full cooperation for a single period t, out of the total T periods. Since
the only difference between λPC and λFC , is that λPC has an additional
βi
αi
term, these
are the only terms necessary for comparison.
λiPC =
1
θ
−
(βi
αit
)σ 1
θ(1+σ)
λiFC =
1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
For λPC , only positive values are of interest. Limiting the analysis to only positive values
and holding θ constant, it follows that
0 ≤ λPC ≤ 1
θ
The corresponding limits for β
α
from λPC are
λPC = 0,
β
α
= θ
λPC =
1
θ
,
β
α
= 0
The smaller is βi relative to α
i
t, the larger is λPC . The maximum value that λPC can
attain is 1
θ
. The smallest value λPC can attain is 0, when
β
α
= θ. This implies that the
range of possible values for β
α
are 0 ≤ β
α
≤ θ. These results are illustrated in Table 5.3.
Table 5.4 shows numerical values for λFC and λPC , for values of σ equal to 0.5, 1, and
1.5 respectively.
Table 5.3: Maximum and minimum values for λFC and λPC , holding constant σ
λFC λPC
Max (β
α
= 0) 1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
1
θ
β
α
= 1 1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
Min (β
α
= θ) 1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
0
These results show that for each individual country in each individual period t, revenue
from partial cooperation varies with the share of the license β and the share of stock α,
and can be less than or greater than revenue from full cooperation. This leads to two
general propositions.
Proposition 11. For each individual country in each individual period t, the smaller the
share of the licenses β relative to the share of the total stock α, the larger is the revenue
from partial cooperation relative to full cooperation, and vice versa.
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Table 5.4: Maximum and minimum values for λFC and λPC , for different values of σ and
the corresponding θ
λFC λPC λPC − λFC
σ = 1.5, θ = 1.8 (concave demand)
Max (β
α
= 0) 0.32 0.54 0.22
Min (β
α
= θ) 0.32 0 −0.32
σ = 1.5, θ = 2 (linear demand)
Max (β
α
= 0) 0.25 0.5 0.25
Min (β
α
= θ) 0.25 0 −0.25
σ = 0.5, θ = 2.25 (convex demand)
Max (β
α
= 0) 0.15 0.44 0.29
Min (β
α
= θ) 0.15 0 −0.15
This result does not need a proof as it is straightforward. For each individual year,
when α > β, λPC > λFC , and when α < β, λPC < λPC . Intuitively this makes sense
because in a given year, if a country is receiving a share higher than average, then it
would be better off selling licenses on it’s own in that particular year. However, this
implies that in other periods it will receive share lower than average, which means it
would receive revenue lower than average. In this case of course it would be better off
under full cooperation. Proposition 11 formally establishes that the income stream from
partial cooperation will be more volatile relative to income from full cooperation. This
is the first important result of this study.
Proposition 12. For each individual country in each individual period t, the expected
positive difference between revenue from partial cooperation and full cooperation increases
with the convexity of the demand function and decreases with the concavity of the demand
function.
This result also does not need a proof as it is illustrated in Table 5.4, and follows from
Proposition 10. To determine more specific results, I look at an application of the model
to the simplest example possible which is a two-country two-period model.
Example: 2 Country, 2 Period Model
Let the subscripts denote the time period t = {1, 2} and let the countries N = {A,B}
be denoted by the order (A,B) for α, β and pi. α is stochastic, which determines β, the
average of the α values over both time periods and the share of the licenses each country
gets. β is constant over the two time periods.
pii =
2∑
t=1
βi
p2qXt
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
]
= βi
p2qX1
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
]
+ βi
p2qX2
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
]
pii =
[
βi
p2q
c
](
X1
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
]
+X2
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
])
pii =
[
βi
p2q
c
](
(X1 +X2)
1
θ
− (X1 +X2) 1
θ(1+σ)
)
(5.8)
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pˆi =
2∑
t=1
βi
p2qXt
c
[1
θ
−
(βi
αit
)σ 1
θ(1+σ)
]
= βi
p2qX1
c
[1
θ
−
(βi
αi1
)σ 1
θ(1+σ)
]
+βi
p2qX2
c
[1
θ
−
(βi
αi2
)σ 1
θ(1+σ)
]
pˆi =
[
βi
p2q
c
](
X1
[1
θ
−
(βi
αi1
)σ 1
θ(1+σ)
]
+X2
[1
θ
−
(βi
αi2
)σ 1
θ(1+σ)
])
pˆi =
[
βi
p2q
c
](
(X1 +X2)
1
θ
− (βi)σ
[ X1
(αi1)
σ
+
X2
(αi2)
σ
] 1
θ(1+σ)
)
(5.9)
To compare the income over time, I examine 5.8 and 5.9.
pii =
[
βi
p2q
c
](
(X1 +X2)
1
θ
− (X1 +X2) 1
θ(1+σ)
)
pˆi =
[
βi
p2q
c
](
(X1 +X2)
1
θ
− (βi)σ
[ X1
(αi1)
σ
+
X2
(αi2)
σ
] 1
θ(1+σ)
)
The first thing to note is that the only difference between 5.8 and 5.9 are the very last
terms. In particular the only terms required for comparison are
µFC = X1 +X2 µPC = (β
i)σ
[ X1
(αi1)
σ
+
X2
(αi2)
σ
]
The µ term that is smaller will yield a higher revenue since it is subtracted from the first
term in the large brackets from 5.8 and 5.9. To compare, first I simplify µPC as follows.
µPC = (β
i)σ
[ X1
(αi1)
σ
+
X2
(αi2)
σ
]
=
(∑T
t=1 αt
T
)σ[ X1
(αi1)
σ
+
X2
(αi2)
σ
]
=
(α1 + α2
2
)σ[ X1
(αi1)
σ
+
X2
(αi2)
σ
]
µPC =
(α1 + α2
2αi1
)σ
X1 +
(α1 + α2
2αi2
)σ
X2
Consider that
∑T
i=1 Xt = X. This means that if I let
xt =
Xt∑T
i=1Xt
it implies that
T∑
i=1
xt = 1
This gives me 5.11, which are two simple convex combinations of αt’s.
x1 + x2 =
(α1 + α2
2αi1
)σ
x1 +
(α1 + α2
2αi2
)σ
x2 (5.10)
While this condition depends on the value of σ, in general if either coefficient for x on
the right hand side is greater than 1, then µFC < µPC . To see why consider a positive
value yσ. If y > 1
lim
σ→0
yσ = y
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lim
σ→∞
yσ =∞
If y < 1
lim
σ→0
yσ = 1
lim
σ→∞
yσ = 0
This means is that σ will not make any value greater than 1 if it is less than 1, and vice-
versa. This implies that σ will not change which mechanism will yield a higher revenue
level, although it may have bearing on the magnitude of the difference. So any results
from the linear case where σ = 1, will generalize to either case.
Letting σ = 1 and simplifying 5.10 gives me 5.11. Extensions to three and four period
versions can be found in appendix 5.E.
x1α1α2 + x2α1α2 = α
2
2x1 + α
2
1x2 (5.11)
The general form of 5.11 is as follows.
(T − 1)
( T∑
t=1
xt
( T∏
t=1
αt
))
=
T∑
t=1
xt
( T∑
s 6=t
(
αs
T∏
s 6=t
αs
))
(5.12)
Proposition 13. If the stock levels remain constant from year to year, full cooperation
always yields equal to or greater income than partial cooperation for each member country
over T > 1 periods.
Proof. When stock levels are equal over each time period, from 5.11, I get
α1α2 ≤ α22 + α21
For multiple periods, from 5.12 I get
(T − 1)
T∏
t=1
αt ≤
T∑
t=1
α2t (5.13)
Since 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1, this is always true.
This result is that for all values of 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, if X1 = X2, it will always be true that
full cooperation will yield higher revenues than partial revenue. The only time that the
revenue from full cooperation and partial cooperation are equal is when α1 = α2.
Proposition 14. If the stock levels vary considerably from year to year, it is possible that
full cooperation may yield less income than partial cooperation for an individual member
country over T periods.
Proof. Rearranging 5.11 gives me 5.14, which is the condition that must be met if pit > pit.
x1
x2
>
α21 − α1α2
α1α2 − α22
(5.14)
Let α2 = εα1, and assume that α1 > α2 such that 0 ≥ ε ≥ 1. Condition 5.14 then
becomes
x1
x2
>
1− ε
ε− ε2 (5.15)
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Assuming that x1 > x2, the greater the difference between x1 and x2, the larger the left
hand side of 5.15. The greater the difference between α1 and α2, larger the value of ε and
the smaller the right hand side in 5.15. It is straightforward to show that under these
conditions, pit > pit.
Proposition 14 will hold true if there is a significant difference between the total
stock sizes in each period, with a corresponding large difference in the shares a country
receives. The intuition behind these two results is as follows. If the fluctuations in the
total stock of fish from year to year is minimal, then full cooperation will yield higher
income. However, if there are significant fluctuations in the total fish stocks from year
to year, then in certain cases where corresponding shares to a country vary considerably,
partial cooperation may yield higher income levels. For example, let the year 1 total stock
size be much larger than year 2, with country i enjoying a high share in year 1 and a
low share in year 2. Under partial cooperation, it’s income in year 1 would be very large,
possibly large enough to offset the gain it will make from moving to full cooperation.
While such cases are possible, they are probably very rare in real world application
of the PNA. Table 5.5 shows different combinations of x1 and x2 and the corresponding
approximate values of ε where pit = pit. The second row shows that for total stocks which
decrease by around 33 percent, the difference in α from year 1 to year 2 such that revenue
from partial cooperation is greater than that from full cooperation, must be greater than
66 percent. As the difference in stock levels from year 1 to year 2 increase, the threshold
difference ε falls. The last row shows that for total stocks which decrease by around 88
percent, the difference in α such that revenue from partial cooperation is greater than that
from full cooperation from year 1 to year 2, must be greater than 11 percent. It should
be noted that for the stock size on the scale of the PNA, fluctuations of the magnitude
shown in the table will be significant. One plausible scenario might occur if there was a
significant decline of the fishery. These results imply then that it is highly unlikely that
shares will vary enough such that countries observe revenue under partial cooperation
exceed revenue from full cooperation. In any case, although country i may receive higher
total revenue under such conditions, it will still have very large fluctuations in revenue
from year to year.
Table 5.5: Stock level proportions and corresponding approximate values for ε where
pit = pit.
x1 x2 ε
0.6 0.4 0.66
0.7 0.3 0.43
0.8 0.2 0.25
0.9 0.1 0.11
5.2.2 Coalition Revenue
Next I examine total revenue for the coalition. The general equations are
pi =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
[
βi
p2qXt
c
](1
θ
− 1
θ2
)
(5.16)
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pˆi =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
[
βi
p2qXt
c
](1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
(βi
αit
)σ)
In a single period 2 country case, full cooperation gives me
pi =
2∑
i=1
βi
p2qXt
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
]
pi = βA
p2qXt
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
]
+ βB
p2qXt
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
]
pi =
p2qXt
c
1
θ
(βA + βB)− p
2qXt
c
1
θ(1+σ)
(βA + βB) (5.17)
Partial cooperation this gives me
pˆi =
N∑
i=1
βi
p2qXt
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
(βi
αi
)σ]
pˆi = βA
p2qXt
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
(βA
αA
)σ]
+ βB
p2qXt
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
(βB
αB
)σ]
pˆi =
p2qXt
c
1
θ
(βA + βB)− p
2qXt
c
1
θ(1+σ)
[
βA
(βA
αA
)σ
+ βB
(βB
αB
)σ]
(5.18)
Proposition 15. For each individual period t, if the demand for licenses is linear or
convex, then total income to the coalition from full cooperation will always be equal to or
greater than total income from partial cooperation. If the demand for licenses is concave,
then this result may not hold
Proof. Comparing 5.17 and 5.18, for pit ≥ pit to be true, the following condition must be
satisfied.
1 ≤
N∑
i=1
βi
(βi
αit
)σ
Let N = {A,B}. Applying to one of the periods in the 2 country 2 period case gives me
1 ≤ βA
( βA
αAt
)σ
+ βB
( βB
αBt
)σ
= βA
( βA
αAt
)σ
+ (1− βA)
( 1− βA
1− αAt
)σ
(5.19)
Since they are shares, all the values of α and β must be within [0,1]. This means (1 −
βA) and (1 − αA) must also be within [0,1]. As long as these conditions are met it is
straightforward to show that if the demand for licenses is linear (σ = 1) then
1 ≤ β
2
A
αA
+
(1− βA)2
1− αA
If demand is convex, then this result also holds true because
lim
σ→0
(βi
αit
)σ
= 1
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However, if demand is concave then at higher levels of σ this result may not hold because
when β
i
αit
< 1
lim
σ→∞
(βi
αit
)σ
= 0
This result may appear suprising, because for the same mechanisms over a single year
both input and output regulation yields the same revenue. However, the intuition behind
this result is that when there is a mismatch in the share of licenses received and the share
of fish in each country’s waters, then not all licenses will be sold. This situation occurs
when β 6= α.
Total Periods
For total revenue over all of the periods, full cooperation gives me
pi =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
βi
p2qX
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
]
Partial cooperation gives me
pˆi =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
βi
p2qX
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ(1+σ)
(βi
αi
)σ]
Applying to the two country two period case gives me
pi =
p2q
c
1
θ
(βA + βB)[X1 +X2]− p
2q
c
1
θ(1+σ)
(
X1
[
βA + βB
]
+X2
[
βA + βB
])
(5.20)
pˆi =
p2q
c
1
θ
(βA + βB)[X1 +X2]−
p2q
c
1
θ(1+σ)
(
X1
[
βA
(βA
αA1
)σ
+ βB
(βB
αB1
)σ]
+X2
[
βA
(βA
αA2
)σ
+ βB
(βB
αB2
)σ])
(5.21)
Proposition 16. Over the entire T > 1 periods, if the demand for licenses is linear or
convex then total income to the coalition from full cooperation will always be greater than
total income from partial cooperation. If the demand for licenses is concave, then this
result may not hold.
Proof. Comparing 5.20 and 5.21, for pi ≥ pˆi to be true, the following condition must be
satisfied.
T∑
t=1
Xt
( N∑
i=1
βi
)
≤
T∑
t=1
Xt
( N∑
i=1
βi
[βi
αit
]σ)
Let N = {A,B}. Applying to the 2 country 2 period case gives me
X1(βA + βB) +X2(βA + βB) ≤
X1
[
βA
( βA
αA1
)σ
+ βB
( βB
αB1
)σ]
+X2
[
βA
( βA
αA2
)σ
+ βB
( βB
αB2
)σ]
(5.22)
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Once again the condition for 5.22 to be true is that for all individual periods t,
1 ≤ βA
( βA
αAt
)σ
+ βB
( βB
αBt
)σ
This is the same condition that was proved in 5.19 for proposition 15. It must follow that
for linear and convex demand functions, pi ≥ pˆi.
The general equations for total revenue are
pi =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
βi
p2qXt
c
[1
θ
−
( 1
θ(1+σ)
)]
(5.23)
pˆi =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
βi
p2qXt
c
[1
θ
−
(βi
αit
)σ 1
θ(1+σ)
]
(5.24)
Applying the model to the two country case gives me Table 5.6, which is the same as
simple case in the introduction.For simplicity I have assumed that all of the constant are
equal to 1 and that σ = 1. I have assumed that Country A is larger than country B.
The table shows the total revenue over both periods from partial cooperation (pˆi) is lower
relative to full cooperation (pi).
Table 5.6: Illustration of profits for non-constant α. Assumes all constants are equal to
1 and σ = 1 for simplicity.
β α1 α2 pˆi1 pˆi2 pi1 pi2 pˆi − pi
Country A 0.25 0.20 0.30 0.046 0.073 0.063 0.063 -0.005
Country B 0.75 0.80 0.70 0.199 0.174 0.187 0.187 -0.002
5.2.3 Preferences
From Proposition 13 and Proposition 14, it is not clear which management scheme each
individual member country will prefer because those results depend on the stock of fish
X from year to year. One way to make a comparison is to make general assumptions
about a countries preferences and consider the income stream over T periods as lotteries.
Lotteries are essentially a set of alternative outcomes, with associated probabilities for
each outcome. In this case the outcomes are pi = RFC and pˆi = RPC .
More formally, let α be an S valued random variable (S ∈ [0, 1]), distributed according
to some function f(α). Then pi and pˆi are functions mapping α to R. For the full
cooperation case, each country gets a share β =
∫
αf(α)dα of the total profit with
probability 1. β is the same through each time period. For the partial cooperation case
each country in each time period t gets a profit level pi with probability p(α) = f(α)dα.
I assume that each country has rational preferences % defined over the outcomes pi and
pˆi respectively. I assume this preference relation is complete and transitive, and satisfies
the independence axiom. I make an additional assumption that from year to year, the
distribution of α for a particular country does not change.
Since I consider α to be a random variable, from 5.6 I get the following.
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pii =
[
βi
p2q
c
](1
θ
T∑
t=1
Xt −
(βi
αit
)σ 1
θ(1+σ)
T∑
t=1
Xt
)
This means that any results from the single period case holds for multiple periods.
Proposition 17. Assume α is distributed according to a symmetric distribution f(.) over
the interval [0, 1], with a standard deviation σ > 0. Then, revenue from full cooperation
at a given time t second-order stochastically dominates (SOSD) revenue from partial
cooperation.
Proof. The proof follows a version of the general definition of SOSD.
E[pi] =
∫ b
a
pi(α)f(α)dα ≥
∫ b
a
pˆi(α)f(α)dα = E[pˆi]
where f(α) is the probability distribution function of α. Since α is distributed symmet-
rically from [0, 1], this implies that α is distributed around some mean µ, which is
µ =
∫ 1
0
αf(α)dα = β
Substituting, the expected revenue under full cooperation is
E[pi] =
∫ 1
0
µ
p2qXt
c
(1
θ
)
f(α)dα−
∫ 1
0
µ2
p2qXt
c
( 1
θ2
)
f(α)dα (5.25)
Similarly, the expected revenue under partial cooperation is
E[pˆi] =
∫ 1
0
µ
p2qXt
c
(1
θ
)
f(α)dα−
∫ 1
0
µµσ
p2qXt
c
1
ασ
( 1
θ2
)
f(α)dα (5.26)
Once again the only difference are the right hand terms. The condition for E[pi] ≥ E[pˆi]
is that ∫ 1
0
µ
p2qXt
c
( 1
θ2
)
f(α)dα ≤
∫ 1
0
µσ
p2qXt
c
1
ασ
( 1
θ2
)
f(α)dα
µ
∫ 1
0
f(α)dα ≤ µσ
∫ 1
0
1
ασ
f(α)dα
The left hand side of the condition is
µ
∫ 1
0
f(α)dα = µ
[
F (α)
]1
0
= µ[F (1)− F (0)]
Similarly the right hand side is
µσ
∫ 1
0
1
α
f(α)dα = µσ
[ 1
α
∫ 1
0
f(α)dα−
∫ 1
0
−σ
α(σ+1)
(∫ 1
0
f(α)dα
)
dα
]
= µσ
[ 1
α
(
F (1)− F (0))+ ∫ 1
0
1
α(σ+1)
(
F (1)− F (0))dα]
= µσ
( 1
α
(
F (1)− F (0))+ (F (1)− F (0))[− 1
ασ
]1
0
)
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Approximating ε ≈ 0
= µσ
( 1
α
(
F (1)− F (0))+ (F (1)− F (0))[− ( 1
1σ
− 1
εσ
)]1
0
)
Let
η = −1 + 1
εσ
which is a large positive number. This finally gives me
µσ
∫ 1
0
1
α
f(α)dα = µσ
[(
F (1)− F (0))( 1
α
+ η
)]
Since 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, it follows that
µ[F (1)− F (0)] ≤ µσ
[(
F (1)− F (0))( 1
α
+ η
)]
If I consider that countries have an utility function over revenue u(pi) with all of the ususal
assumptions, this result implies that countries who may be risk averse would prefer full
cooperation to partial cooperation. This result is fairly general and can be applied to
different distribution functions. I apply it to the uniform and normal distribution in
Appendix 5.F.
5.3 Discussion
This study has four primary results. The first result is that the income stream is more
volatile under partial cooperation. Although this is fairly intuitive from the example
provided in the introduction, Proposition 11 formally establishes this result. Proposition
11 states that for each individual country in each individual period t, revenue from partial
cooperation varies with the share of the license β and the share of stock α, and can be
less than or greater than revenue from full cooperation. If α > β then the country would
be better off under partial cooperation. However, this higher α has to be offset in other
periods with lower α to average out to β. This ultimately leads to excess demand in some
period and excess supply in others. If the share of fish stock for each country is constant
over all time periods, partial cooperation will yield the same revenue as full cooperation.
The intuition is that for the years where α < β, a country will not be able to sell all of
its licenses and so it will not have as much revenue as under full cooperation. For the
years where α > β, a country will have a shortage of licenses. Table 5.6 illustrates this.
Proposition 9 is also important for this first result, as it implies that full cooperation
is only beneficial over multiple years. In other words, full cooperation has no benefits
over partial cooperation if it is implemented yearly. Intuitively, this result makes sense
because the premise behind full cooperation is averaging income over multiple years.
Proposition 13 and Proposition 14 together form the second main result in this study.
If the total stock of fish to the coalition remains stable from year to year, revenue to
each country is always greater under full cooperation. If total stock levels fluctuate
significantly, it is possible that revenue to some countries could be higher under partial
cooperation. Such significant fluctuations are rare in the real world, but can occur if
for example there was a collapse of the fish stocks. Table 5.5 shows that stock levels
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need to vary considerably for partial cooperation to lead to higher revenue relative to full
cooperation. These all point to this scenario being highly unlikely.
The third main result is derived mainly from Proposition 15 and Proposition 16.
Together they find that total income to the coalition for each individual period for full
cooperation will be equal to or greater than partial cooperation, only if the demand
function is convex or linear. If the demand function is concave, this result may not
hold. The convexity of the demand function for licenses plays an important role in the
degree of the difference in the revenue between the two functions. For very concave
demand functions, countries are better off under partial cooperation. The general form
of the demand function adopted in this paper allows for representation of convex, linear
and concave demand functions, while retaining the intercepts in all cases. The results
show that the concavity or convexity of the demand function play an important role
in determining the degree of difference between the two mechanisms. Proposition 10
says that under yearly implementation, the more concave the demand curve, the higher
the revenue and vice versa. For multiple periods, Proposition 12 finds that the more
convex the demand function, the greater the expected difference in revenue between full
cooperation and partial cooperation, and vice versa.
The last major result of this study is that risk averse countries will prefer full cooper-
ation to partial cooperation. I show in Proposition 17 that full cooperation second order
stochastically dominates partial cooperation. This essentially implies that on average,
income from full cooperation will be higher than partial coopertion. However, for some
periods partial cooperation can have higher revenue. Table 5.4 shows how full cooper-
ation yields a sure revenue level, but income from partial cooperation can be higher or
lower. Countries which may be risk loving will prefer partial cooperation. Given that
most governments have only a few years per term, it seems obvious that they will prefer
to plan their budgets before time, such that they are not left with large income stream
in their outgoing year. This implies that most governments would be risk averse. That
debate however, is beyond the scope of this study.
In the model I assume that the stock of skipjack migrate between the waters of each of
the countries in the PNA, and are therefore common to the majority of the coalition. For
simplicity I assumed a single stock, and that each country has a share α of the stock in
each time period. The total area encompassing the PNA is very large, and in some cases
disjoint with pockets of international or high seas in between. However, when considering
the entire stock as a whole, this makes no difference to the model since I have not relied
on any inter-migration of fish.
One of the assumptions made in this study is that the demand functions for the
coalition and each individual country have the same vertical intercept and the same slopes,
which implies that each individual country has the same market power as the coalition.
This assumption was made so that any benefits from the proposed approach are derived
only from its design and not from market power gains. This assumption means that the
revenue potential to the coalition and each individual country is the same under both
approaches, which enables the comparison between the two approaches to be as objective
as possible by disregarding any market power gains from the new approach. While this
assumption may reflect the case for larger countries which have significantly larger shares
relative to the smaller countries, it is unlikely that smaller countries can command enough
market power to justify this assumption. It is probable that the market for the licenses
resembles an oligopoly. In this case, then there will be some gains in revenue specifically
from market power for the full cooperation approach relative to partial cooperation. For
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example if I assume that some countries have linear demand functions like that observed
in perfectly competitive market, the proposed approach will yield large revenue levels
relative to the current approach. This is an area for future research.
When examining coalitions, stability is usually an important consideration. The PNA
has now been existence for more than two decades, and endured several deviations from
the coalition rules by members. For this reason I assumed that the PNA is inherently
stable focusing instead on showing that the revenue under full cooperation is at least
as good as revenue under partial cooperation. One issue that is uncertain is how this
proposed approach may affect the way that the shares are decided. Although the current
approach is based primarily on grandfathering and fish stock shares, this process is not
very clear and likely also entails some level of political considerations.
Policy Implications
This study has shown that full cooperation provides a consistent income stream relative
to partial cooperation. The first policy question is whether these benefits are worth giving
up control of fishing licenses and perhaps more importantly control over the amount of
fishing in each EEZ. The primary benefit of full cooperation is the stable revenue stream.
For countries with volatile stock shares, they will also experience an increase in revenue.
Although it hasn’t been shown in this study, the market power gains from full cooperation
is likely to also be significant. Smaller countries who are more vulnerable to volatile stock
shares because of their lower stock endowment may be the countries who can benefit the
most from full cooperation. Larger countries on the other hand may not be as vulnerable
to revenue fluctuations given their larger endowments. For them the benefits may not be
as significant. The deciding point for political buy in for these larger countries is likely
the degree of improvement of revenue from full cooperation.
The second policy consideration is how to implement full cooperation. Given the
scale of the PNA and the fact that the two approaches are very similar, a gradual imple-
mentation scheme may be a prudent approach. Firstly, if the benefits are primarily to
smaller countries, an initial step in implementation may be for smaller countries to sell a
single license as a sub-coalition. This would give them greater market power relative to
selling individually, while leaving the larger countries to continue with the local licensing.
The coalition as a whole can be insulated from any unexpected issues which may arise.
One possible problem with this is that forming a sub-coalition may cause stability issues
within the PNA. Another possible intermediate step is to distribute the shares as licenses
rather than revenue. This is technically equivalent to distributing revenue shares because
the prices will be all the same. However, this would give countries control of their own
finances and will not require the PNA to set up a central sale and finance facility.
One potential benefit from moving to full cooperation may be that it can serve as a
catalyst for joint action on illegal fishng. Illegal fishing is a major problem not just for
the PNA but for fishing in general. The PNA members countries EEZ are very large,
and the members do not have sufficient resources to monitor and patrol their waters.
As it currently stands, countries are essentially individually monitoring their own EEZ
for illegal fishing with whatever little resources they have. With a joint selling facility,
countries may find it easier to contribute to a regional fund to at least find a solution to
the illegal fishing problem.
The final policy implication, at the very least this study should generate debate and
perhaps encourage policy makers to examine why the current partial cooperation mech-
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anism has inefficiencies. As it currently stands, some countries are not able to sell all of
their licenses. These are the countries that will stand to benefit the most. This implies
that either the predictions used to base the shares of licenses is incorrect, or the process
used to determine the share is not based solely on the shares. This clearly implies that
there must be space for improvement. This study could provide insight into methods on
how to find and implement those improvements.
Limitations and Extensions
The main limitation with this study is the assumption that the endowment of stocks are
known from year to year. This to some extent reflects how the PNA tentatively sets its
TAC from year to year, and in that respect this limitation is also shared with partial
cooperation. This tentative TAC implies that there is room to allow for uncertainty.
This is important because if stock levels cannot be predicted with some level of accuracy,
then full cooperation may not yield the expected benefits. A future study can extend this
model to characterize the revenue streams under varying scenarios of uncertainty. This
will be an important area for expansion in the future.
Some other assumptions that I make are that the cost of fishing are the same across
all countries, and that the quality of the fish is the same through all countries. Since the
area encompassing the PNA is very large, this is not likely to be the case. However the
model can easily allow for expansion in this area in the future
One simple extension of this study will be to include market power gains. This is
simple and only requires minor modification of the demand function. This particular
area of future work would be very useful if data could be used to estimate the extent of
market power for each country.
5.4 Conclusion
In this paper I analyze two approaches to revenue sharing in the PNA. The first is
partial cooperation, and is the current arrangement where the number of total licenses
is set together then distributed to members to sell individually. The second is a full
cooperation approach where the total number of licenses are set and sold together as one
entity. Under partial cooperation, the licenses are distributed individually according to
some sharing mechanism based on the historical catch as well as the stock levels available
to each country. Under the proposed arrangement for full cooperation, the licenses are set
and sold together and the revenue is shared among members according to same sharing
rule used in partial cooperation.
This study has four primary results. The first result is that the income stream from
full cooperation will be more stable than income from partial cooperation. The second
result is that if the total stock of fish to the coalition remains stable from year to year,
revenue to each country is always greater under full cooperation. If total stock levels
fluctuate significantly, it is possible that revenue to some countries could be higher un-
der partial cooperation. This can occur if for example there was a collapse of the fish
stocks. The third result is that total income to the coalition for each individual period for
full cooperation will be equal to or greater than partial cooperation only if the demand
function is convex or linear. If the demand function is concave, this result may not hold.
For very concave demand functions, countries are better off under partial cooperation.
113
The last major result of this study is that risk averse countries will prefer full coopera-
tion to partial cooperation, while countries which may be risk loving will prefer partial
cooperation.
Smaller countries who are more vulnerable to volatile stock shares because of their
lower stock endowment will be the countries who can benefit the most from full cooper-
ation. Larger countries on the other hand may not be as vulnerable to revenue fluctu-
ations given their larger endowments. For them the benefits may not be as significant.
The deciding point for political buy in for these larger countries is likely the degree of
improvement of revenue from full cooperation.
Given the scale of the PNA and the fact that the two approaches are very similar,
a gradual implementation scheme may be a prudent approach. Firstly, if the benefits
are primarily to smaller countries, an initial step in implementation may be for smaller
countries to sell a single license as a sub-coalition. Another possible intermediate step is
to distribute the shares as licenses rather than revenue. This is technically equivalent to
distributing revenue shares,but would give countries control of their own finances and will
not require the PNA to set up a central sale and finance facility. One potential benefit
from moving to full cooperation may be that it can serve as a catalyst for joint action on
illegal fishing. With a joint selling facility, countries may find it easier to contribute to a
regional fund to at least find a solution to the illegal fishing problem.
The main limitation with this study is the assumption that the endowment of stocks
are known from year to year. Although I do not include uncertainty in this model this
will be an important area for expansion of the model. Other assumptions that I make
are that the cost of fishing are the same across all countries, and that the quality of the
fish is the same through all countries. The model can be relaxed to allow for expansion
in this respect in the future. Another simple extension of this study will be to include
market power gains to fully characterize the gains under full cooperation.
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Appendix 3
5.A Demand Functions
Under both of these cases, p is the market price per ton of tuna, c is the cost of catching
a ton of tuna, q is the catchability coefficient of a representative fishing vessel, and X is
the stock of fish. Note that in both cases, the license price w increases with p, q and X,
but decreases with c.
5.A.1 Input Regulation
The profit function of the fishing vessel under input regulation is
pik = pqXe− we− ce
Taking the first order condition gives me
max
e
pqXe− we− ce
pqx− w − c = 0
which finally gives me the demand function of each individual fishing vessel
w = pqX − c
5.A.2 Output Regulation
The profit function of the fishing vessel under output regulation is
pik = pqXe− wqXe− ce
Taking the first order condition gives me
max
e
pqXe− wqXe− ce
pqx− wqx− c = 0
which finally gives me the demand function of each individual fishing vessel
w = p− c
qX
5.A.3 Market Demand
In order to represent a wider spectrum of cases, consider the following class of general
demand functions which can be used represent linear, convex and concave demand func-
tions. y is the dependent variable and x is the independent variable, a and b are constants.
When 0 < σ < 1 the demand is convex. When σ = 1, the demand is linear. Finally when
σ > 1 the demand is concave.
y = a− axσ
( b
a
)σ
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y = a− b
a
x
The individual vessel demand functions in 5.A.1 and 5.A.2 have desirable characteris-
tics. The license price w increases with p, q and X, but decreases with c. To get market
demand functions based on 5.A.1 and 5.A.2, substitute in w as the dependent variable
and L as the independent variable. Substitutions for a and b depend on whether it is
input and output regulation.
For input regulation, substitute a = pqX and b = c. The general and linear cases are
as follows
w = pqX − pqXLσ
( c
pqX
)σ
w = pqX − cL
For output regulation, substitute a = p and b = c
qX
. The general and linear cases are
as follows
w = p− pLσ
( c
pqX
)σ
w = p− c
qX
L
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5.B Optimal Licenses
Optimal licenses isthe same under both input and output regulation. In this paper I have
used output regulation, however the results are the same.
5.B.1 Output Regulation
Under output regulation, the demand function and optimal L are as follows.
w = p− pLσ( c
pqX
)σ
max
L
(
pL− pLσ+1( c
pqX i
)σ)
First order condition is
p− p(σ + 1)Lσ( c
pqX i
)σ
= 0
p = pLσ
( c
pqX
)σ
Lσ =
(pqX
c
)σ
Optimal license numbers are
L∗ =
pqX
c(σ + 1)
1
σ
5.B.2 Input Regulation
Under input regulation, the demand function and optimal L are as follows .
w = pqX − pqXLσ( c
pqX
)σ
max
L
(
pqXL− pqXLσ+1( c
pqX
)σ)
First order condition is
pqX − pqX(σ + 1)Lσ( c
pqX
)σ
= 0
pqX = pqX(σ + 1)Lσ
( c
pqX
)σ
Lσ =
1
(σ + 1)
(pqX
c
)σ
Optimal license numbers are
L∗ =
pqX
c(σ + 1)
1
σ
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5.C Partial Cooperation Revenue
The revenue for each country under partial cooperation is
RiPC = (pqX − pqX(Li∗PC)σ(
c
pqX i
)σ)Li∗PC = (pqX − pqX(βiL∗PC)σ(
c
pqαiX
)σ)βiL∗PC
RiPC =
[
pqX − pqX
( βipqX
c(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
)σ( c
pqαiX
)σ] βipqX
c(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
RiPC =
[
pqX − pqX
( βi
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
)σ( 1
αi
)σ] βipqX
c(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
RiPC = β
i (pqX)
2
c
[ 1
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
−
(βi
αi
)σ 1
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
+1)
]
5.D Full Cooperation Revenue
The revenue for each country under full cooperation is
RiFC = (pqX − pqX(L∗PC)σ(
c
pqX
)σ)L∗PC
RiFC =
[
pqX − pqX
( pqX
c(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
)σ( c
pqX
)σ] pqX
c(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
RiFC = β
i (pqX)
2
c
[ 1
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
− 1
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
+1)
]
RiFC = β
ip
2qXt
c
[ 1
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
)
− 1
(σ + 1)(
1
σ
+1)
]
(5.27)
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5.E Revenue Comparison
µPC =
X1 +X2 +X3
3
+
X1(α
2
2α3 + α2α
2
3) +X2(α
2
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2
3) +X3(α
2
1α2 + α1α
2
2)
3α1α2α3
µFC = µPC
X1+X2+X3 =
X1 +X2 +X3
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X1(α
2
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3) +X2(α
2
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3
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1α2 + α1α
2
2)
µPC =
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4
+
X1(α
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5.F Distributions
Proposition 18. Assume α ∼ U [a, b]. Revenue from full cooperation first-order stochas-
tically dominates (FOSD) revenue from partial cooperation. That is, member countries
always prefer full cooperation to partial cooperation.
Proof. The proof follows a general definition of FOSD,
E[pi] =
∫ b
a
pi(α)f(α)dα ≥
∫ b
a
pˆi(α)f(α)dα = E[pˆi]
where f(α) is the probability distribution function of α. Let RiFC = pi
i (5.7), and RiPC =
pˆii (5.6). Since α is a share of the stock fish in each country, assume that α is distributed
uniformly from a = 0 to b = 1. This means that
f(α) =
1
b− a = 1∫ 1
0
f(α)dα =
[ 1
b− a
]1
0
= 1
β =
∫ 1
0
αf(α)dα =
∫ 1
0
α
b− adα =
[α2
2
]1
0
=
1
2
The expected revenue under full cooperation is
E[pi] =
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
αf(α)dα
)p2qXt
c
[1
θ
− 1
θ2
]
f(α)dα
E[pi] =
p2qXt
2c
[1
θ
− 1
θ2
]
E[pi] =
p2qXt
2c
(1
θ
)
− p
2qXt
2c
( 1
θ2
)
(5.28)
The expected revenue under partial cooperation is
E[pˆi] =
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
αf(α)dα
)p2qXt
c
[1
θ
−
(∫ 1
0
αf(α)dα
) 1
α
1
θ2
]
f(α)dα
=
∫ 1
0
p2qXt
2c
(1
θ
)
dα−
∫ 1
0
p2qXt
4c
1
α
( 1
θ2
)
dα
The problem here is that the relationship
∫
1
x
dx = log(x) does not hold for non-
positive bounds. To get around this, I approximate the second term as follows. Let ε be
a very small but positive number close to zero. Then∫ 1
ε
p2qXt
4c
1
α
( 1
θ2
)
dα =
p2qXt
4c
( 1
θ2
)
(− log(ε))
log(ε) yields a large negative number. Therefore, − log(ε) yields a large positive number,
which I denote as η.
E[pˆi] =
p2qXt
2c
(1
θ
)
− ηp
2qXt
4c
( 1
θ2
)
(5.29)
From 5.28 and 5.29, it then must be true that E[pi] > E[pˆi].
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Proposition 19. Assume α ∼ N(µ, σ2). Revenue from full cooperation first-order
stochastically dominates (FOSD) revenue from partial cooperation.
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as in Proposition 18.
E[pi] =
∫ 1
0
pi(α)f(α)dα = pi(α)
∫ 1
0
f(α)dα−
∫ 1
0
pi′(α)
( ∫ 1
0
f(α)dα
)
dα
f(α) =
e
−(x−µ)2
2σ2√
2piσ
pi′(α) = 0
∫ 1
0
f(α)dα =
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0
e
−(x−µ)2
2σ2√
2piσ
dα = 1.erf
0.353553
σ
β =
∫ 1
0
αf(α)dα =
∫ 1
0
α
e
−(x−µ)2
2σ2√
2piσ
dα =
1
2
erf
0.353553
σ
Let α ∼ N(µ, σ2).
E[pi] =
(∫ 1
0
αf(α)dα
)p2qXt
c
[1
θ
− 1
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θ
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− p
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2c
[ 1
θ2
]
(5.30)
E[pˆi] =
∫ 1
0
pˆi(α)f(α)dα = pˆi(α)
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ε
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E[pˆi] =
p2qXt
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θ
]
− p
2qXt
4c
[ 1
αθ2
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4c
[ η
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]
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θ
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(5.31)
From 5.30 and 5.31 it must be true that E[pi] > E[pˆi].
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Chapter 6
Policy Implications
Chapter 3 developed the heterogeneous model for a single country. The most significant
result of the heterogeneous model for a single country is that the revenues under input and
output regulation schemes are not equal. The analysis finds that output regulation will
generate higher revenues relative to input regulation. These results strongly suggest that
for a single country, an output regulation management scheme is recommended. Although
this result has important implications for resource management in general, it has limited
specific policy implications for the PNA case with a coalition of seven countries.
Applying the model to a more PNA relevant two-country setting in Chapter 4 finds
that although output regulation yields higher revenue to countries, the harvest tagets
for output regulation may not be reached. This implies that under the assumptions
made in this study, output regulation may not be supportable. One key assumption is
the constant cost of fishing over different countries. If the costs of fishing over different
member countries is the same, then the PNA may be better off retaining the VDS.
However, if the cost of fishing over different countries are significantly different, then
output based quota regulation could be supportable. In this case a switch to output
regulation would be recommended given the higher revenue levels that are possible.
A serious issue for the PNA is the prevalence of illegal and unreported fishing (IUU).
The Pacific countries are actively working to improve monitoring and surveillance, how-
ever the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA 2016b) report suggests that the majority of IUU
activities in the Pacific are by fishing vessels that are licensed to operate in the Pa-
cific region. This has important implications for the VDS as this suggests that stronger
measures are required to improve monitoring of fishing vessels and their catch levels. If
fishing vessels can continue to fish illegally or under report catch sizes, then a switch to
harvest based licenses will not be successful. On the other hand if appropriate monitoring
measures are taken, a switch to output regulation would impact rent for fishing vessels
negatively. This may increase the incentives to fish illegally instead of buying licenses.
In this case monitoring becomes even more important. Countries may consider setting
aside revenues from licenses to combat IUU fishing.
One implication from Chapter 4 is that the PNA should set modest harvest targets,
and consider a safety margin for the number of licenses that it sells. The analysis suggest
that the conditions required for the a fishery manager to hit the exact harvest targets
are very specific, and hence unlikely to occur. This implies that it is more likely that the
harvest targets set by the PNA are either not met, or they are exceeded. Furthermore,
the analysis suggests that this experience is likely to be different for each of the countries.
This reflects the real world experience for some PNA countries that are unable to sell
123
all of their licenses, while other have excess demand for their licenses and therefore have
incentive to sell more licenses than they are allocated. This experience suggests the
PNA should examine current licenses sales arrangements and pricing mechanisms to see
if improvements can be made to ensure that at all licenses can be sold. Although licenses
can be traded among countries, this does not adress the underlying cause of this demand
discrepancy.
The PNA is a coalition of eight countries, and so a theoretical analysis based on the
methodology outlined in this study will be very complicated. In addition to this, licenses
are sold using auctions which are complex and notoriously difficult to correctly implement.
One approach may be to apply empirical licenses sales data to examine fishing vessels
incentives within the theoretical framework provided in this study, to examine if pricing
mechanisms can be modified to improve license sales.
Together the results from Chapter 3 and 4 suggests that selling a single licenses giving
vessels access to all countries would greatly simplify the management of the fishery and
yield higher income levels. However, these models are not ideal for examining this issue
because they do not consider the mechanism used to share the revenue, as well as the
stability of the revenue stream over time. In Chapter 5, I compare the returns from selling
a single global license relative to individual local licenses by developing a revenue sharing
mechanism that can incorporate both approaches. The result show that a single license
yields not only yields greater revenue levels, but also a more stable revenue stream over
time.
One of the key benefits of individual licenses specific to each country is that each
country retains control of fishing license sales. Not only does this insulate revenue streams
between members but more importantly it gives countries control over the amount of
fishing conducted in each EEZ. The primary benefit of full cooperation demonstrated
in the analysis is the stability in the revenue stream over time, even for countries with
highly volatile stock shares from year to year. Although it was not shown in this study,
the market power gains from full cooperation is likely to also be significant. Smaller
countries who are more vulnerable to volatile stock shares because of their lower stock
endowment may be the countries who can benefit the most from full cooperation. Larger
countries on the other hand may not be as vulnerable to revenue fluctuations given their
larger endowments. The deciding point for political buy in for these larger countries will
be the degree of improvement of revenue from full cooperation, and whether this will
overcome the loss of control over fishing effort within their individual EEZ.
One important consideration is how to implement a single license system. Given
the scale of the PNA and the fact that the two approaches are very similar, gradual
implementation may be a prudent approach. Firstly, if the benefits are primarily to
smaller countries, an initial step in implementation may be for smaller countries to sell a
single license as a sub-coalition. This would give them greater market power relative to
selling individually, while leaving the larger countries to continue with the local licensing.
The coalition as a whole can be insulated from any unexpected issues which may arise.
One possible problem with this is that forming a sub-coalition may cause stability issues
within the PNA. Another possible intermediate step is to distribute the shares as licenses
rather than revenue. This is technically equivalent to distributing revenue shares because
theoretically the prices will be all the same. However, this would give countries control
of their own finances and will not require the PNA to set up a central sale and finance
facility.
One potential benefit of a single common license for all countries may be that it can
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serve as a catalyst for joint action on illegal fishing. The PNA members countries EEZ
are very large, and the members do not have sufficient resources to monitor and patrol
their waters. With a joint selling facility, countries may find it easier to contribute to a
regional fund to combat the illegal fishing problem.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
A key aim of the PNA countries is to ensure the future health of the fishery, while maxi-
mizing the returns from this important resource. This thesis is an attempt to contribute
to this effort by examining developing models tailored specifically towards answering two
key questions. The first question is whether a switch to output regulation from the
current input regulation management scheme is justified. The standard model used to
analyze fisheries management problems in the literature cannot identify any differences
between the two management approaches as it predicts that harvest and revenue under
both management schemes are identical. I introduce heterogeneity of fishing vessels into
the standard textbook model for fisheries, which allows for distinction between the two
models. The second question asks whether a single license for the entire coalition could be
a superior approach to license sales as compared the current practice of members selling
country specific licenses.
In Chapter 3 I develop the model for a single fishery. I show that in this single coun-
try case, revenue from output regulation is always higher relative to input regulation. In
Chapter 4, I extend this model to a two country case. Under ideal conditions, output
regulation is still predicted to yield higher income levels. However, in this multi-country
setting each fishing vessel has to choose which country to buy licenses from. This addi-
tional dynamic reveals that without the assumption of perfect information for the fishery
manager, achieving the target harvest and stock levels set by the manager can be very
difficult. A key consideration is the methods used to set the prices. Together these two
cases suggests that selling a single licenses would greatly simplify the management of the
fishery. However, a key consideration is the mechanism used to share the revenue as well
as the stability of the revenue stream over time.
In Chapter 5, I compare the returns from selling a single global license relative to
individual local licenses by developing a revenue sharing mechanism that can incorporates
both approaches. The result show that a single license yields not only yields greater
revenue levels, but also a more stable revenue stream over time.
There are three general implications from this study. First, a clear recommendation for
a switch to harvest based licenses from the VDS may not be relevant. Output regulation
for a single country setting will always yield higher revenue levels for the fishery manager
selling license to fishing vessels. However, this result is not a straightforward extension
to the multi-country setting. Assuming costs of fishing are constant across countries,
output regulation may not be supportable. This implies that some countries may not
be able to sell all of their licenses, and other countries might be pressured to sell more.
Second, the results strongly suggest consideration of a single license that gives fishing
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vessels access to all countries. A single license will yield consistent and higher revenue
streams over time. Such a case would be equivalent to a single country, and so output
regulation over the VDS is clearly recommended and would yield higher income levels.
The final implication is that more research needs to conducted to validate these results and
examine conditions necessary to support these results. A logical next step is the analysis
of empirical data within the framework provided in this study. One key issue to address is
whether monitoring systems have improved enough to a level where harvest from fishing
vessels can be correctly measured. Without this prerequisite, output regulation will not
work.
The PNA and the VDS is a unique example of a multilateral agreement for cooperative
management of a dynamic resource that has been successful. This dissertation is an
attempt to provide insight into some issues that could build on this success, to improve
the income levels from this resource to the PNA members. At the very least, it is the
authors hope that it demonstrates how complex this problem is, and provoked thought
and discussion about these issues.
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